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I. Chapter: Some Conceptual Problems of  Law 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systematic monographs on the theory of law traditionally begin with the exposition of the 
concept of law, then each chapter unfolds the key components in the concept of law. This 
tradition can be called proper because of the needs of the didactic presentation, and it will be 
fundamentally followed here too. However, on the basis of our general social theory background 
(see Luhmann 1984; Pokol 1990) in the framework of which we believe all activities performed 
en masse and aimed at a function of social size can be grasped as a system, subsequently the 
adequate exposition of the concept of law can cover nothing but the concept of the legal system. 
Once the concept of the legal system has been expounded, it is possible, complying with 
traditional legal thought, to sum up the concept of the less precise “law”, which is actually a 
notionally looser repetition of the concept of the legal system. 
 
 
 
1. The nature of social reality: the intellectual reality 
 
The legal system is one of the functional subsystems of society just as science, politics, mass 
communication, health care, etc. represent such a subsystem. Therefore, first the “operating 
material” of society must be clarified, which represents the material of each social subsystem, 
separated from the material of natural reality beyond society (or to put it evolutionarily: below 
social reality). And after that we can near to the internal components of the legal system. 
 
Living under the conditions of natural reality we are inclined to grasp social phenomena 
interwoven with and focusing on the objects of physical reality. For example, to identify a city, a 
people with its geographical surroundings, and in general even unconsciously to tie the reality of 
the observed social phenomenon to physical and biological circumstances. E.g., the museum is 
represented by its characteristic building, the university by the platform and the lecture hall. 
However, the reality of social phenomena is only built on these, and the more developed level the 
operation of society reaches, the more it uses the circumstances of physical and biological 
existence as a precondition, and unfolds the specific material of social reality. And this represents 
the peculiar existence of intellectual connections, which are maintained in the communication 
among people, and are made lasting in norms, concepts and the symbols expressing them. 
 
During the short socialisation after their birth, which is getting gradually longer at higher level of 
social development, human beings with consciousness acquire the concepts, terms dividing 
natural and social reality and the operations necessary for handling these created by earlier 
generations. Commonly used concepts provide social reality with stable division subsequently the 
intellectual softness of concepts disappear and the option of different division with different 
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concepts does not even emerge. This is how, in spite of the intellectual structure of social reality 
established by means of concepts, categories, norms, the notion of social reality “with physical 
solidity” and its interpretation as the extension of natural reality comes into being. Especially 
under the circumstances of simple societies evolves the notion that social phenomena, norms are 
created for eternity just as the laws of natural causality. Under the conditions of modern society, 
however, the “created” character of social institutions and their continuous re-creation 
mechanisms become increasingly visible, and this makes the intellectual build-up of social reality 
increasingly apparent to the eye. Thus the thesis on the “objective” existence of social formations 
independent of communicative practice is false, also false is to deny the independence of these 
formations of individual notional and linguistic aspects. The degree of the existential relevance of 
social formations between these two extremes can be determined always on the grounds of a 
particular examination. 
 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century this development led, especially in the German science, to 
separating specific social reality from natural reality, and grasping social reality as intellectual 
reality. This scientific development following Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, then Alfred Schütz 
became accepted in social theory thought. 
 
 
 
2. The functional subsystems of society as intellectual systems 
 
 
With social development social communities cannot properly solve basic functions necessary for 
their survival unless activities performed en masse aimed at each function are functionally 
separated. To mention the most important one only reference should be made to the fact that, for 
example, the need for a kind of community administration, protection, maintenance of order, each 
community demands some kind of state-political activity, or likewise occurring conflicts require 
an institution of administration of justice among people, or, for example, newcomers every time 
need to be socialised, and this calls for some kind of education, and we could enumerate the basic 
functions of society, which each community has to solve somehow to be able to survive. 
 
At a rudimentary level these functions are solved either within the family, or in neighbourhood 
relations, or in the totality of a village without special social institutions, but the higher level a 
society‟s development reaches, and the more overall and impersonal society the people of a 
village live in, the greater the role of independent functional subsystems is in implementing these 
functions. Thus we can see the functional separation of politics, law, science, economy, 
education, health care in the course of history, and highly developed societies cannot survive 
unless through the independent operation of these subsystems and balanced relations among 
them. 
 
With this functional separation the intellectual build-up is more and more shaped by the legal 
subsystem, political subsystem, scientific system etc. representing independent intellectual 
subsystems. It must be further noted that with social development social subsystems specialised 
for each social basic function not only split and unfold their internal intellectual connections, but 
they are more and more professionalised and through that rise above the world of everyday life 
(see Pokol 1990). Only through lengthy socialisation, profession like specialisation does a single 
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person get to the stage where he or she is able to pursue activity in a professional subsystem, and 
the development of the entire society is ensured by its basic functions fulfilled by 
professionalised lawyers, politicians, entrepreneurs, writers, artists, physicians, etc. in the 
subsystems that have risen above everyday life‟s lay activities. 
 
The keeping of a functional subsystem separately from the others (and the organisations of 
everyday life) is ensured by it processing the events of reality through a value dual of its own and 
typical only of it (see Luhmann 1984:34-35). This specific value dual (or, in other words binary 
code) allows that the functional subsystem could formulate connections and things to do from the 
side of the social function fulfilled by the given subsystem. For example, science processes reality 
in terms of the value dual: true/false, economy in that of profitable/non-profitable, democratic 
politics in that of “taking over government/going into opposition”, law in that lawful/unlawful. 
The establishment of the concepts, patterns of thought, connections in each subsystem is 
determined by its own value dual, and by that they allow reality being processed in a peculiar 
segment. Thus the intellectual build-up of society are composed of intellectual subsystems 
operating in conformity with each basic function, and the concepts, patterns of thought created in 
each professional subsystem are shifted through mediation, in a simplified form, to everyday life 
as part of general education thus improving everyday thought. All this allows that more 
complicated societies are able to survive, contrary to the level of social organisation which is 
suitable only for the maintenance of a simple society, in which all functions are fulfilled by 
diffusely interwoven social activities and their institutions. E.g., the royal court in the Middle 
Ages was the institution of military, judicial, religious, economy controlling, etc. activities 
together, or a monastery was the common institution of religious, economic, educational, 
scientific, etc. activities, and this did not allow each activity being functionally differentiated. 
Simpler social formations and the elementary fulfilment of functions are yet possible but they are 
not suitable for attaining the level of complex social institutions. 
 
So while researching modern societies we need to deal with functionally separated intellectual 
systems which unfold their own logic pursuant to their value dual, and on this basis are able to 
ensure the operation of society at a higher level. 
 
 
 
3. Law as an intellectual system 
 
 
Law processes reality to avoid conflicts among the members and organisations of society and 
to resolve them should they occur in the segment of lawful/unlawful, and as a result of that 
provides the members of society with normative points of reference for behaviour in relations 
among themselves. How one ought to behave him or herself in particular situations; what a 
person acting in particular situations may and may not do; and if he or she does not do that, 
then public authorities, in the last resort applying force against him/her, will bind 
consequences (sanctions) to the injury of the norm of behaviour. Thus law in its most general 
formulation represents norms of behaviour supported by public force. 
 
In a general formulation law can be described as a norm, but it must be made clear that it is 
necessary to ensure that the relation among norms should be uncontradicted to avoid and 
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resolve conflicts in the entire society. That is, legal norms can effectively operate as a system 
of norms established by means of taking each other into consideration. The development of 
law reveals that, e.g., from the early, medieval phase of European development in several 
hundreds of years up to the 1800‟s the legal norms of each country became a more and more 
regular system separated into internal branches of law, more specifically into legal institutions 
supplementing each other. 
 
The necessity of uncontradictness grows in law simultaneously with the development of 
society, and the complicated operation of complex societies is possible only at a high level of 
uncontradictness. This is what the systematic nature of legal norms can ensure. With 
increasingly more frequent social relations and increasingly more intense contacts among 
millions and millions of people and organisations, contrary to the unchanged relations in 
minor communities living in small villages at an earlier level of the development of society, 
for example, only increasingly complicated legal systems allow systematic legal norms. While 
in Europe in the Middle Ages, e.g., it was only judges who represented the administration of 
justice, who for a long time were not even trained lawyers, and it was from their decisions that 
the law of the given country was consolidated for centuries as common law, in later centuries 
conscious lawmaking separated from judicial administration of justice and rose above it, first 
by creating codices of common law, then by framing more and more consciously drafted new 
codices; simultaneously, jurisprudence appeared markedly to work out exact legal concepts. 
During the Enlightenment it was already the independent legislation, judicial application of 
law subject to statutes and jurisprudence working out legal doctrines, concepts together that 
represented the system of law. 
 
Subsequently the system of legal norms as an intellectual system has been able to operate as 
the common product of three layers of law in the modern societies of the recent centuries. The 
layer of the text shaped in the processes of legislation, the law dogmatics layer of jurists 
working out the intellectual connections among concepts, categories, distinctions in legal 
texts, and finally the layer of case law of judges applying-specifying law to specific cases 
constitute the three layers of the legal system traditionally as it developed by the 1800‟s. 
 
The proportions among these three layers of law may be different in each legal system. For 
example, the English legal system, which has developed mostly on the basis of judicial case 
law – and the parliamentary statutes that have gained ground since the second half of the 
1800‟s, apply the case based detailed regulation technique and does not set forth abstract 
norms as the legal systems on the Continent – has not constructed a developed legal dogmatics 
layer, but it is just owing to the detailed, particular way of regulation that judicial case law is 
not separated dramatically from the intellectual level of the layer of the texts of statutes (see 
Dawson 1968). Here it is judicial precedents basically tailored to cases, on the one hand, and 
particular and detailed statutory provisions also tailored to cases, on the other hand, that 
represent law being the two halves of a single layer of law. Although it should be indicated 
that a certain set of law dogmatics concepts does exist even in the English legal system, but it 
is not so pervasive there as in the abstract law of codices on the Continent. 
 
In the legal systems of the Continent, however, division into three layers of law appears 
markedly, and it can be said that the stronger the role of law dogmatics is in a legal system – 
and thus abstract codex law prevails in it – the more necessary it is to supplement it with 
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judicial case law. The clearest example for that is German law, and the legal systems including 
the Hungarian that developed under its influence well show the division of the legal system 
into three layers of law. In this solution the intellectual definition of legal norms heavily shifts 
from the legislator to the circles of jurisprudence, and parliamentary politicians can bind only 
a few definitions to the abstract codex law drafted by them when accepting the wording of 
statutes. However, on the other hand judges receive open norms, and they have a great 
freedom in shaping case law in the framework of the provisions of the abstract text. That is, in 
this arrangement the focal point is shifted from the parliamentary politics, and the juristic 
circles and the judiciary will be given a greater role in this. It is, however, undoubted that thus 
law is given more emphatically into the hand of professional lawyers, while in the aforesaid 
English solution beside lawyers parliamentary politicians also have a significant role in 
determining law. 
 
If we confront English law with Continental law, then we can also see that while the English 
legal norms going into details represent mostly norms with the accuracy of rules for the actors 
in particular situations, the Continental legal systems based on abstract legal codices provide 
guidance for behaviour to be followed in particular situations only at the level of legal theory. 
Only the supplementary layer of law of the specifying judicial case law will show what is 
lawful in the given situation and whose action is supported by the law with as well public 
force. That is, contrary to English law with accurate rules, it is the abstract legal theory 
normative material and the judicial case law specifying it together that represent the 
alternative in Continental legal systems, and the two different solutions can be formulated as 
two answers given to the question of regulatory necessities in modern societies. 
 
Alongside these traditional layers of law another layer of law has appeared in the past half 
century in the legal system of several countries, and its appearance has restructured to some 
extent even the traditional layers of law. This is the layer of basic constitutional rights, and it 
appears as an independent layer of law only where constitutional court jurisdiction evolves 
beside written law. In the beginning it was typical only of the United States from the 
beginning of the 1800‟s, then from the 1950‟s it appeared continuously in several European 
countries, and in the wave of democratisation in 1989 in Central-Eastern Europe the new 
constitutional court jurisdiction was introduced in this region too. 
 
Constitutional rights appeared first as human rights in the ideological fight against feudalism, 
formulating various political, humanitarian demands, and were included in state constitutions 
in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. When constitutional court jurisdiction based on them began, and 
justices started to compare particular statutory provisions with them, examining their possible 
unconstitutionality, then it became obvious that as an abstract demand basic rights can control 
public decisions, but when the intention is to decide particular rights in cases with them, then 
each basic right stimulates to move toward different decisional directions opposing each other. 
That is, at the level of cases these basic rights are often contradictory, and can be applied by 
restraining some of them and giving priority to others. However, if it is other justices that 
decide the case, and give priority to other basic rights, then they will reach just the contrary 
result, and subsequently an unpredictable constitutional court jurisdiction will control law. As 
it is the individual justice‟s hierarchy of values that will determine which rights he deems prior 
to the others, and which to be pushed in the background. 
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In spite of this problem, if the layer of basic constitutional rights are directed only at 
legislation and lawmaking and this layer of law controls the selection of one of the alternatives 
only in this respect, then with several years‟ constitutional court decision material basic rights 
can be provided with more or less cleared decisional points of references, and with a 
consistent system of viewpoints (tests, internal measures) contradictions among them can be 
eliminated. Of course, only in the event that the public opinion of the underlying legal circles 
puts pressure on constitutional court justices to attain consistent adherence to the elaborated 
viewpoint system. Then basic constitutional rights and basic constitutional principles 
discerned in the constitution will determine lawmaking “from above”, by extending the most 
abstract normative points of reference, and will not allow that statutory provisions are pushed 
into directions which are possibly accepted by the majority of the empirical public will but 
come into conflict with longer term civilisation requirements. 
 
The problem is greater when the abstract and contradictory basic constitutional rights and 
principles begin to push out legal dogmatics activity in each branch of law working with 
traditional case law attitude, and in its place formulations of concepts for each branch of law 
deduced from the abstract basic rights/fundamental principles come into existence. This 
happened once in the history of law in the 1700‟s and the beginning of the 1800‟s, when the 
intention was to deduce evolving regulations and concepts for the branches of law from 
intellectual law and natural law principles. This legal argument and thought meant for 
“eternity” was not able to regulate the rapidly changing conditions of a complex society, 
subsequently by the mid of the 1800‟s this method was no longer applied, but in recent years 
the exaggerations of constitutional court jurisdiction and “constitutionalisation” have partly 
revived these attempts in certain circles of lawyers. 
 
The problem is even greater when constitutional rights begin to produce their effect directly on 
judicial application of law, possibly the relevant statutory provisions can be struck down as 
unconstitutional by referring to some basic right, and decision can be reached directly on the 
grounds of basic rights. For some years the administration of justice in the United States 
shifted in this direction from the mid 1950‟s, but due to the problems that arose by the 1970‟s 
it was radically cut back. 
 
Nevertheless, if constitutional rights have an impact on the legislation, then they can be 
accepted as a new layer of law placed above the traditional three layers of law. In most of the 
countries where constitutional court jurisdiction has appeared, this is typical. 
 
 The main difference between basic constitutional rights and principles and the basic principles 
for each branch of law abstracted from the rules of each branch of law is that the latter 
constitute an uncontradicted unit, actually they contain the abstract intellectual order of the 
particular rules of the branches of law in a consolidated form. Contrary to that, basic 
constitutional rights and principles are not able to constitute an uncontradicted system even if 
with internal tests/measures they might be as well specified by the constitutional court justices 
of some legal systems. E.g., the taking away of the life of the embryo allowing abortion can be 
never reconciled with the mother‟s right to have disposal over her own body, the right to 
develop her personality, if she intends to get rid of the unwanted pregnancy through abortion. 
Regarding such contradictions it will be always the constitutional court justices‟ values that 
decide, and other justices‟ other hierarchy of values will take decisions pertaining to this in 
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other directions, but it will not be possible to give a final answer in this basic rights conflict in 
a satisfactory manner. And not so much apparently though, in each basic rights conflict this 
situation will arise.  
 
 
 
4. The concept of the legal system 
 
 
From the above description it can be seen that law is an intellectual system, which contains the 
norms – basic rights, basic constitutional principles, principles for each branch of law, 
statutory and order rules, judicial case law norms – in the relations of the members and 
organisations of society in the last resort supported by public force. It is in various proportion 
that the legal system of each country is divided in the system of its intellectual construction 
into the layer of the text, the layer of legal dogmatics and the layer of judicial case law, and 
allows the development of the layer of basic constitutional rights above them. To ensure 
predictable administration of justice under the conditions of complex societies it is necessary 
to establish certain optimal proportions with regard to the weight of each layer of law. Thus a 
particular way how a legal dogmatics layer exerts its effect and through that the pushing of 
statutory provisions to a more abstract domain, for the sake of regularity and flexibility, seems 
to be a modernisation requirement. To a certain extent, even English law has been shifted in 
this direction in recent decades, although it does not reach the level at which Continental legal 
systems are built on legal dogmatics. In the same way, the abstract codex law built on legal 
dogmatics would not be able to provide predictable administration of justice without the 
specification of judicial case law; and the growth of the role of judicial case law in most 
Continental legal systems has indeed become apparent in the past decades (see 
MacCormick/Summers 1991; 1997). Finally, basic constitutional rights and principles as a 
new layer of law built above the traditional layers of law can work optimally only on condition 
that their effect is directed at the legislation, and they do not extend to reach judicial 
application of law. In this event, fundamentally it does not threaten the traditional layers of 
law and predictable legal dogmatics specifications, but ensures the incorporation of longer 
term civilisation requirements into the law through controlling lawmaking. 
 
 
 
 
5. The concept of law 
 
 
In a more precise formulation, i.e., formulating it at the level of social sciences, law can be 
grasped as a legal system, but following the juristic tradition the concept of law can be defined 
in a looser form too by gathering the conceptual elements from the above analysis. Law is, 
thus, the system of norms and the legal dogmatics concepts used by them, which are at the 
most comprehensive level determined by the basic constitutional rights and principles and the 
constitutional court justices making their decisions on the grounds of them, are made under 
this framework by the legislators and other lawmaking bodies pursuant to the connections 
among legal dogmatics concepts, and are specified by high courts, especially supreme court 
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justices, making their decisions on the basis of them by means of case law, and the judicial 
and authoritative decisions made in cases based on them may be implemented in the last 
resort also by public force. 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Chaptetr: The Concept of the Multi-Layered Legal System 
 
 
If one decides to make a comparative analysis of the various modern legal systems, one will 
inevitably encounter the following phenomenon; namely, that the very same component which 
one finds in the legal systems of different countries is of varying importance; in certain countries 
it plays a major role, while in others it is much less important.  Such a comparative study which 
examines components of several different countries will reach a far more comprehensive result 
than research which only focuses on a single legal system.  Therefore, an attempt to create an 
overall legal concept will be more precise if it is based on a comparative study of the various 
legal systems of the present, and further compared with the opposing influential legal theories of 
the last centuries. The result of such a comparison will show that these legal theories restrict the 
actually existing multi-layered legal systems.  This can be easily integrated into an overall theory 
of law, which is the aim of this brief study. 
 
 
 
1. Restricting legal theories and multi-layered legal concepts 
 
 
If one examines the development  of the legal theories of the past two-hundred years, one 
observes the formulation of certain opposing legal concepts which identified law with 
phenomena that determined the rulings of court.  Montesquieu‟s  surprising statement, which 
declared that the judge is the mere mouthpiece of law, appeared in numerous tendencies of legal 
theory in the last two-hundred years.  First, it was the French “école de l‟exegese” in the first half 
of the 19
th
 century; later on it appeared in German legal theories by Julius Bergbohm and, some 
time later, by Hans Kelsen. Subsequently it made its appearance  in the theories of the  Soviets.   
 
The legal concept which identified law with the text of the past decisions made by state bodies 
was opposed by the leading German legal concept of the 19
th
 century, namely the pandectist 
jurisprudence,  known  under several designations, such as “Begriffsjurisprudenz” or “jurisdiction 
built on legal-doctrines”, according to the terminology of its critics.  This concept defined law as 
a “touched up”, refined system of legal-terms.  Its main representatives, Georg Puchta and 
Bernhard Windscheid, for instance, saw the determination of the judicial decisions through the 
hierarchical order of the legal terms, and  when the first draft of the German BGB (civil code) 
was completed with the participation of Windschied in 1884, the practicing judges of the time 
labeled it a “monstrosity of jurists” (Fikentscher 1975; Larenz 1979).   It is impossible to deal 
with everyday cases, with all their tiny divergences, if legislation is based upon an abstract 
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system of legal terms - this was the opinion of the practicing judges. 
 
This clarity of legal notions and the identification of law with the clear-cut system of legal terms 
appeared in the United States in the 1870‟s, almost contemporaneously with Windscheid‟s works, 
through the participation of Christopher Columbus Langdell, the dean of the Faculty of Law of 
Harvard University (Duxbury 1991; Grey 1996).  It remained the leading tendency of the 
American legal practice and influenced works on legal science for the next several decades.  An 
opposing tendency emerged which defined law as the collection of all judicial decisions.  In 
Germany, it was supported by the members of the so-called  School of Free Law, while in the 
United States its representatives were the exponents of the trend of “legal realism”. 
 
From time to time, although a few influential jurists appeared who endeavored to include the 
multiple layers of law in their legal concepts, although the authority of the ruling tendency 
always oppressed these random attempts.  The authors of multi-layer legal concepts therefore 
abandoned their ideas, and they too adopted the mainstream direction.  The German Carl 
Friedrich von Savigny can be mentioned, for instance, who, in his earlier works wrote about legal 
institutions and legal dogmatics which analyze them and formulate general rules.  Later on, 
however, influenced by Georg Puchta himself, he also shifted his attention towards a legal 
concept built on legal terms in spite of being one of the main supporters of the idea of a school of 
legal history.  Another example is Francois Gény who, at the end of the 19
th
 century in France, 
opposed textual positivism propagated by the “école de l‟exegese”, and emphasized the 
importance of the multiple components of law.  In 1921 in the United States, Benjamin Cardozo 
emphasized the role of the multi-layered legal components in his book  “The Nature of the 
Juridical Process” (Cardozo 1921).  Later on, however, he adopted the views of the legal realists, 
who emphasized  the central role of the rulings of the court. 
 
Thus, these theories define law as a “textual layer”, “legal dogmatic layer”, and “a layer of judge-
made law”, though it must be said that these theories only recognized one of the three layers as 
law at a time, and sometimes the coming into existence of  one of these theories was in reaction 
to another.   
 
Another layer of the law was emphasized by an emerging legal theory in the United States in the 
1960‟s, which  can be identified with the name of Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin 1977).  This theory 
found the essence of law in the fundamental constitutional rights and basic constitutional 
principles.  Dworkin‟s thesis was set out in his book “Taking Rights Seriously”, though his legal 
theories are more clearly expressed if we paraphrase the title as “only basic rights should be taken 
seriously!”.  In the United States from the 1960‟s the extension of the judicial process based 
directly on the constitution  led to the relegation of simple laws to the background while, in 
parallel, the doctrinal conceptual system of certain legal branches also lost its importance. These 
developments, which began in the United States, have emerged in several other countries in the 
past years, while in the U.S. they fell into the background (Posner 1990; Grey 1996).     
  
The textual layer, the doctrinal layer, the layer of judge-made law and, above all, the layer of 
fundamental constitutional rights - these notions summarize the most influential legal theories of 
the last two-hundred years.  How is one to create an overall theory, a multi-layered legal concept 
out of these opposing legal concepts? 
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2. The layers of the law 
 
 
If one examines the development of the modern legal systems, a striking feature of its progressive 
tendency is that the rules of law tended to take the form of decisions of the sovereign power, and 
that judicial decisions had to be made according to the texts of the state power.  Based on the 
medieval  continental European jurisdictions, which already  possessed collections of customary 
laws,  the legal practice that  can be always amended by the central state power was rapidly 
accomplished with the influence of the absolutist rulers of the 1600‟s (Caenegem 1980).  Later 
on, with the sovereign power‟s growing democratisation and the development of  
parliamentarism, it was only the place of making the final decisions that shifted from the royal 
authority to the parliaments.  With this progress, law became the collection of the decisions of the 
sovereign power, but it primarily became a collection of legislated texts in countries with a 
democratic political system.  In England and in countries influenced by England‟s common law 
system, however, it was attenuated by allowing the high courts to create judge-made law.  
 
With the adoption of a multi-party system and within the sphere of mass-media based on freedom 
of speech, the parliament became the culminating point of the society‟s political common will; so 
the law that appeared in legislative texts more or less depended on the will and majority opinions 
of society.  The court decisions that depend on legislation fulfill society‟s self-governing nature: 
society itself decides when  the judges apply these fixed laws in each individual case and dispute. 
Because law fundamentally appears in legislative texts and is a result of a democratic decision of 
the state power, it tends to express the empirical common will of society.   
 
When textual positivism identifies law with legislative texts, it emphasizes an important aspect, 
but it also commits two fundamental mistakes.  One of these concerns the following: in the 
complex and intricate social context, thousands and thousands of legal regulations have to be 
perpetually created if they are to be consistent.  If this is not done properly, they may end up 
canceling each other‟s effects through contradictory content.  It might be well imagined what sort 
of  legal chaos would result on the level of judicial case-law.  It is only a carefully prearranged 
system of legal concepts that can provide harmony amongst the many thousands of legal 
regulations.  Furthermore, it is the unified application of these concepts in many legal rules that 
can maintain this intellectual systemic quality and consistency in a heightened form.  Thus 
without a legal dogmatic layer, the layer of legal texts cannot function.  Overlooking  this fact is 
one of the errors of textual positivism.   
 
The other source of error is the failure to take into account the openness of  the legal regulations.  
It is very typical of code-like  laws to use overall, rather general notions and regulations, which 
renders divergence possible in its application.  This could result in several different judicial 
decisions in a country in similar or even identical cases, which would easily create legal chaos.  
Thus without a Supreme Courts‟ use of concretizing precedents, the imprecise legal regulations 
could not properly function. (For the growing role of the precedents in the contemporary legal 
systems see MacCormick/Summers 1997). 
 
Textual positivism, a concept of law built on  legal dogmatics and the concept of judge-made law 
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can be integrated into a multi-layer legal concept, if their striving for absoluteness is set aside.  
The textual layer of law, that can function as a consistent intellectual organization due to its 
prearranged doctrinal conceptual system, is connected to a democratic political common will, and 
among the existence of many thousands of legal provisions, it keeps the functioning of law in 
consistent order.  The openness of the regulations  that the texts of laws, that are formed from a 
legal-dogmatic point of view, contain, are counterbalanced by the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Courts. It is a jurisdiction built on precedent, and together with the doctrinally formed texts of 
laws, it renders a unified law for each country.   
 
The importance and function of the aforementioned three layers of law can be easily observed in 
continental European legal systems, as well as those built on the common-law system, though in 
different proportions.  It can be stated, that the more abstract the codified law gets in a legal 
system, the more inevitable it becomes to concretize the doctrinal categories, and to shape the 
judicial processes accordingly.  Furthermore, the loose regulations that the codes contain have to 
be concretized and updated with the current judicial precedents.  In contrast, the more specific 
and concrete the legislative provisions, the less necessary it becomes to have a doctrinal layer or a 
concretizing body of  judicial precedents.  Accordingly, judicial precedent would instead function 
as a method of  independent regulation, and not as a concretizing legal layer.  The English legal 
system can be characterized as such a system, while the legislation of the United States started to 
shift in the last century towards that of the continental European countries‟ codified legal system 
and, compared to the English system, a stronger legal-dogmatic categorical system was 
established in certain fields of law (Dawson 1968).  However, among the continental European  
countries‟ legal systems,  a visible difference can be observed concerning  the importance of each  
of the three legal-layers;  while in the German legal system and in the other continental legal 
systems  influenced by it,  the doctrinal layer is of high importance, it is much less so in the 
French legal system. 
 
There is a divergence amongst the continental legal systems with regard to the development of 
the layer of judicial precedent.  Although its significance seems to be increasing everywhere in 
the course of the  last few decades, it is mostly in the Scandinavian countries and Germany where 
it is of marked importance, while in the southern-European countries and France it is still not so 
highly emphasized (see Alexy/Dreier 1997; La Torre/Taruffo 1997; Peczenik/Bergholz 1997). 
Among the post-socialist countries, it is in Hungary and Poland that a visible development can be 
observed concerning the importance of the aforementioned layer of judicial precedents 
(Wróblevski 1991).  Besides the mere textual layer of official regulations,  the layers of doctrine 
and judicial precedent are also an essential part of the legal systems of these countries.  In 
Hungary, the empirical statistics which analyze the rulings of the courts prove that the position 
taken by the Courts is based on the texts of law, as well as on the interpretations of certain 
doctrinal notions, together with the precedents of the Supreme Court which provide solutions for 
some of the legal dilemmas which were left unsolved by the former legal regulations ( see Pokol, 
2000a; 2000b). 
 
The cooperation of these three layers of law is not recent; it can be observed in the legal history 
of the past centuries and, in some countries where a Constitutional Court was established, it was 
even accompanied by a layer of constitutional rights.  If we do not accept Ronald Dworkin‟s 
overemphasizing attitude on this field, and we attempt to integrate fundamental rights into an 
extensive legal concept, as a recently established legal layer, the following connections have to 
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be emphasized. 
 
As a starting point it has to be stressed that this recent legal layer may have a different impact on 
the three already existing layers within the legal systems of various countries.   Wherever the new 
legal layer comes into being with the establishment of a Constitutional Court, it inevitably 
influences the creation of the textual layer.  A judicial decision which is declared unconstitutional 
loses its validity - this is the sole influence of the layer of fundamental rights.  Its other important 
influence is due to the procedure of considering the essential normative basis of the previous 
constitutional decisions before issuing new judicial decisions.    
 
A third influence can be observed if the fundamental constitutional rights and their concretizing 
constitutional restrictions are included in each legal branch‟s doctrinal activity, and the doctrinal 
system of legal terms of  the criminal law, family law, labour law, etc.  is (also) altered according 
to the legal layer of fundamental rights.  If this is accomplished, the new legal layer, besides its 
effect on the textual layer, will have an influence on the doctrinal layer as well. 
 
Finally, a third influence is that of fundamental rights on certain court rulings; either through its 
inclusion in the analysis of judicial decisions - together with other evaluations, or through their 
exclusion - or relegating the relevant judicial decision itself to the background, and issuing a 
ruling based on fundamental constitutional rights.  If the latter occurs - as it did in the United 
States during the period of the activist Warren Court in the 1960‟s and 70‟s, then fundamental 
rights push all other legal layers into the background.  In most legal systems which have 
constitutional courts, the layer of fundamental rights only influences the layer of the legal text, 
and jurists also form their “de lege ferenda” suggestions that consider fundamental rights 
according to the legislation and not with the aim of influencing the judicial decisions. 
 
In this restricted solution the traditional cooperation of the three legal layers remains, and the 
fundamental constitutional rights only slightly modify its final outcome.  Aspects of 
righteousness, and influences that have a short-term pacifying effect on the empirical common 
will,  improve the functioning of the legal system.  
 
If the aforementioned ideal arrangement is established, the layer of legal texts, together with the 
layer of legal dogmatics and  that of judicial precedents and fundamental constitutional rights 
together provide a unified legal system.  This is the goal of the concept of a multi-layered legal 
system.  Besides defining the ideal  concept of law, it also points out the shortcomings of other 
legal concepts that strive for the absoluteness of one of the legal layers.   
 
 
 
 
3. The implications of the concept of the multi-layered legal system 
 
 
The broadening of the concept of law and the recognition of other legal layers engenders the 
necessity of reconsidering several legal phenomena.  In the following, we shall examine a few of 
these. 
 
 16 
(The definition of law)  One of the first aims of the necessary reconsideration has to be to 
redefine what law itself means.  In other words, if we include the doctrinal system as an 
inevitable part of the law then, accordingly, it has to be expressed within the definition of law 
itself.    
 
There is another aspect in which law differs from non-legal norms.  Namely, it produces an 
intellectual system, and after a certain stage of development this emphasizes the notions and 
categories that are used by legal norms from other notions of everyday-thinking. The only way to 
eliminate the (possible)  inconsistencies that might occur among the many thousands of legal 
norms is to deliberately create specific legal terms, expressions and classifications, and then 
systematically  use these when dealing with any legal norm in question.  Contrary to this, other 
non-legal, social norms rely on notions that are used in everyday-life, and the solutions based on 
these notions do not constitute a unified intellectual system.   
 
Taking all this into consideration, the definition of law can be given as the following: law is a 
system of norms and their terms that express regulations and prohibitions which, failing all else, 
is sustained by coercion of the state.   
 
(Legal dogmatics as a barrier of legislation)  The prearranged system of legal terms that the 
legal norms are based on also has an influence on the modifiable nature of certain legal norms.  
Namely, the modified norm has to fit the already existing unified intellectual system and, for 
instance, a new legal norm can not use a classification that would clash with the classifications 
used by the already existing legal norms.  For example, in the criminal law of most of the modern 
legal systems, the intentional character is separated from negligence when judging culpability - or 
rather these concepts are divided into different degrees.  If a new legal rule contained a new 
classification of guilt, regardless of the already existing ones, the numerous restrictions of the 
criminal code would simply collapse.  To replace a legal norm with a new one is only possible if 
it is doctrinally verified.  The emphasis of this connection sheds a different light on the ability to 
modify legislation and the role of legal dogmatics which ensures the law‟s intellectual unity.                
 
Often it is sufficient to include well-trained lawyers in the parliamentary apparatus and legislative 
committees in the ministries in order to verify the consequences of certain amendments.  But if a 
more significant amendment or a new enactment of the legislature is at stake, the consideration of 
the doctrinal questions should be done by a specialized legal experts in the relevant field.  This is 
especially so in the case of codified laws. 
 
Inasmuch as the politicians in parliaments often amend and interfere with laws which rely on a  
prearranged notional system, or rather establish new codes, and this does not affect the 
fundamentals of the legal-dogmatics, we have to hypothetically assume that there has to be a 
transformational-mediator sphere in existence between the legislation and the legal dogmatic 
sphere, that  somehow connects legislators following a political logic and the legal dogmatic 
sphere itself.   In order to verify this hypothesis, the following things have to be taken into 
consideration: the methods of codification, the political intentions of the parties, or rather the 
professional organizations of legislation.  As a result, the outlines of a legal-political sphere can 
be detected which, in some form or another, is present in every modern democracy, particularly 
in the case of the continental European countries.   
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On the one hand, this legal-political sphere exists as a part of the legal subsystem that is directed 
towards politics, and on the other hand, some institutions can be found as part of the political 
subsystem that are involved with issues of legislation.  Ideally, these two elements of the legal-
political organization adopt parts of the “de lege ferenda”-type  restrictions in a two-step 
transformational process, and in the course of a selected borrowing the political side gradually 
tables bills which were originally formed as part of a doctrinal activity,  according to the logic of 
politics (for instance the method of aspiring to maximize the number of votes).  
 
The  part of legal-politics that is established as a part of the legal subsystem, typically consists of 
bodies and assemblies of the various legal professions.   The conferences, programs, 
membership-meetings and publications of these bodies mostly emphasize proposals about 
amendments that  react to the recent social problems , and that were previously outlined and 
supervised from a doctrinal point of view and already published in some of the legal periodicals.  
Thus, a part of the numerous “de lege ferenda”-type propositions that the legal experts of 
universities and the members of the high courts etc. outlined only from a juridical point of view, 
become the object of a certain filtering process.  As a result, those propositions will come to the 
foreground that are the reactions on the current social problems.  At the same time, non-topical 
propositions that concern academic-scientific issues only excite attention in scientific circles and 
are the subject-matter of the legal periodicals, without having any influence on the functioning 
legal sphere. 
 
The other part of the legal-political sphere that is founded as part of politics, consists of the legal 
experts of the parties, the legal groups of the parliamentary party-factions, and of the groups of 
the jurists who are the members of the so-called “background-institutions” of the political parties, 
such as the political foundations and  party-schools.  Though the aspirations of the parties are 
mostly determined by the maximization of the votes ( and due to this they try to include motions 
in the party‟s program that are likely to enhance the number of votes), the adequacy of the 
programs inquires aspirations that are more or less workable.  On account of the latter reason, the 
legal experts of the parties can only choose from propositions concerning amendments that are 
adaptable from a legal-dogmatic point of view.   Although it becomes very important method to 
start looking for such motions among the lot that would fit the interest of a certain party the best, 
or rather to look out for those that would be against their interest the most.  The jurists of the 
parties mostly concentrate on those “de lege ferenda”-type regulative propositions that were 
already emphasized on the assemblies and conferences of the associations of the lawyers, and  the 
social consequences of which  were already stressed in relation to certain propositions.  Thus 
with a double transformation - despite the pushing of the pure legal-dogmatic point of view into 
the background and emphasizing the logic of politics - those regulatory models will appear in 
legislation, that do not violate the intellectual coherence of law.  The legal experts of 
parliamentary committees are continually on the watch for motions concerning amendments that 
would violate the established legal-dogmatic system.   
 
It is only this legal-politic sphere that mediates between law and politics, that can assure the 
proper   operation of legislation, and the intellectual systematic character of law.   
 
(The expansion of the circle of legal sources)  The inclusion of more legal layers into the 
concept of law requires the expansion of the circle of legal sources.  As the multi-layer legal 
concept can be best observed in the legal systems of the continental European countries, let us 
 18 
look at their legal sources. 
 
It is the state bodies that are in charge of the textual layer of law, and the sources of the textual 
layer are those forms of decision making, that contain the textual layer of law.  The most 
characteristic of these are the forms of decision making in the case of parliamentary acts, the 
forms of decision making of the governmental orders, the orders of the ministers, or rather the 
locally prevailing forms of decision making of the local authorities.   
 
The first outcome of these forms of decision making is a series of open legal norms, that can only 
be accurately interpreted according to the legal-dogmatic categories that the norms contain.   The 
reduction of the occurring disparate possibilities and the establishing of a more unified 
interpretation can be achieved with the consensus of the legal profession.  The employment of the 
accepted legal opinion in legal case-decisions, and - due to juridic decisions that refer to these - 
also the legal-dogmatic works that express legal consensus, all contain characteristics of legal 
source.  This is typical of Germany, for instance, where in the case of legal dilemmas that have to 
be decided by the Supreme Court, the judges often refer to works of certain jurists (Alexy/Dreier 
1991).  It is characteristic of numerous countries that when a decision has to be made about a 
legal dilemma, it is the commentaries of the law that they refer to, and not directly to the law as it 
applies to the case.   According to this - although on a comparatively small scale -, some 
systematizing legal-dogmatic works may also serve as a kind of a legal source in certain legal 
systems.   
 
The legal textual layer‟s regulations - even if it is amplified with the legal-dogmatic 
interpretations - still remain open, and the layer of the concretizing judicial precedents that 
supplements it and creates a further legal source, has to be perpetually observed by lawyers, if 
they want to know what they should expect in their cases.  These judge-made laws, that gained 
considerable importance in the legal systems of the continental European countries, were mostly 
created by the Supreme Courts of the countries in question, and the forms of decision making of 
these judicial forums function as a legal source. 
 
Finally, wherever a constitutional court is in existence, its concretizing decisions concerning 
fundamental constitutional  rights and basic principles also serve as a legal source.  These 
constitutional decisions have to be separated from the concretizing precedents that concern basic 
legal decisions, because the fundamental rights that these are based on are not systematized 
dogmatically, they are usually more abstract and compared to certain legal restrictions their 
openness is greater, or the fundamental rights contradict each other in some cases, respectively.  
This is one of the various reasons why, based on these, in the continental countries it is the 
constitutional court that decides in these cases, and their influence is reduced to legislation, 
furthermore, they do not directly affect the judicial decisions.  Naturally, there are great 
differences between the degree of influence that they have on a countries‟ legislation , and apart 
from most of the countries where the impact of fundamental rights and the decisions of the 
constitutional court (that serve as the interpretations of them) is restricted to the role of 
controlling legislation, in Germany they also influence certain judicial decisions.  In theory the 
judge, based upon the constitutional court decisions and  the constitutional basic rights, could 
simply set aside the given judicial provisions that should be applied under those circumstances 
and directly refer to these in a constitutional case, as it was achieved in “the rights revolution” in 
the United States in the 1960‟s (see Epp, 1998).  However, this did not become customary in 
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Europe.  In other respects, if this is not established, then it can result in the falling of the other 
legal layers to the background, and furthermore, in the course of the re-politicization of the law it 
can lead to the corrosion of the predictable judicial decisions - as it could be seen as one of the 
consequences of the “ rights revolution” in the United States. (For the politization of the law in 
the United States see Scheingold 1998). 
 
The existence of  these degrees show that the constitutional court-decisions would only be of full 
value as a legal source if they had direct influence on certain judicial decisions, though this only 
appears as an exception in the continental legal systems.  In most places their impact is narrowed 
down to the control of legislation, therefore their function as a kind of a legal source is limited. 
 
(Broadening the methods of statutory  interpretation)  Having included numerous other legal 
layers into the theory of law and the legal system, and the discovery of the determined  relations 
between them, influences the ways of legal interpretation as well.  Let us look at a few 
connections visible on this field. 
 
The recognition of the importance of the textual layer of law brings forth the recognition of the 
primary importance of grammatical interpretation.  It is the parliament, as the chosen 
representative of society‟s political common will, that is in charge of  the proper interpretation 
and usage of the textual layer of jurisdiction, therefore to take the grammatical meaning of the 
text seriously is identical with taking the empirical common will seriously.  The several ways of 
interpretations that rely on the other legal layers can only advance as far as it does not contradict 
the clear grammatical meaning of the legal text.   
 
The legal-dogmatic layer and the emphasis on the intellectually systematic character of law in the 
course of the functioning of legislation impels the employment of those ways of legal 
interpretation, that, beyond the grammatical meaning of the textual layer,  help  the judge in 
decision making in a given case.   One of the possibilities is the interpretation based on the use of 
legal-logical maxims, that, starting from the text‟s perceivable meaning, but not encroaching it or 
using  judicial autocracy, manages to control the judicial procedure.  The so-called “argumentum 
a minore ad maius” (to reach more from the less by inference), and the “argumentum a maiore ad 
minus” (to reach the less from more), their collective designation is “argumentum a fortiori”, or 
the “argumentum a contrario” (induction from opposites) etc.  can control jurisdiction with the 
extrapolation of the text‟s perceivable meaning. In order to remedy a situation when a legal gap 
occurs, the judicial decision that relies upon analogies shall also end up leaning on the legal-
dogmatic layer, as it constructs the verdict directly from the legal principles (this process is called 
legal analogy), or it transfers a legal provision that was created in a similar case, so to base the 
current regulation on the former example (the method of statutory analogy).  As to the doctrinal 
interpretation, it implements the embedding of the notions found in the textual layer, therefore it 
binds the textual and the legal-dogmatic layer together, in relation to the current case. 
 
The interpretation based upon precedents connects the textual legal layer with the layer of 
judicial precedents, and it specifies the open regulations, and therefore assures the nationwide 
unity of jurisdiction.  Thus, this is of primary importance in the concept of the multi-layer legal 
system. 
 
From the multi-layer legal system‟s point of view it can be qualified as dangerous, when in 
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relation to a current case, the verdict relies on an interpretation that is based on such 
constitutional court decisions that concretize fundamental constitutional rights and basic 
principles.  The American legal practice that carried this into effect is a proper example to show 
how this process “re-politicizes” law, and how it instigates to push the other legal layers - besides 
the layer of the fundamental rights - into the background (see MacCann/Silverstein 1998; 
Scheingold 1998). The German legal practice is also liable to experience such a shift, and the 
only reason why  it has not yet shown such negative sings is because - despite having accepted 
the fundamental rights as directly prevailing through the German constitution - in practice they 
are rarely included into the current judicial procedures.   
 
In Central Europe it was in Poland where, for only a few years, the constitutional court‟s legal 
interpretations were obligatory, that is, the judges were bound to take it into account.  But the 
judicial opposition to the functioning of a re-politicized constitutional court led to its exclusion 
from the new constitution of 1997 (Poplawska 1998).  The Hungarian constitutional court - even 
on an international scale - has a very great competence, and it has a right to eliminate laws, 
though the constitutional court decisions do not directly influence judicial decisions.  In fact there 
are some lawyers and smaller groups of legal experts who - based on the American pattern 
achieved by “the rights revolution” - support the introduction of the constitutional court‟s direct 
influence on judicial decisions, but this has not been put into practice yet.   
 
Thus in order to conclude, the concept of the multi-layered legal system supports the idea of a 
law on a larger scale, accepting the parallel operation of several methods of legal interpretation at 
the same time, therefore it is against legal concepts that place a single legal layer into the center.   
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III Chapter: The layers of law in the history of legal theories 
 
 
 
It is judicial casuistry, the sphere of jurisprudence/law dogmatics, the sphere of legislation and 
the constitutional court practice over constitutional rights created in a large number of legal 
systems in recent decades that can be grasped as the layers of law. Keeping this overall picture in 
view, the restrictions, the one-sidedness of the key tendencies in legal theory can be classified 
into main types, and thus the legal concepts that can grasp the total structure of law more 
completely will become more easily assessable. First, let us consider some examples of the legal 
positivist concepts that restrict law to the text of law; then the approach of restricting law to the 
layer of law dogmatics; after that we shall dwell on the view that identifies law with the judicial 
practice; then we shall deal with the approach that settles law around constitutional rights, 
which is a quite recent development. A good number of the approaches of the sociological school 
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of law, primarily at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, identified law with everyday practice, thus 
we shall also touch upon this as a remarkable restriction. 
 
 
1. The restriction of decisionist legal positivism 
 
This view of the law puts one of the important aspects of modern legal systems in the centre. Law 
consists of decisions issued by defined bodies (high courts, public authorities), from which judges 
and other law enforcement officers gather judgements with regard to particular cases. This 
attitude towards law has two sides, and these two sides should be assessed differently. On the one 
hand, law in this interpretation is equal to the text of decisions that appear in formalised legal 
sources. From the point of view of the practising judge, at least as regards the main weight of his 
orientation, this side contains an important truth. The other side of decisionist school of law is the 
really problematic one, which considers the adjudication material appearing in these legal sources 
actually the product of the public authority that issues it, and thus declares the option to change it, 
or at least this ensues from it without being stated. Provided that this latter side, that is, the option 
to change is realised in practice, it immediately comes out that the thesis of judges being bound 
by the text of law contains restriction, and this will stay hidden as long as the text of law consists 
of the categories of law dogmatics activity of working out harmonised decision viewpoints, the 
deductions that socialise judges and the constructions allowed by those. As long as this is the 
situation, legal positivism means no major problem from the point of view of judges. 
The first clear formulation of the decisionist view of the law can be traced back to Hobbes 
(Perelmann 1983:428), who, contrary to Locke‟s former concepts, set no limits to the sovereign 
ruler who had ended the original state of nature. Rousseau‟s concept of sovereignty vested in the 
community took this sovereign legislation limited by nothing further, and Montesquieu‟s theory 
of the separation of powers, in which the judge as “the mouth of law” simply declared the 
judgement, accomplished this basis of ideas. In France this theoretical background and the 
successfully drafted codices of Napoléon made “école de l‟exégčse”, “the exegetic school” 
dominating since the beginning of the 19
th
 century, which was not willing to acknowledge 
anything but the text of codices as law for almost a hundred years. As one of their 
representatives, Bugnet stated he did not know the concept of private law, what he exclusively 
used was Code Napoleon (Kramer 1969:6). Bergbohm‟s “Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie” 
published in Germany in 1896 represented the first pure formulation of the decisionist school of 
the law, and it became so dominating as it never did in France. Due to the peculiar features of 
common law, theories in England had never played an important role in determining the actual 
development of law, subsequently, Jeremy Bentham‟s and following him John Austin‟s view of 
the law which based law on state commands had only theoretical importance. Austin had a 
greater impact on the 19
th
 century American legal theory, which joined in legal practice in 
operation to a greater extent, and could thus influence the reality of American law more. It was, 
however, not Austin‟s definitive legal concept based on state commands that became important 
but his analytical attitude towards law that highlighted legal categories. (And it was just this that 
later the American realist school of legal thought took firm action against, and turned to judicial 
practice similarly to the free school of law that took firm steps against the German conceptual 
jurisprudence.) Thus it is mostly due to his definitive law concept that Austin‟s view may be 
ranked among etatist law concepts (see Ott 1983:425). 
 
One of the most powerful formulations of decisionist legal positivism undoubtedly comes from 
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Hans Kelsen. In this respect the most important peculiarity of Kelsten‟s Pure Jurisprudence is that 
it breaks, without explicit refutation, with the concept of law based on intellectual unit accepted 
in German jurisprudence since Savigny and Puchta. The traditional reply to the question what 
gives unity to the multitudes of legal forms was that it was the hidden law dogmatics system of 
categories chiselled together. Whereas Kelsen believes that the essence of unity is that particular 
legal decisions can be traced back to earlier decisions, eventually to the constitution and a 
hypothetical fundamental norm behind it (Kelsen 1934:63). It is the specific feature of law that a 
state decision connects the casuistic facts of a case from real life to an artificial legal 
consequence. Law is thus a special technique that can connect anything to anything through this 
connection, hypothetical judgement, which must be considered law. The only precondition is that 
this state decision should be made during proceedings and comply with frames that has been 
determined by an earlier state decision for it (Kelsen 1934:24). The essence of the unity of the 
law is this formal scale of validity. 
 
2. The absoluteness of legal dogmatics 
 
In the second half of the last century pandect jurisprudence, or, as called by its critics 
“Begriffsjurisprudenz”, “conceptual” jurisprudence, alongside decisionist legal positivism, 
clearly shows another possible restriction of the structure of law. Law in this view is the system 
of subordinated and superordinated concepts, legal theses logically deducible from one other, 
which bind both the law maker, should he intervene in the law, and the judge when they apply 
law or rather the legal conceptual system created by the layer of legal dogmatics/jurisprudence to 
the particular case. In this concept of law the profession of lawyers is the carrier of law but it is 
only university jurists getting in the centre of the profession who can ensure the systematic and 
scientific nature of concepts. “Even the concepts set up by the law-maker can get their 
justification only by being deductible from the concepts of the legal system, thus 
Begriffsjurisprudenz is in harsh conflict with legal positivism” (Jerusalem 1948:149). 
 
 
3. Law as judicial law 
 
This view of the law could be considered mostly realistic with regard to the specific nature of 19
th
 
century English common law restricted to judicial precedents. On the Continent, however, also in 
the United Sates where contrary to the rigid adherence to precedents in the UK statutory law 
already played a greater role and some more abstract legal theory/law dogmatics mediating layer 
started to evolve at that time, the emphasising of sovereign judicial law-making can be 
appreciated as one of the restrictions of the total structure of the law. 
 
In Germany Oscar Bülow‟s 1895 “Gesetz und Richteramt” (Law and the court) can be esteemed 
as an introduction to the view of the law of the free school of law transplanting law from law 
dogmatics and jurists to individual judicial decisions and judicial practice. In this concept of law 
it was the artificial structures of law dogmatics that became the main point of attack in terms of 
the operation of law, and state legislation only a secondary one. A certain binding force of the 
latter was acknowledged, and it was the domination of the layer of jurisprudence/law dogmatics 
that was primarily criticised. In their formulation the judge‟s sensation of the law creates law 
while passing individual judgements, and it can be gathered exclusively from the judicial practice 
of passing judgements. It was this trend that Eugen Ehrlich belonged to, who later pushing the 
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substratum of law a level deeper in his sociological jurisprudence found “live law” in every day 
practice. The positions of the concept of judicial law can be, however, still gathered quite well 
from Ernst Fuchs‟s writings, perhaps the most bellicose figure of the free school of law. (For the 
analysis of the free school of law see Larenz 1979:339.) It was Fuchs among them who went the 
furthest in declaring judges‟ freedom against the text of the law and law dogmatics categories in 
his essay bearing the telling title “The public harm of constructive jurisprudence” in 1909, in 
which he deemed that on the grounds of the principles of equity and justice judges were 
authorised to make judgements against the explicit provisions of law (Fuchs 1909:99). 
 
In America K. N. Llewellyn and Jerome Frank were the key advocates of the realist school of 
legal thought putting judges in the centre, which had a great influence between 1930-40. This 
trend did nothing else but accomplished the turning away from the analytical view of the law that 
ensured the systematic order of law launched by O.W.Holmes at the end of the last century, and, 
similarly to the German free jurists, thought to have found law in individual judgement. As 
Llewelyn put it in summary:What judges charged with law enforcement decide in a legal case is, 
in my view, law itself. Jerome Frank more radically rejected lasting, predictable elements of law, 
and placing the judge‟s image influenced by several psychical, incidental circumstances in the 
limelight, denied the binding force of earlier judicial precedents too. Provided that in passing 
judgement on the same legal case another judge will pass a judgement that will be quite different 
subject to what impressions happen to affect the judge. (While in Llewelyn‟s view determined 
rules meant if not a decisive force but a certain orientation for the judge.) 
 
 
4. Law as the layer of basic rights 
 
Contrary to Hart‟s concept of law restricted to rules Ronald Dworkin attempted to place the layer 
of legal principles into the law since the end of the 60‟s, keeping mainly constitutional rights in 
view, and to interpret it as a dual structure of the layer of rules and legal principles (see Dworkin 
1977a). In this thematic interpretation if there is no specific rule for deciding the case, it still does 
not give the judge the option of free deliberation, which comes from Hart‟s approach, but the 
case must be decided on the grounds of legal principles as another part of the law. However, quite 
often this is the situation also when there is a seemingly specific rule but as a result of that an 
obviously inequitable result would be produced. Dworkin cites examples from legal practice 
when in such cases the court reaching back to a hidden legal principle revised the provision made 
on the level of rules. A person defined in a testimony, for example, after being held responsible 
for a criminal act, could not be deprived of his inheritance, therefore the court reaching back to an 
overall legal principle, “nobody may acquire advantage as a result of an action against the law”, 
deprived the inheritor of the inheritance. 
 
A peculiar restriction can be found in Dworkin, and now this is what is important for us, when 
concentrating on the basic rights principles enshrined in the constitution he attributes genuine 
legal force to these, and on the grounds of them in the event of the provisions of simple law he 
exempts citizens from the obligation of obedience, provided that such provisions contradict basic 
rights. “The option of disobedience to the law is not a separate right…not some kind of 
subsequent right against the government. It is simply one of the traits of basic rights…and it 
cannot be denied without denying such rights themselves” (Dworkin 1977b:211). Or, in other 
words, “…any society that acknowledges these basic rights must reject the idea of general 
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obedience to the law that applies to any and every case” (216 p.). In this thematic interpretation 
real law is restricted to the layer of constitutional rights, which grants citizens primary subjective 
rights, and simple legal provisions on the level of rules are only conditionally in force, and they 
must be only conditionally obeyed. 
 
 
5. Law as everyday practice 
 
The layers of the professional legal system emerging from everyday customary standards enjoy 
freedom in numerous respects contrary to daily routine followed en masse, and are able to shape 
this routine again and again through the multitudes of mediating mechanisms. The too great 
cession, however, makes lawyers suddenly aware of the limits of this freedom. “A gap of 
change” can be defined as the maximum distance allowed for the cession between professional 
law and everyday routine. As a reaction to the creation of written law becoming marked first in 
the 19
th
 century and legal concepts alien to everyday language acquiring a dominating position, 
from the end of the last century, some legal theory approaches, seceding from legal positivism 
and dogmatic positivism, made their way to everyday practice while searching for “real” law 
under “paper law”. 
 
Facing the rigid legal positivism of “école de l‟exégčse” dominating in France in the decades 
before and after the turn of the century, in his theory the French Léon Duguit fully rejected the 
thought of an independent legal sphere rising above everyday practice. For him “objective law” 
(droit objektif) represented the actual law, and public positive law was valid as long as it 
manifested this objective law. “The collective state of the mind which calls for a sanction is the 
creative legal source.” (Duguit 1920:206). An economic or moral rule becomes legal standard 
when masses of people become convinced that the given social group, or those who represent the 
greatest force among them, may intervene to suppress any infringement of these rules. 
 
In the same years Eugen Ehrlich arrived at the thoughts similar to those of Duguits in the German 
language area. Going beyond judicial practice, Ehrlich eventually found “real law” also in 
everyday practice. As he wrote, he had consulted six hundred volumes of judicial decisions to 
come upon real law under the paper of the codices. “Soon, however, I was captivated by what 
happens in reality much more than by judicial decisions” (Ehrlich 1913:71). 
 
Looking for “real law” under paper law in his study in 1907 the Polish Leo Petrazsiczkij came to 
the same conclusion. “Where are legal phenomena to be looked for?” he put the question, then he 
stated, “..traditional jurisprudence is simply an optical illusion. It perceives law not in its natural 
habitat but in a place where there is absolutely nothing of it…that is, in the world outside the 
perceiving person”. (Petrazsickij 1981:125). That is, he found real law in the psyche of individual 
persons. He called that “intuitive law” which was different in each person and it was affected by 
the state‟s positive law only as one of the elements among other determinants equal with it. 
 
Reference can be made here to the American Graham Sumner who ascertained the same relation 
with different phrases between “folk customs” and positive law also at the turn of the century as 
the one observable in Ehrlich‟s “live law” or Duguit‟s “droit objektif”. 
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6. The theories of a complex legal system 
 
Balanced approaches that keep several aspects in view represent exceptions rather than the 
standard vis-á-vis approaches that restrict law to specific layers. Friedrich C. von Savigny‟s 
approach, who is perhaps the most outstanding figure in modern legal theory, belongs obviously 
to this group. Savigny both connects the development of law to everyday practice – by 
connecting it to “public spirit”, a term chosen somewhat unluckily because it sounds mystical – 
and highlights the casting of the rather diffuse/obscure legal standards into the categories of law 
dogmatics/jurisprudence. (See Larenz 1979:14-25). His complex view of the law was later 
narrowed by his followers as the historic school of law was restricted to “conceptual 
jurisprudence” but Savigny‟s theoretical attitude may serve as an example. 
 
At the turn of the century Francois Gény was able to break the rule of the legal positivism of the 
French “exegetic school” and, in the meantime, avoid going to the opposite extreme like the 
contemporary Duguit did, and formulated his complex legal concept preserving the freedom of 
the individual layers of law beyond everyday practice. In exploring the components inside law 
the starting point for Gény was the separation of the “given” layer and the layer “constructed” by 
jurist activity (Gény 1917:6). By the former he means the necessary incorporation, 
acknowledgement of social phenomena beyond the law into the law, and by the latter legal 
techniques created by lawyer‟s activity. As used by Gény “legal technique” indicates what was 
meant by the law dogmatics categories, special legal distinctions classifying subtle/difficult social 
phenomena in 19
th
 century German jurisprudence but in his interpretation these appear not as part 
of a general detailed law but as elements helping the judge in connecting rules and facts. Even if 
Gény fails to emphasise the thought of a system behind the rules, comparing Code Napoléon, the 
German BGB and the freshly drafted Swiss civil code, he prefers the German BGB based on a 
chiselled law dogmatics system as an ideal product and criticises the rather loose French and 
Swiss codices for the deficiencies in their system (Gény 1917b:548). Alongside the layer of legal 
technique under the layer of the text of the law, the thought of the independent role of legal 
principles appears in his work. “Under what conditions do judicial decisions go beyond the level 
of actions of the administration of justice with a view to get them closer to legislative actions? Is 
it not proper to make distinction between judgements in this respect? What should we think of 
“standards” that constitute guidelines rather than exact rules?” (Gény 1917b:547). Even if we 
may miss logical tenseness in Gény‟s analyses, it is just through these manifold observations that 
the image of a more complex law built of several layers emerges in his writings. (For a detailed 
description of Gény‟s theory see Fikentscher 1975 Band 1:460-497). 
 
Similarly to Gény, and primarily under his influence, in American legal theory at the turn of the 
century Benjamin N. Cardozan produced a multi-layered concept of the law. Alongside “ratio 
decidendi” of precedents typical of the Anglo-Saxon law and written laws, Cardozo places the 
role of “general ratio decidendi” crystallised from several precedents, the legal principles made 
beyond rules, in the centre. Furthermore, he separates basic juridical constructions which stand 
behind precedents that control judges in making their decisions (Cardozo 1921:20). In his 
analysis law appears as the framework of particular rules, precedents, legal principles, maxims 
that rise above legal concepts, dogmatic categories and rules of decision that ensure orderliness. 
Later Cardozo withdrew from the view of the law manifested in his book in 1921 and got closer 
to the trend that turned Holmes radical in the direction of the realist school of legal thought, but 
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in the past 70 years his booklet has proved to be one of the most influential works not only in the 
United States but through Josef Esser‟s mediation from the 1950‟s also in the German legal 
theory. 
 
Thus, in addition to restricting views of legal theory, we can find influential theories in the 
history of legal theory that kept the multi-layered structure of the law in view. These must be 
used as a basis even today when we want to explore the layers of a complex legal system 
extensively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV Chapter: The theories of legal dogmatics 
 
 
 
The evolution of modern law resting on systematic/abstract categories is the historic 
achievement of the German pandect jurisprudence in the second half of the 19
th
 century, which 
following the natural law systematisation in the 17
th
-18
th
 century remoulded the categories of 
practical law to form an intellectual system. It was this that the French jurisprudence gaining 
ground again towards the end of the 19
th
 century received the greatest impulses from, as earlier 
John Austin in England and following him the reviving American legal thought considered the 
German jurisprudence a model too. 
 
In the 20
th
 century it is the German law literature that deals with the system of intellectual 
connections in law to the greatest extent, and this is what is called “legal dogmatics” in the 
German law literature, while in the French and American terminology the term “legal doctrines” 
is preferred. It is primarily in the German law literature that the analysis of the legal dogmatics 
activity itself, in addition to performing legal dogmatics with regard to practical law, continues 
to be a key area. Thus the various theories pertaining to the nature of legal dogmatics to be 
looked at will be taken from this literature. 
 
 
From the vast amount of material continuously accumulating only a few selected approaches are 
to be introduced in a short study, and even them with the technique that regarding each author no 
other than the momentum, original compared to others, in specifying the nature of legal 
dogmatics will be highlighted 
 
 
 
1. Some current German theoretical approaches to legal dogmatics 
 
 
 
It is Niklas Luhman‟s legal dogmatics theory the analysis of the approaches is worth beginning 
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with because he embeds the whole body of the legal system into the total society, and analyses 
legal dogmatics through comparing it to other social subsystems. At this level of abstraction, 
where each social subsystem (economy, science, art, etc.) appears as a peculiar form of 
homogenised communication of the social world, legal dogmatics can be grasped as 
homogenisation that ensures the  systematic nature of the law. This homogenisation, as in each 
functional subsystem, re-divides social actions, connections in a homogeneous field of 
evaluation from a special point of view, disconnects those connected in another field of 
evaluation, connects freestanding ones there to process social reality from the point of view legal 
evaluation. This evaluation homogeneity is basically ensured in law by evaluation in terms of the 
pair of values of lawful/unlawful as the evaluation homogeneity of science is represented by 
true/false and that of the economy by profitable/non-profitable. These pairs of values (Luhman 
calls them the binary code of each subsystem) in themselves, however, allow nothing else but 
keeping each field of evaluation separately, and only further specifying mechanisms can make it 
possible to decide what is lawful, or scientifically true, etc., and it is only together with such 
mechanisms that a pair of values can tear a homogeneous sphere from real social events. In 
science it is logic, theories of science, rules of verification that make it possible to decide what is 
true or false regarding specific assertions, artistic beauty is specified by aesthetics, art reviews, 
and finally the decision of what is lawful and unlawful is circumscribed by the defined rules of 
the law in each particular case, various theories of interpretation and the law dogmatics 
conceptual order ensuring that rules are free from contradictions (Luhman 1971: 232-252; 
1974: 6; 1981: 194). That is, it is the underlying binary codes (or, in other words, value duals) 
that ensure that each field of evaluation is kept separately, but these codes need to be 
supplemented with specifying programs to allow their application in various cases. 
 
 
It is, however, necessary to go beyond Luhman, and it can be asserted that in the event of the 
functional system of the law a systematic nature stricter than in most of such subsystems also 
prevails. Because while in them it is mostly enough to ensure mere evaluation homogeneity; and, 
e.g., each scientific assertion in each field of science need not be assembled into an 
uncontradicted whole, it is just the juxtaposition of scientific assertions refuting/competing with 
each other that takes science further; in law a part of all legal assertions within the legal material 
in force from time to time must be also uncontradicted in a stricter sense, and any alternative 
regulation proposals contradicting them are clearly separated as de lege ferenda proposals (as 
“only scientific proposals”) from the law in force. This stricter systematic nature, in addition to 
mere evaluation homogeneity, is ensured by legal dogmatics for the system of law. 
 
In his studies Josef Esser has defined this function of the legal dogmatics ensuring stricter 
systematic nature with special clarity. “Dogmatics ... in the framework of a system represents the 
controlling mechanism that ensures the compatibility of solutions with regulations in other 
fields” (Esser 1972:104). In another study Esser clearly identifies the point of the binding force 
of the dogmatic order too. “The issues of dogmatics are closely tied to the issues of 
systematisation. The principles that are to a great extent the principles of systematisation 
represent more or less defined legal opinions made obligatory” (Esser 1972b:15). 
 
In the literature on legal dogmatics the point is often raised to what extent legal dogmatics points 
of view bind and when is it possible to disregard them? If we set out from the aforesaid function 
of legal dogmatics ensuring the intellectual connection in the law in force, then we can answer 
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that the legal dogmatics order and each part of it is nothing else but the demonstration of 
connections. Thus it cannot be bypassed unless coherently rearranging the relevant connections 
in the legal material, expressed in an abbreviated form by specific legal dogmatics distinctions, 
categories, and demonstrating the legal dogmatics model expressing the new, uncontradicted 
alternative order. That is, egal dogmatics represents “impeding” the amendment of rules by 
making this option subject to thinking over the given amendment giving rise to further 
amendments. But once the arising further effects have been checked, and they fit into the overall 
law dogmatics order, then the dogmatics allows the rule be amended in the given way. That is, if 
it should contradict a more overall dogmatics order too, then it may not be attained unless the 
more overall dogmatics order itself is restructured into a new order, in adherence to the required 
amendment of the rule. 
 
Subsequently, the binding force of legal dogmatics is not absolute, its aim being definitely not 
getting one out of the habit of thinking, but it stimulates one to rethink things in broad terms 
when an amendment of a rule is insisted on it sets the order to rethink overall connections. On 
the other hand, it of course takes the burden off of thinking, and it makes the application of the 
law in cases easier, because it allows specific provisions of the rules of the law to be connected 
to the particular legal case that has occurred through the legal dogmatics order of steps practised 
in legal education. 
 
It is thus important to point out regarding the issue of the binding force that it is not the rules of 
positive law that legal dogmatics thought is bound by, not these are the “dogmas” that are 
compellingly given for the legal dogmatics jurist, but the set of categories behind the rules which 
have shaped these rules in their coming into existence, that is, the system of categories behind 
the rules connecting the rules of positive law is the dogmatic order of positive law, and only this 
must be obligatorily taken into consideration. And, as it has been shown, it will bind as long as 
an alternative system of connections can be identified. And that, of course, would take place 
outside the legal material in force, in the academic sphere of de lege ferenda proposals from 
where in most of the cases they should be brought through legislation into the positive law to 
allow the restructuring of the dogmatic order of the positive law. It might also occur, of course, 
that the rules of the positive law are left unchanged in terms of their wording, but by replacing 
certain parts of the dogmatic order behind the rules these rules will be construed in a new order, 
and by that in spite of the unchanged wording different decisions can be made in the legal 
practice. 
 
Spiro Simitis has formulated the function of legal dogmatics ensuring contradiction free rules as 
the higher level of predictability of modern law. “The claim for predictability manifested already 
in law becoming positive is made specific in the mechanisms of dogmatic reflection. 
Subsequently, dogmatics is nothing else but the logical continuation of this positivism.” (Simitis 
1972: 131). 
 
In each legal case the point of “orientation based on consequence” represents the other side of 
legal dogmatics. This point has been raised with a radical edge by Luhman who has elicited 
heated debates with his answers in recent years. Luhman‟s initial proposition in this train of 
thought is that by systematically binding legal decisions in cases into the homogenised world of 
lawful/unlawful, and it is just through this homogeneous aspect that the totality of the law fulfils 
its social function, legal dogmatics becomes more and more indifferent to the external, social 
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consequences of the “legally right” decision (Luhmann 1974: 31).  The “orientation based on 
consequence” is more typical in the field of politics, and law will maintain its separation from 
the logic of the political system by/as long as legal dogmatics blocking/blocks the judge‟s 
orientation based on consequence in making his or her decision in the case. Luhman, however, is 
pessimistic as regards whether this role of legal dogmatics, and through that the separateness of 
law from politics, can survive under the circumstances of public organisation of society. Because 
the modern intruding state uses law more and more for the purpose of transferring the aims of 
politics into society, and this change by placing the effect aimed at in the foreground reinforces 
orientation based on consequences. This always means individualisation, subsequently a slow 
disintegration of classifying legal dogmatics can be observed in recent legal development. And 
all this, according to Luhman‟s prognosis, forecasts the entirety of the law merging with politics 
(Luhmann 1974: 32). 
 
This pessimistic diagnosis was disputed by several theorists (e.g. Teubner 1975), and indicated 
that if in terms of legal theory it was hard to define a precise recipe for the judge with regard to 
the proportion of “looking back on legal dogmatics” to “looking ahead to the consequences” 
possibly contradicting the former in certain decisions, but in practice the attitudes shape judicial 
decisions together. The only danger that might occur is when attention placed on legal dogmatics 
correctness is pushed into the background to a great extent for the sake of orientation based on 
the consequences. 
 
The sphere of thought, albeit just from the contrary aspect, was formulated by Carl-Wilhelm 
Canaris pertaining to the relation between legal dogmatics correctness and equity. In this 
formulation legal dogmatics correctness appears as equity created at the level of overall 
connections beyond a particular equity with an ad hoc point of view. “The unity and internal 
order of the law … belong to the most fundamental legal ethical requirements, and are eventually 
rooted in the idea of law itself. Thus the requirement of an uncontradicted internal order comes 
forthwith from the postulate of acknowledged equity that “the similar shall be judged similarly, 
the different in terms of the differences” (Canaris 1968: 16). Subsequently, the decision correct 
in terms of legal dogmatics taking legal dogmatics categories as its basis will transplant the 
points of equity already checked in terms of overall connections to the specific decision, and by 
that allow the judge to “ennoble” the particular equity tied to the specific facts of the given case 
at a more comprehensive level. 
 
This connection of equity and legal dogmatics correctness rests, of course, on the premise of 
formal equality, this is something else that should be underlined in the assessment of Canaris‟s 
thesis, while orientation based on consequences in decisions in cases places individualised 
material equality in the centre. The decrease in the tenseness of legal dogmatics in the 20
th
 
century in the Western countries on the Continent and, on the other hand, the increase of the 
proportion of the orientation based on consequences in judicial decisions are connected to the 
change in the basic ethical attitude that has placed material equality in the centre versus formal 
equality in the past fifteen hundred years, and has entailed the evolution of social state and its 
instrument: organisational law. 
 
By all means, Canaris‟s emphasis points at important connections between legal dogmatics and 
equity, and a more systematic analysis could presumably identify a further formation based on 
principles of equity in building up distinctions, categories. This can be also expressed by saying 
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that legal dogmatics absorbs and emotionally neutralises these points for the judge. Following 
Canaris this consequence was drawn by Niklas Luhman in one of his studies (Luhmann 1974: 
176).  
 
We may attain a more complex understanding of the nature of legal dogmatics when we look at 
the effect of “creating distance from the text” produced by means of legal dogmatics. 
Educatedness in legal dogmatics makes the material of the rules of the law pliable for the judge. 
The judge can discern what the exact meaning of the legal text is with a number of underlying 
legal dogmatics techniques by making legal dogmatics principles to relate to each other. 
Furthermore, as alternative relations might be elaborated in the law literature behind the rules, 
therefore in the event of unchanged legal text the judge might reach an alternative decision in 
specific cases. The dangers of discretionary legal arguments that might arise from this are 
fortunately eased by the system of appeal, and, of course, by the fact that in lower courts where 
the majority of the cases are terminated in the first and final instance, most judges implement the 
most widespread interpretations as a routine procedure and do not leaf through works of 
jurisprudence. Inquiry in alternative dogmatic models is more frequent in high courts, but their 
own previous decision making practice ensures the existence of the necessary continuity. 
 
In the history of legal theory an important school was established at the end of the last century to 
formulate the effect of “creating distance from the text” in the form of “the theory of objective 
analysis”. One of its key figures, Joseph Kohler described it as follows “ Interpretation must 
remould the statute to allow the legal principles inherent in it come to the surface, and thus 
specific provisions of law appear as the outcome of these legal principles. However, legal 
principles are not always given complete and undisturbed expression in statutes. Then it is up to 
the interpretation to eliminate unavoidable confusion from the expression of the statute and to 
develop the incomplete statute pursuant to legal principles (italics mine - BP; quoted by Larenz 
1979:36). It is the legal dogmatics order that becomes the actual centre of the theory of objective 
interpretation and, as underlined by Larenz, law, and the really obligatory layer of law among the 
layers of law; it is only through it that the layer of the text of the law, or the aims of the political 
lawmaker can exert their effect in each judicial decision in a screened form. 
 
 
2. Lawmaking and legal dogmatics 
 
As a general statement it can be established that judges in deciding individual cases are made 
subject to the wording of the relevant statutes and the order of steps of the legal dogmatics 
models behind them, in the course of which they read out the “lawful” specified pertaining to the 
given case. Following this track it can be asked to what extent the final drafter of the text of the 
rule of the law has elbow room in the parliament or elsewhere in terms of law dogmatic models, 
or to what extent the final drafter is the one who from time to time simply “puts on paper” the 
results already evolved in the preliminary legal dogmatics activity. 
 
Looking at it historically, three phases can be identified in the relation between political 
lawmaker‟s and the legal dogmatics-jurist‟s activity. Prior to the evolution of codifications, in 
the 17
th
-18
th
 centuries, on most of the Continent the legal dogmatics sphere was the regular 
unifier of law and one of the driving forces of the development of law. The creation of the 
codification at the end of the 18
th
 century formally represents the appearance of the state power‟s 
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control over the law, but in its content the jurist-legal dogmatics control remained at the level of 
establishing the content of codices. E.g., the “Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis” from 
1756 can be considered as a case for “a textbook with legal force” due to its purely juristic 
origin, which is therefore far from practical law. Similarly, the Prussian Landrecht from 1794 
was the creation of exclusively three jurists, and the German BGB at the end of the 19
th
 century 
was mostly, at least in its first drafts, also the product of jurists, and the Swiss civil code in 1907 
was the exclusive product of a single jurist (Seiler 1989:117-1120).  
 
The actual strengthening of the role of political lawmaking can be observed first in the 20
th
 
century, and where the system of political organisations opposed to each other and continuously 
struggling for government power, that is, parliamentary, multi-party politics, prevails, pure 
juristic-law dogmatics activity loses its exclusive role in determining the field of law. The 
politician lawmaker is actually also in need of the products of preliminary doctrinal-legal 
dogmatics activity, because he/she must reach into a systematically interweaving web in creating 
statutes on criminal law, civil law, labour law, etc. when any part of them concerned has been 
harmonised with some degree of indirectness with the rules of the given area of law. 
 
In the age of modern political legislation the lawmaker is in need of the preliminary results of 
legal dogmatics, while legal dogmatists are in need of political lawmakers for shifting their 
models into positive law. Let us look at this relation from two aspects. First, we attempt to give a 
brief summary of the outline of the structural connections between legislation and legal 
dogmatics activity, then our intention is to expose a few connections of the abstract outline 
through some specific examples. 
 
To understand the relation between the political legislation and doctrinal-legal dogmatics activity 
it is necessary to note in advance that here the different logic and evaluation considerations of 
two different functional subsystems are addressed; and while the logic of politics, in a 
parliamentary, multi-party system being now considered, is organised around the pair of values 
of “taking over the government”/“going into opposition”, and this is what determines each 
political decision, law is organised around the pair of values “lawful/unlawful”, which is cast 
into more specific form by the legal dogmatics order behind the law in force in each area of the 
law. These two different types of logic must be neared to the point where the logic of politics 
does not dominate lawmaking, but on the other hand, purely doctrinal-legal dogmatics activity 
alone cannot determine the products created. To fulfil this task stable Western parliamentary 
democracies have developed a mediator law politics sphere which may be joined both by 
jurists/politicians from the side of political parties and law professors active in politics from the 
purely legal sphere.  At the conferences, in the periodicals, etc. of lawyers‟ associations each 
competing legal dogmatics model is selected bearing its social consequences in mind and 
exposing them to the public opinion beyond professional circles. Similarly, each party attempts 
to select from the de lege ferenda proposals received with greater consensus through their own 
lawyer-experts, and attempts to find the models that suit their party program more properly, and 
include them in their lawmaking program. Through this two-sided approach a part of the 
doctrinal-legal dogmatics products become part of the overall political debates, and the 
parliamentary party politicians of the legislature form time to time will clash over these, while 
the jurists of legal dogmatics consulting systematic, dry monographs and case law reports in 
university rooms or preparing high court proceedings work on elaborating de lege ferenda 
proposals. The picture outlined above is, of course, ideal; considering itself a sovereign 
 32 
legislator, politics actually attempts to create statutory provisions itself, overriding legal 
dogmatics proposals. When this kind of lawmaking is exercised to a too great extent, the internal 
uncontradicted state of the law will break up, and the system of the law will become chaotic. 
And this becoming a political problem will force politics to correct itself. Legislation thus cannot 
override the legal dogmatics order behind the relevant rules for a long time unpunished. 
 
Let us look at an example from the literature on the theory of criminal law, which properly 
shows the connection between legal policy alternatives and legal dogmatics models. This 
example takes a new tendency as its basis, which is described in German law literature as turning 
towards “victim orientated legal dogmatics”. 
 
In recent literature on the theory of criminal law three legal dogmatics alternatives can be 
identified, which have shaped and are shaping criminal law regulations in the past decades. The 
greatest consensus has been attained regarding general prevention implemented with criminal 
law means and the re-socialisation of perpetrators to attain that goal. As an alternative to the 
spectacular failure of the measures taken to improve criminals and the criminal law system 
achieving just the contrary effect, i.e., persons under the circumstances of imprisonment 
becoming criminals, a turning toward two recent models can be observed. Accepting the 
impossibility to achieve re-socialisation as reality one of them places retaliation in the centre of 
the criminal law institution system. 
 
The core of this latter alternative is that it turns the attention from general prevention desiring to 
hinder a person from “becoming a future victim”, and focuses on the victim of the particular 
case, the possibly broadest redress of the victim‟s injury and the active participation of the 
particular victim in the criminal procedure (Seelmann: 1990:160-165). With this revolution, 
however, the criminal legal dogmatics of rules in force requires reshaping in several respects. 
One of the most important effects of this revolution is that the conciliation of the perpetrator with 
the victim and the redress of the caused injury in some way becomes more appreciated in 
criminal procedure, and allows either the termination of the procedure or the suspension of the 
punishment imposed on probation. On the other hand, the prosecutor‟s sphere of authority 
becomes less appreciated beside the victim‟s and the lawyer‟s power to shape the lawsuit. A 
further change is the shift to victim orientated legal dogmatics that the redemption of the caused 
damage as an independent sanction becomes institutionalised, as it was introduced from the 
beginning of the 80‟s in the UK and the US (Seelmann 1990:162). The fact that criminal law has 
become “civil rights dominated” is represented on the side of the victim also by the fact that the 
victim‟s possible responsibility for and behaviour‟s contribution to the crime coming about 
becomes important too. A further impact of this kind of legal dogmatics alternative is that the 
victim‟s active participation in the criminal procedure becomes both possible and necessary. In 
addition to the prosecution, broad right to have a say is given to the victim and the victim‟s 
lawyer. (E.g., in the United States this dogmatic change is important in economic crimes). In the 
literature dealing with this issue the question is raised that such an intense confrontation of 
victim and perpetrator during the criminal proceedings will deplete the presumption of 
innocence, which allows that the person of the perpetrator is determined only after the final 
judicial decision (Seelmann: 1990: 167).  
 
The relation between legal policy and legal dogmatics is thus well shown by these three 
dogmatics alternatives in criminal law. The working out of each alternative requires a detailed 
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survey of the entire criminal law including both its substantive and procedural areas and the 
elaboration of solution models necessitated by each alternative only a jurist of criminal legal 
dogmatics with conceptual comprehension is able to accomplish. Law politics choice and shift to 
a model that is an alternative to the one in force can be conceived only after the completion of 
this legal dogmatics work. Otherwise, the mass of contradictory impacts would soon make 
criminal jurisdiction chaotic. 
 
 
 
3. Logic and evaluation in legal dogmatics 
 
 
Legal dogmatics was given the clearest elaboration in the German legal thought in the second 
half of the last century, also the picture of legal dogmatics work widespread among today‟s 
jurists goes back to this. And this has made the classifying-logical features of legal dogmatics 
exclusive, connected to which the picture of “subsuming” application of law based on rules built 
up on such logically clear concepts developed. We have seen this legal dogmatics picture both in 
Luhman‟s and Josef Esser‟s works, and this picture appeared not only at the level of theoretical 
reflections but, in the period of the pandect jurisprudence at the end of the last century, as reality 
it shaped the operating legal material to a great extent. The codifications edited entirely by jurists 
were acknowledged in the era as the model of a unified system of sub- and superordinated 
concepts, clear deductions, which, however, for that very reason were of little help in solving 
real social problems. (When the first draft of the German BGB prepared by Windscheid, the 
great pandect jurist was made public in the 1880‟s, operating lawyers and judges were horrified 
to notice its distance from practical life; see Larenz 1979). As it is publicly known it was as a 
reaction to this that the sharp distance from “concept jurisdiction” in the legal thought on the 
Continent was established and a shift toward the free school of law and sociological school of 
legal thought took place. After that, however, shifts to remedy the problems of purely classifying 
legal dogmatics were made even without any loud rejection. One of the directions of such shifts 
is exemplified by Karl Larenz‟s legal theory, who attempted to push conceptual legal dogmatics, 
as a version of dogmatics from the end of the 19
th
 century, toward evaluating legal dogmatics. In 
his attempt he was assisted by the separation of category triplet “concept”, “type” and “general 
clause”. Let us briefly look at his exposition. 
 
 
Provided that the lawmaker intends to establish the facts of the case, to which the rule binds legal 
consequences, with conceptual accuracy, then he needs to gather all the conceptual traits 
contrary to the formulation based on type. “A concept is established by its definition so that it 
can be applied to a particular process or the facts of the case “in the event and only in the event” 
that all the conceptual traits of the definition are present in it. This is not the case regarding type. 
The presence of the traits, or some of them, given in the description of type is not indispensable; 
they may be present in the particular case to various extent. Often they can be divided into 
grades and to a certain extent one trait can be replaced with another one” (Larenz 1979: 200). 
Regarding type it is not specific conceptual traits that are important but if the entire case 
occurred is in conformity with the type established as the facts of the case under the rule of law. 
Subsequently, the particular case cannot be subsumed under such a rule of law, the judge must 
evaluate the case‟s compliance with the type. On the other hand, the citing enumeration of the 
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traits of the type and the overall picture gained from that must be neared to the particular case so 
that it should decide whether the case is in conformity or not. 
 
 
Contrary to the conceptual establishment of the facts of the case, Larenz gives a better mark to a 
looser establishment based on types because in the event that the elements of the facts of the case 
are defined with conceptual accuracy, cases in everyday life most of the time do not fit 
conceptual traits, a good number of them are missing, and numerous further traits go beyond the 
conceptual description of the rule of law. It is eventually only a “seeming accuracy” that is 
attained, under which the judge is compelled to “feign” the case in life being subsumable under 
the rigid facts of the case. On the other hand, Larenz indicates that through the facts of the case 
established in types after numerous specifications, which is possible only in the course of the 
mass of judicial cases emerging, it is quite often possible to attain the establishment of facts at 
the level of concepts. Thus type based establishment of the facts can be considered a preliminary 
grade of establishing facts with conceptual accuracy. 
 
With getting away from concept “loosening” goes even further when the rule of law no longer 
sets forth types but indicates them simply with general clauses. Such are, e.g., “proper due date”, 
“good reason” or “due proportion”, required between service and consideration, kind of 
establishment of facts under statutory facts of the case. The lawmaker sets forth only an abstract 
consideration of value, which disregards all conceptual traits, and only some proper specification 
of judicial casuistry can provide them with normative content afterwards, and the “sense of 
justice” of general awareness of justice offers some points of reference for their application 
(Larenz 1979: 203).  
 
After analysing the above triplet Larenz attempts to add types based law dogmatics that allows 
evaluation to the merely conceptual law dogmatics from the last century. By taking this direction 
of development he could resolve the alienation of law dogmatics from life in a way that he 
managed, for the same reasons, to avoid the step taken by the free school of law and the 
sociological school of law that reject the entire system of intellectual connections of law. 
 
It is in another way how Josef Esser seeks to reconcile evaluations required by the conceptual 
version of legal dogmatics with practical law. He accepts the assessment of classifying legal 
dogmatics evolved toward the end of the last century, nevertheless he places evaluations in legal 
topics (Esser 1956: 310). Esser formulates legal topics revived at the beginning of the 50‟s by 
Theodor Viehweg as “primary normative establishment of elements” evolved in the judicial 
practice, as judicial maxims that develop pursuant to the basic principles of the entirety of law 
referring to each other on the ground of the juristic socialisation, on the one hand, and equity in 
particular cases, on the other hand. Legal dogmatics interpreted in the original conceptual-
classifying sense is given a role after this in Esser‟s formulation as the factor that subsequently 
selects, conceptually specifies primary standards, and through that fits them to the system of the 
entire law (Esser 1956: 313- 315). That is, contrary to Larenz‟s extended evaluating legal 
dogmatics, here evaluations slide to the field of legal topics and law dogmatics remains the area 
of conceptual systematisation. In other words, the logic of the field narrows down for the jurist 
and only the judge is given the option of evaluation. 
 
Furthermore, the triplet applied by Larenz, concept, type, general clause, provides good points of 
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reference for exploring the possibilities of the dogmatics of basic constitutional rights. In this 
field it is almost inconceivable that terms are conceptually specified, and even fact finding is 
possible only to a small extent. Basically it is in the emptiness of the general clause that basic 
rights become part of the constitution, and it is on the grounds of this that the constitutional court 
is given the power to repeal over simple statutes worked out with conceptual or at least type 
based accuracy. General clauses can always be filled only with internal specifying maxims in the 
constitutional court practice with regard to certain groups of the emerging cases, but the edges, 
outline of these must always remain disputable when deciding whether later cases can be 
subsumed under them. Therefore the basic rights dogmatics cannot reach even the accuracy that 
Larenz‟s evaluating dogmatics sets for types, and, on the other hand, this kind of specification 
always gives greater ground for the constitutional court justices‟ evaluation. Logic here 
(drawing compelling consequences from the provisions of the constitution) can be observed only 
to a low extent, and it is mostly the consensus of the basic rights lawyers that provide the frame 
for the more liberal evaluation of the constitutional court judicial decisions from time to time. 
The measures, maxims of basic rights dogmatics turning general clauses more specifically legal 
yet ensure some predictability for basic rights jurisdiction. However, basic rights that resist even 
this kind of specification (e.g., the inviolability of human dignity, “one‟s right to express him or 
herself in every respect”, etc.) are already beyond law, and no juristic consensus is conceivable 
regarding their normative direction in particular cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
V Chapter: The validity of the law 
 
 
1. Multi-layered law and the validity of the law 
 
The force of the law arises in law education with regard to the separation of force/validity. 
According to this the force of the law indicates the period that elapses between the formal 
promulgation and the termination by a later law, while validity refers to the pre-question whether 
the rules applying to the procedure have been complied with when creating and promulgating the 
law. Once the creation and promulgation of a law has taken place in the proper form, then this 
law is valid; looking at it from another aspect, a law is in force until it is made null and void by 
another law, or the end of the term it has predetermined for its own force. 
 
This approach to validity is, however, implicitly based on a preliminary concept of the law, 
which became dominant in Hungary especially in the second half of the 20
th
 century, primarily in 
the field of public administration law. According to this concept law is equal to the text of the 
decision made in proper form by a relevant administrative agency. The given rule can be made 
void only in the event that the text of such decision has been drafted in proper form. This concept 
of the law, of course, has not been fully accepted in the past decades neither in public 
administration law, nor in civil law, as the actual meaning of new rules is construed every time by 
the judicial practice through law dogmatics screening, and the rules themselves are constructed in 
a way that the actual normative guidelines of particular parts of the text come out only in the light 
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of a hidden law dogmatics system. Thus the legal validity inspired by public administration has 
not given an answer to this either, and it can be considered not more than “the validity of the 
text”, and its acceptance can be explained in the field of public administration law by the fact that 
in this field, during the past century of its existence, the law dogmatic order and the judicial 
practice of frequent further development observable in traditional areas of the law (private law, 
criminal law) have evolved only rudimentarily. The fact that law enforcement officers are bound 
by the text, which entails detailed provisions down to the level of the most specific facts, is a 
phenomenon that actually exists in the field of public administration law, thus this restricted 
concept of the law misses reality less. 
 
In the traditional fields of the law, however, this concept of the law represents the rejection of 
reality because the text of codices in itself does not determine the law that is valid for the 
particular case. The strength of the law being bound to the text in these fields is, of course, 
greater in our legal system even today as it can be observed in the German/Austrian region of 
Continental law into which Hungarian legal development was embedded in the past centuries. In 
this jurisdiction the product of the political legislator, the text of the law is controlled all the more 
by law dogmatic models and high court practice than it was possible in the past decades in our 
legal system, and these three layers of the law together constitute the premises of the valid 
“lawful” for the particular case in this more overall region. If we have widened our concept of the 
law to go beyond the text of rules and set out from a multi-layered concept of the law, then the 
aforesaid concept of legal validity inspired by public administration must be widened as well. 
Because it is only inside one layer of the law, the layer of the text, that this interprets the 
conditions of “lawful every time” thematically towards legal decision in a case, and this is not 
enough for determining the overall conditions of the relevant “lawful”. 
 
The Continental legal systems consist of the totality of the texts of the rules in force, the law 
dogmatic order behind them and the standards of the high court practice which further develop 
them. In the past decades in numerous countries the layer of constitutional rights was placed over 
this traditional layer of the law, and the product of the former three layers of the law became the 
actual part of the legal system only after having been screened by the layer of basic rights. 
Putting it meticulously, since this change it can be also said that force is shifted to some extent, in 
a part of the cases, and after the mere statutory promulgation it is the successful upholding of the 
constitutional court review that grants indisputable validity to a new legal provision. 
 
Intellectually the legal system in Continental law is divided into several layers, and none of the 
layers of the law in itself constitutes the “lawful” for the judge to be declared in each situation. 
Nor does it help if I make all the aforesaid layers of the law the subject of the examination, 
although this is a precondition of going further in this direction. The only thing I have reached is 
that now I can describe what the relation between political law-making, judicial casuistry and the 
layer of basic rights over these is like regarding their general connections, in the legal system of a 
given country, differentiated also in terms of each branch of the law. The notion of valid law goes 
beyond this, and formulates the lawful arising in specific situations from the projection of these 
layers of the law on each other The valid law in a situation is fixed, drawn up ideally, by the text 
of the politician law-maker, the shape of which is formed by choosing from preliminary law 
dogmatic models, and in its judicial enforcement the legislator‟s text of the law is either specified 
through reaching back to these law dogmatic models or drafted in view of the relevant 
constitutional rights. Briefly, it may rephrased that valid law is the legal system specified as the 
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result of each layer of the multi-layered legal system being projected on each other. 
 
2. Different theories of the validity of the law 
 
The concept of the validity of the law and valid law have resulted naturally from the concept of 
multi-layered law. In the literature on legal theory, however, there are numerous different 
formulations of the validity of the law, and by contrasting them the sense of the validity of the 
law as used here will more clearly unfold.  
 
1 The notion of the validity of the law described above is based on the internal connections of the 
legal system, and this notion of “internal” validity must be separated from the notion of the 
external, or “sociological validity” of the law. The sociological schools of legal thought that 
flourished in the years following the turn of the century, perceiving that laws and decrees created 
by government agencies “remained on paper” and left society‟s actual practice untouched, bound 
actual realisation and observance to the concept of valid law (contrary to the law that remained 
on paper). In this sense the notion of valid law contrasted with “paper law” indicates the actually 
observed law. This is what Eugen Ehrlich used the term “live law” for, and this meant “true law” 
versus mere paper law created by the state (Ehrlich 1913). Or, “objective law” was opposed to 
“positive law” in a similar sense in Duguit‟s works. 
 
Max Weber also applied the validity of the law in this sense, for him, however, in terms of the 
concept of the law this did not mean restricting the notion of the law to the actually observed 
regularities in everyday practice. Calling it the sociological or factual validity of the law, Weber 
separated this aspect from the intellectual validity of the law, which, for him, represented validity 
in the internal intellectual connections of the law. Comparing this distinction to what has been 
said above, it can be seen that it has been Weber‟s notion of intellectual validity and not factual 
validity that we have moved along. 
 
2 It is another formulation of the above train of thoughts when the validity of the law is bound to 
judicial practice.  The concepts of the American realist school of law or the influential German 
free school of law at the beginning of the 20
th
 century used the notion of the validity of the law in 
this sense. Within the paper law in force (i.e., the law created by public authorities) valid law 
shall be nothing else but the law sanctioned and transplanted into case law by judicial practice. 
Here factual and intellectual validity is present in a fused form - contrary to the pure factuality of 
Ehrlich‟s “live law”, or, on the other hand, Weber‟s duality - and thus it can be also considered to 
be the result of a restricted concept of the law. 
 
3 The validity of the law in terms of its ethical content has been formulated from various aspects. 
The key trend formulates the validity of the law from the legal concept of natural law. The law 
created by the state becomes valid on condition that it complies with the requirements of natural 
law formulated in various forms, whereas rules in its part that contradicts this are not made valid 
by the fact that they have been created and promulgated by the state. 
 
In the recent decades, with the incorporation of human rights into the constitution and the 
development of regular basic rights jurisdiction, this ethical validity of the law has been bound to 
constitutional rights by an effective trend originally based on the American Ronald Dworkin‟s 
concept of the law, and existing in the field of German law on a wider basis (see Dworkin 1977, 
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and Alexy 1985 for the German concept of the law). This development concerns the validity of 
the law the most radically because while the impact of the other layers of the law beyond the 
layer of the text of the law on this layer is usually not formulated with textual authorisation in a 
particular legal system, the basic rights review has this kind of character too. In the strongest 
form of the basic rights review, after declaring something anti-constitutional, the constitutional 
court may as well abolish a given part of the layer of the text of the law, erasing it from the law in 
force. But even the lower grades of this formally define the direction of specifying the text of the 
given rule as the actually valid law. As it can be seen in German law, for example, in the event of 
turning “the interpretation of rules in compliance with the constitution” a legal principle, through 
which the text of a law is not abolished but the constitutional court prohibits that courts attribute a 
defined sense to a rule because it has found that sense anti-constitutional. 
 
The ethical validity mediated by the basic rights review is more exact than the earlier natural law 
validity to the extent that in particular cases, in specific constitutional court proceedings, the 
definition of the other layers of the law is yet subject to, albeit an abstract but constitutionally 
defined, text. This may, however, slide back to a rather diffuse level mediated by the 
philosophical/intellectual discourse every time if the constitutional court begins to review the 
layers of the law pursuant to some quite empty formulas of constitutional rights (“the right to 
equal human dignity”, e.g.). There are signs of this in German and quite recently in Hungarian 
basic rights jurisdiction. The basic rights review, which the validity of the law and, in the event of 
abolition, the force of a rule is subject to, can become unpredictable again as earlier in the event 
of mere natural law formulation, but with the increased effect that now on its basis an agency, the 
constitutional court, may as well actually abolish the text of the law and other rules. 
 
Dworkin‟s radical formulation also points out that in the legal system that acknowledges the 
basic rights review of simple law citizens shall be given the right of disobedience against the law. 
The legal material opposed to basic rights is, in this concept, not a valid law, thus citizens may 
reject obedience to it. With this Dworkin outdoes most of the theoreticians of “civil 
disobedience” because they do not deny the validity of the law and do not argue with the 
lawfulness of the punishment imposed on the disobedient citizen. It is just the undertaking of the 
punishment that gives the disobedient citizen the moral basis suitable for rousing the widest 
masses and making them realise that the concerned rule is morally objectionable, and that they 
should start claiming en masse that such rule be changed. 
 
4 Finally the dogmatic validity of the law should be highlighted by analysing the notion of the 
more complex validity as we have attempted to determine it. In this concept, as elaborated 
especially by the German “conceptual jurisdiction”, the validity of the layer of the text of the law 
is always subject to what extent it is in line with hidden law dogmatic categories, legal principles. 
Provided that it is different, then judges must interpret the text in the direction that the text 
adheres to the hidden law dogmatic order. The text in this concept is easy to shape and 
subordinated, as it is, of course, such also in other directions in the event of ethical validity or 
validity in terms of judicial practice, and it is the law dogmatic order that becomes the source of 
the validity of the law. 
 
As a criticism of this concept, in addition to that it utterly denies the impact of the other layers of 
the law on the validity of the law, it can be also said that it exaggerates the unity of the hidden 
law dogmatic order. In the 20
th
 century owing to the activity of a growing number of university 
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jurists optional law dogmatic models are constantly worked out in large numbers and politician 
legislators are able to add something original to and decide in an original way on “making the 
law” just because the law politicians of each party look for the previously worked out law 
dogmatic models that suit the program of the given party more properly. The text of the law is 
thus based on the selection of a determined law dogmatic model, alongside numerous further 
models, and therefore opposing the textual meaning of the law on the grounds of presuming a 
unified law dogmatic order also means that the judge denies the existence of the other law 
dogmatic model deliberately chosen by the legislator. The law dogmatic validity in itself must be 
considered also restricting compared to the validity produced as a result of projecting all the 
layers of the law on each other. 
 
 
 
3. The possibilities to question the validity of the law 
 
 
After the above legal theory argumentation, useful conclusions can be drawn from the concept of 
multi-layered law for the pragmatic side of the lawyer‟s practice. In recent years, especially when 
the value of the subject of the action has been high, or other reasons have urged the parties‟ 
lawyers, the questioning of the constitutionality of the provision of the law to be applied has 
appeared, alongside traditional ways of winning lawsuits, in order to win in the lawsuit. But if we 
consider the entire structure of the law, then numerous other ways to question the validity of the 
law arise. For some of them the conditions of proceedings in our law in force might not be 
available, others are possible in theory but have not become usual in domestic legal practice, 
nevertheless they may be logically systematised and briefly described in the following. A part of 
them may be incorporated into the law in force in the future, or, simply due to changes in 
litigation practices, they may spread in the domestic legal practice. 
 
Taking thus the entire structure of the law into consideration, the questioning of the validity of 
the law arises on the level of the layer of the text of the law, with regard to the dogmatic layer of 
the law, the judicial practice and the constitutional rules and basic rights. Furthermore, the 
connection of the law to the sphere of morality produces a possibility to question it, also either 
the spreading of the rule or the lack of it in everyday practice may flash possibilities for abolition 
for the relevant lawyer and his or her client. Taking account of all this there are 11 different 
possibilities available to question the law on the basis of the concept of multi-layered law for a 
good lawyer. Let us consider these briefly. 
 
3.1. Questioning the layer of the text of the legal norm 
 
There are three key options for questioning but the third can be divided into further possibilities, 
thus five forms of questioning can be listed in total. 
 
1. Questioning on the grounds of the sphere of authority. If the lawyer has got to the point that 
in the event of the rule to be applied a guaranteed failure of the lawsuit can be expected, then the 
first possible way of prevention is that he asks whether it has been issued by an agency, body, 
person authorised to do so? That it should have been issued in a law but it has been issued in a 
government decree, e.g., or, it would have required a ministerial decree, because rights and 
 40 
obligations binding citizens and legal persons have resulted from the rule, yet it has been issued 
in a ministerial order or ministerial circular. (This kind of questioning of the law is possible in 
our law in force in the Constitutional Court.) 
 
2. Questioning based on the infringement of the procedure of making rules. Especially in the 
event of legal sources of higher level, the way of making the law is defined by constitution, law 
or other rule. In the event of legislation, for example, the act on law-making and legal sources 
sets forth obligatory procedural elements, and similarly the standing orders of the parliament 
contain such elements. (Obligatory harmonisation with the interest representation bodies of the 
area to be regulated, e.g.) Also, it can be imagined that the government‟s statutes contain such 
law-making elements with regard to creating the government decree. Thus the questioning of the 
rules to be applied arises on the ground that some obligatory procedure of harmonization has not 
been complied with, or, that the law was accepted, contrary to the standing orders, after a 
parliamentary committee had voted against it, or, that the legislature had no quorum as verified 
by documents, yet the law then debated was accepted, etc. Under this pretext, in certain cases, in 
domestic law in force the questioning of the validity of the rule becomes possible, and this has 
happened several times in the constitutional court so far. Where there is a public administration 
court, there this may take place to a greater extent, and in the event of rules of lower level it may 
represent a way that leads to the success of the lawsuit. 
 
3. The possibilities for questioning on the grounds of coming into conflict with a rule of 
higher level than statutory law. In general, rules of lower level may not come into conflict with 
rules of higher level, and up to the level of statutes there are mechanisms for eliminating this. The 
level above statutes is, however, more uncertain, and more possibilities can be explored for 
questioning. Three major cases should be described here. 
 
a. The rule to be applied comes into conflict with a constitutional regulation, thus on the 
grounds of this it may be questioned. If the constitution enumerates something item by item, for 
example, and a statute defines a further case in addition to the ones listed, then the point of its 
unconstitutionality may be raised, but it falls under the same category when the rule to be applied 
can be opposed to an accurate constitutional regulation which contradicts it. In domestic law this 
is possible through the constitutional court. 
 
b. The rule to be applied comes into conflict with a constitutional right. This questioning is 
wider than the one above because basic rights are abstract norms that indicate guidelines only, 
and thus they may be referred to in the event of numerous provisions of law for declaring rules 
anti-constitutional. The style of jurisdiction of constitutional court justices, their activist 
interpretation of the constitution or one that adheres to the text of the constitution much more, 
however, allows questioning on these grounds in each country to a different extent. It should be 
noted that the Hungarian constitutional court practice in the past years has permitted this kind of 
questioning on a large scale. 
 
c. In the event of an EU member state reference to domestic rules coming into conflict with 
EU law is the next possibility for questioning. Hungary is not an UE member sate yet, but in a 
few years it will most probably become one, thus this way is significant not only in terms of legal 
theory. The “statutes” of the European Union, the decrees of the Council, and partly the 
guidelines of the Committee, represent law directly in force in EU Member States, and since the 
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1960‟s the European Court has transformed the relation between the Union‟s legal material and 
the Member States‟ legal material that the member state courts are obliged to ignore any internal 
law and any other internal rule that contradict a EU legal provision. What is more, a lawyer active 
in a member state may be obliged within the sphere of lawyer‟s responsibility to pay damages 
subsequently, when he or she has failed to call the court‟s attention to a relevant European 
provision and the party represented by him or her loses the action. In the event of conflict, the 
operative knowledge of the huge EU legal material and the questioning of the validity of the 
domestic rule to be applied in a particular case make a great opportunity for domestic lawyers. It 
should be also noted that while in the former case lawyers may only call the court‟s attention to 
the infringement of the constitutional provision or the constitutional right by the provision to be 
applied, and may request the suspension of the procedure and that the given provision should be 
contested in the constitutional court, in the third event the lawyer may immediately propose that 
the internal rule be ignored. 
 
 
3.2. Questioning on the level of law dogmatics 
 
Here two possibilities for questioning the validity of the law may be highlighted. 
 
1. The interpretation embedded in law dogmatic notions used until now of the legal 
provision to be applied may be questioned and embedding in an alternative system of concepts 
may be suggested for the interpretation, which may result in a fundamentally contrary judgement. 
Totally different legal specifications become possible in numerous fields of public administration 
if we interpret the Hungarian constitutional regulation, for example, on the level of central public 
authorities on the grounds of the American branches of power, or, on the other hand, if we 
interpret the separation of powers doctrine only as the separation of the spheres of authority. The 
Hungarian constitution has been interpreted since the turn in 1989 publicly by strong opinion 
groups in accordance with the American separation of the branches of power, in our view 
incorrectly, and the constitutional dogmatic reinterpretation of this in the public opinion would 
radically transform the possible regulations of our public law statutes with a basically unchanged 
text of the constitution. Well, as this example possibly shows quite different judgements can be 
made in each branch of the law from the reinterpretation of the dogmatic order behind the text of 
rules. Presumably, only with the involvement of jurists in the special field of the law does their 
complicatedness allow the questioning of law dogmatics and the placing of elements into another 
law dogmatics urged in order to win the action, but in the form of regular expert assignments, at 
least in the event of lawsuits of key importance, this involvement of jurists may become a more 
extensive practice in the future. 
 
2. The embeddedness of the legal regulation into hidden law dogmatics can be also questioned 
when the team of lawyers interested in the litigation attempts to ignore the entire embeddedness 
into legal concepts, and tries to replace the legal concept frames used until now with the 
arguments of interest searching jurisdiction. Or, the other way round, if it is just this that 
constitutes the hidden conceptual frame in a specific field of the law, then jurists ignore it and 
attempt to base the sense of the legal paragraph to be applied on classical legal concept 
arguments. 
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3.3. Questioning the sociological validity of the legal norm 
 
In this respect again three options may be fulfilled. In the first two cases, the invalidity may be 
asserted with reference to the derogation of the legal provision to be applied by practice, in the 
third case just to the contrary the reason for invalidity can be that a recently introduced rule is not 
obeyed in practice, i.e., is “not live yet”. 
 
1. “Derogation I” should refer to the case when we base the questioning of the validity of the 
given legal provision on the fact that a great, increasingly greater, part of society has not obeyed 
to it for a long time, what is more just the contrary behaviour is typical in the given situation. 
This is the case of the traditional “destroying the law” in common law derogation, and although 
there is no legal provision in force regarding this, law enforcement agencies in the Continental 
legal system actually do take it into consideration. 
 
2. “Derogation II” should refer to the questioning when we base it not so much on the actual 
decrease of obedience – a fairly good number of people still obey to the given standard – but on 
the fact that in the event of disobedience almost always no sanctioning is applied, thus what has 
occurred is the derogation of the legal sanctioning. After a longer period of time this will, of 
course, entirely eliminate obedience to the standard, provided that some interest beyond the law 
does not support the standard to live on, but with this distinction the derogation of legal 
sanctioning allows that reference is made to legal invalidity. 
 
3. Questioning the validity of the legal standard not living yet, or, at least requesting that it 
should be applied with lighter consequences is an accepted argument in sanctioning the 
infringement of numerous new legal obligations, so it may be considered a living practice even 
today. “Not knowing the law does not exempt one of due consequences” but in the first phase of 
the new legal standards becoming living, that is, obeyed practice, remarkable reductions are 
applied when imposing sanctions in the event they have been infringed, therefore this may be 
ranked among the arguments of questioning validity in terms of sociology. 
 
 
3.4 Questioning law ethically 
 
Finally, the reference to the rule coming into conflict with ethical standards arises as an 
ultimate solution for the questioning of the rule to be applied. A long time ago, in the period of 
the rule of natural law doctrines this was one of the most important references to invalidity (after 
World War II, for example, this was the basis for making people who had obeyed the law of 
Germany responsible subsequently), but since the time of constitutional principles and basic 
rights reinforced constitutional court jurisdiction this separate ethical questioning has been forced 
into the background. It can be also said that this “has been absorbed” into various types of 
questioning through the ethically coloured basic rights. In spite of that, reference beyond these to 
purely “ethical depravity” in the event of a rule to be applied is not excluded. An example for that 
has been given by the German constitutional court when decision had to be made in the 1950‟s in 
the case of deprivation of heritage as a result of an openly anti-Semite law made in the epoch 
before the war, and without any reference to constitutional rights it declared the rule in question 
invalid because it was “in conflict to a great extent with apparently ethical standards”. 
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* 
In summary, it can be thus seen that through more thorough survey, albeit not during the legal 
work of an average lawsuit, but in actions of major importance, and based on the co-operation of 
a larger team of jurists, numerous legal theory possibilities for questioning the validity of the 
legal provision to be applied, and subsequently for winnig the action, can be identified. One of 
the central thoughts of Rudolf von Jhering, the great German jurist in the last century was “the 
fight for the law”. Because although the law is given but lawyers and other jurists can do a lot for 
shaping the law in a given direction, fighting for the making of a new law, for example, as well as 
interpreting the legal texts in force in new directions, or establishing their enforcement in this 
direction. Even if jurists bound to the routine of the independent lawyer‟s practice may have a 
minor role in this, larger lawyer‟s offices may become the vanguards of the movement of “the 
fight for the law” through internal distribution of work and undertaking more complex cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI Chapter: Statutory interpretation  in Hungary 
 
 
 
With several years of research work the research team evolved under the name „the Bielefeld 
Circle‟ has performed a comparative study to explore how statutes are interpreted and then, in a 
similar way, how high court decisions work as precedents. (See MacCormick/Summers 1991 on 
summarising the findings of the first research and MacCormick/Summers 1997 on findings of the 
second). Using the results of these two researches, last year I examined the issues of interpreting 
law and judicial precedent in Hungary on the grounds of a total of two thousand high court 
decisions which were issued in the official monthly publication entitled Decisions of Courts. 
 
The surveys made during the recent decade have revealed that there are eleven ways of 
interpreting law available under modern legal systems for judges using which setting out from the 
text of law they make decisions with regard to the cases disclosed to them (Summers/Taruffo 
1991: 464-465). These bases for interpretation are taken into consideration, as a matter of fact, 
with different weight in various countries; also there are countries where certain ways of 
interpretation are absolutely unknown, and others where almost all of them are used to some 
extent. These ways of interpretation are as follows: 1. Interpreting the legal text in view of the 
meaning of the words in everyday language; 2. Interpreting the legal text in view of the 
special/technical meaning of the words, provided that a given word, phrase has such a meaning 
either in addition to its everyday meaning, or has no other than such a meaning; 3. Contextual 
interpretation means the kind of interpretation of the legal text where the words of each provision 
are construed in compliance with the meaning attributed to them when fitted in the entirety of the 
law or a complete body of related laws; 4. Interpreting the legal text on the basis of law logistics 
maxims; 5. Interpreting the legal text through analogy; 6. Interpreting the legal text on the 
grounds of precedents set at the time of previously enforcing the given law; 7. A doctrinal/law 
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dogmatics interpretation; 8. Interpreting the legal text in the light of implied ethical values of law 
or certain branches of law; 10. Interpreting the legal text in the light of the aims of the given rule 
of law; 11. And, finally, interpreting the legal text on the grounds of the will of the legislator. 
 
Which ways of interpreting law are used by high courts in Hungary? The intention of this study is 
to give, at least on an experimental level, an answer to this question based on approx. 600 leading 
cases published in the Decisions of Courts. (It is the official publication of the decisions of the 
higher courts in Hungary.) In selecting leading cases, a more or less equal number of cases from 
both criminal law and civil law have been included in the examination, taking the different 
features of law interpretation in the two fields into consideration, thus avoiding in both fields 
cases of appeal evolved due to law interpretation debates regarding rules of court, and only legal 
cases that contain substantive law debates have been covered by the examination. Also, in order 
to explore the changes in the statutory interpretation during the past decades, with regard to the 
practice prevailing in 1977, the 1988 issues and concerning the 1990‟s, the 1998 and the first half 
of 1999 issues of the Decisions of Courts have been examined. Thus, it has been possible to 
explore the differences between the 70‟s, 80‟s and 90‟s every time on the basis of a hundred 
criminal law and civil law judgements. Furthermore, it should be noted that the leading cases 
issued in the Decisions of Courts constitute decisions of the Supreme Court as the court of second 
instance or, due to protests on legal grounds (and recently requests for revision) as the court of 
third instance; and they contain, as part of the description of the cases, a description of the law 
interpretation of the judgements made by the court of lower instance. Subsequently, in addition to 
the Supreme Court, the county courts‟ practice of interpreting law has been also revealed in them. 
 
1. Grammatical, word by word interpretation 
 
This kind of interpretation appears to be of key importance in the practice of the Hungarian high 
courts with regard to criminal and civil law judgements with the difference that in the latter 
grammatical interpretation is often combined with legal dogmatics interpretation actually 
appearing embedded in that. Whether the action is to be considered to be in the phase of either 
preparation, or attempt, or completion; whether it is an aggravated case pursuant to one type of 
the criminal code facts, or rather the technicality of a case that got stuck in the phase of attempt 
pursuant to another type of facts; whether one of the perpetrators is an accomplice or rather an 
accessory; whether the intention in committing the action is to be deemed contingent or rather it 
may be inferred from the facts that direct intention is involved, etc.; -- these questions constantly 
permeate grammatical interpretation in criminal cases. On the contrary, in civil law cases the 
grammatical interpretation of events of life is less embedded into a law dogmatics interpretation 
framework. (Although, as we shall see, it means a rising tendency here as well.) 
 
It is another difference in grammatical interpretation between the two fields of law that while 
adherence to the general meaning of words in everyday language is prevalent in criminal cases, 
the meaning of words in civil cases are more liberally handled. Thus the extended or restricting 
interpretation is more frequent in civil cases, whilst in criminal cases the generally accepted 
meaning of words constitute the point of reference for establishing the facts of the case the 
judgements are based on. In spite of that, it occurs several times also in criminal cases that by 
attributing an extended or restricting meaning to the text of the law a judgement is made which is 
quite contrary to the judgement that would have been made if the generally accepted meaning of 
the words had been applied. 
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Let us consider some examples for the grammatical/word by word interpretation. In the criminal 
proceedings published in the 1998/8 D.C. (=Decisions of Courts), two perpetrators were brought 
to trial because of thirteen counts of crime committed against property, and although they 
committed a major part of these together, the Supreme Court proceeding in error deemed that the 
statement of „conspiracy to commit unlawful acts‟ had been incorrect because the circumstances 
showed that such crimes were every time planned by the perpetrators „casually getting together‟. 
Pursuant to Clause 6 § 137 of the Criminal Code, however, „conspiracy to commit unlawful acts‟ 
is established when two or more persons commit crimes in an organised form or they agree to do 
that‟, but the restricting grammatical interpretation did not allow to ascertain that. In accordance 
with the everyday/word by word interpretation of the words, however, a judgement just contrary 
to the above would have been reached. A restricting interpretation can be found in the criminal 
case published in the 1998/263 D.C. as well. The three defendants, having become angry with the 
editor of the journal of their town, because of an article written previously by that journalist about 
them, arranged a sham bomb attempt, fabricating an object that looked like a bomb which they 
placed in front of the door of the cathedral of the town. They wanted to see how the town journal 
would distort the events of the sham attempt. Once the area surrounding the church had been 
closed, traffic in the centre of the town was at a complete standstill for long hours, and the court 
of first instance, rejecting the prosecutor‟s motion to ascertain the crime of threatening with a 
danger to the public, did not find the three perpetrators guilty. It interpreted the crime of 
threatening with danger to the public in a restricted way (Criminal Code Clause. (1) § 270/A) and 
because of the innocent, toy like character of the bomb that looked real, forbearing from 
establishing the commitment of a crime, deemed that by said action only the petty offence 
technicality of breach of the peace had been accomplished. (The court of second instance, 
rejecting the prosecutor‟s appeal, upheld this interpretation.) 
 
The righteousness of the extension of the grammatical interpretation was discussed in the civil 
proceedings published in the 1999/13. D.C. with regard to the extent of liability of the external 
member of a deposit partnership. Pursuant to Clause (1) § 100 of Act VI of 1988 on Business 
Corporations „The external member shall be liable the same way as the internal member is if its 
name is stated in the firm name‟. In the present case, the firm name of the deposit partnership was 
made of the initials of the family name of both the external and the internal member. The court of 
first and second instance interpreted the text of the law with an extended meaning and found that 
the application of the initials was sufficient for ascertaining the external member‟s liability and 
compelled the external member to pay eight and half million HUF payable under the lawsuit. 
Whereas, the council of the Supreme Court proceeding in error rejected the extended 
interpretation. 
 
A restricted interpretation determined the outcome of the inheritance lawsuit published in the 
1999/69 issue of the Court Rulings. The elderly testator entered an agreement with the plaintiff to 
oblige the plaintiff to support, take care of and have the testator buried after his death and in 
return the testator made him the inheritor of any and all of his moveable property and real assets. 
After some month he died and it came out during the probate that the person thus called the 
inheritor was unable to either read or write and because pursuant to clause (3) § 624 of the Civil 
Code an illiterate person shall make a will in no other than the form of an official document, and 
pursuant to § 656 the technicality of the last will shall be applied with regard to the agreement of 
inheritance, therefore no matter that the testator himself was able to write and read, because of 
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the illiteracy of the beneficiary of the agreement of inheritance the last will was deemed null and 
void by the court of first instance in the lawsuit thus instituted. The council of the Supreme Court 
proceeding error, however, interpreted the rules of the technicality of the last will in a restricting 
way with regard to the agreement of inheritance and found that it was sufficient that the party to 
the agreement of inheritance to make a will had the ability to write and read, and by that it 
declared the debated agreement of inheritance valid. 
 
To draw a conclusion it should be noted that in administrative court proceedings in the 
grammatical interpretation the restricting and the extended interpretation seems to prevail to a 
lower extent, and the decisions of the administrative judges of the Supreme Court strictly adhere 
to the generally accepted meaning of words in their decisions. As one of the authoritative writers 
on the subject puts it, the Supreme Court‟s judges set aside judgements made at county level if 
through restricting or extended interpretation they depart from the generally accepted meaning of 
words (Dudás 1997:603). Thus, the kind of interpretation that adheres to the text as applied by 
domestic courts is the strongest in the field of administrative law. 
 
2. Interpretation by legal dogmatics 
 
This kind of interpretation means that to the open texture of the rule is added by the court a more 
prcecise ruling which was derived from the legal categories used in the text of the rule. The legal 
dogmatics is a set of doctrines, definitions, and categories which contanin systemic connections 
of meaning which build up the legal intistitutions and aim at the elimination of the contradictories 
from these.  As it has been shown, this kind of interpretation is more frequent in criminal 
proceedings but when looking at its proportion during the course of its progress, it can be said 
that compared to the 1970‟s the frequency of this kind of interpretation has increased in both 
fields. In criminal sentences with regard to the decisions made in 1977 a legal dogmatics 
interpretation was discerned in one out of every five such decisions, whereas in the sentences of 
1988 this kind of interpretation was present only in every other such sentence, and the sentences 
made in 1998/99 showed the same proportion. In civil judgements in 1977 a legal dogmatics 
interpretation was present in one out of every ten such judgements, whereas in 1988 in one out of 
every five of them; and this proportion remained the same in the judgements made in 1998/99. 
Thus the role of legal dogmatics interpretation has increased in both fields but even at this higher 
level of frequency there is a difference between criminal sentences and civil judgements similar 
to the difference that was present between them back in the 70‟s. 
 
Here are some examples from both fields of law for legal dogmatics interpretation. In the 
criminal action published in the 1999/148. D. C. the perpetrators who had robbed banks and post 
offices in succession were accused of committing of several counts of robbery, and with regard to 
one of the crimes committed when in a post office they had made the post office assistant woman 
lie on the floor but because of a customer who entered unexpectedly they had to flee thus 
interrupting the perpetration, it was debated between the court of first and second instance 
whether it could be ascertained in that case that the perpetrators had voluntarily ceased from 
committing the crime. The court of first instance took the position that robbery consisted of two 
phases: application of force and misappropriation, subsequently after the first phase (the 
application of force) it was no longer possible to ascertain that the perpetrators had voluntarily 
ceased from committing the crime. Whereas the court of second instance deemed it was possible 
to ascertain that even in such a case: „In terms of dogmatics it is a false reasoning that says that 
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“because of the character of robbery having two phases it is conceptually impossible to enforce 
voluntary ceasing from committing crime”. The composite nature of robbery does not make it 
impossible in advance to ascertain ceasing from attempt.‟ It was also related to the complications 
implied by the two phases of robbery that formed the basis of a legal debate in the Court Rulings 
1999/152 case. The two perpetrators walking in through the open door to an elderly woman‟s 
place were able to take her moveable properties without any force but could eventually leave with 
the movable properties and jewellery only by pushing a neighbour, who came to help the elderly 
lady, to the ground. They took the objects from the owner without any force and it was an 
element absolutely necessary for establishing the facts of robbery but the court stated that: „the 
person who suffered the force and the owner of the objects shall not be the same person‟. 
 
A legal dogmatics debate in civil action can be found also in another case published in the 
1998/18 . D. C. The opposing parties had entered into an agreement that the plaintiff and its late 
spouse would purchase the real estate owned by the defendant for a purchase price of 1.650.000 
HUF. In order to secure that a down payment was made in the amount of 300.000 HUF on the 
day of signing the agreement, then after a few days 200.000 HUF was also paid. The purchase 
failed because of the death of one of the purchasers since the other purchasers also desisted in 
view of that fact, and in the lawsuit to claim the down payment back the court deemed that only 
the 300.000 HUF given simultaneously with signing the agreement constituted down payment, 
and the 200.000 HUF given later was only an advance payment in view of the full purchase price. 
Similarly to the previous action, in the case published under 1998/333. D. C. the dogmatic issues 
related to down payment constituted the subject of the law interpretation that lead to the 
judgement. There was an intention to sell a landed property through inviting bids the basic price 
of which was 20 million HUF and participation in the bidding was subject to paying two million 
HUF bidding security which would have been included in the purchase price. On the day of the 
bidding no applicants presented themselves, subsequently it was unsuccessful, and on the 
grounds of the decree of the body of representatives of the local government that wanted to sell 
the land thereafter within 30 days without inviting further bids, the purchase agreement could 
have been entered with any applicant. The plaintiff appeared within that time period and paid the 
two million HUF which was registered by the employee of the local government/defendant as 
„down payment‟. Finally, because of the local government/defendant the entering into the 
agreement failed, but the plaintiff, who hoped to be purchaser, claimed the double of the two 
million HUF back in vain, because pursuant to the rules of down payment, the court found that „It 
comes from the nature of down payment that it presumes the existence of a valid agreement…but 
entering an agreement had not even been discussed at that time, negotiations between the parties 
began only after that‟. In spite of the false „down payment‟ entry as registered by the employee of 
the local government, the court in compliance with the dogmatic interpretation of down payment 
deemed that the two million HUF paid was simply bidding security and thus no more than that 
amount, and not the double of it, was to be paid back to the plaintiff. 
 
3. Interpretation that refers to judicial practice or precedent 
 
The ways of interpretation that refers to judicial practice („permanently pursued judging practice‟, 
„consistent judging practice‟, etc.) and to precedents have to be considered jointly because 
reference to precedent is often made by citing the Supreme Court‟s one or more decision(s) in 
cases published in the Decisions of Courts as reinforcement to the reference made to judicial 
practice. Also it often happens that without citing a precedent, reference is made to judicial 
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practice, or reference is made to a D.C.-decision without referring to judicial practice. The 
judicial practice and the precedent are rulings which circumscribe the facts more precise than the 
rules of the legislative acts themselves and these rules must be used by the court through the 
relevant precedent and the judicial prectice.   Considering frequency reference to judicial practice 
is ahead of reference to precedent, and in terms of reasoning weight judicial practice is ahead of 
precedent. In one of the D.C.-decisions the point of the debate between the court of first and 
second instance was just whether the decision made by the Supreme Court cited by the court of 
first instance really reflected the relevant judicial practice as it was stated by the court of first 
instance or it was contrary to it? The court of second instance found that the judicial practice 
evolved was just contrary to the cited Supreme Court‟s decision in case, and stated that the 
decisions made by the judging councils of the Supreme Court were not binding on the courts of 
lower instance, therefore it would rather abide by the judicial practice (see 1998/232 D.C.). 
 
Looking at how frequently references are made to judicial practice and precedents in terms of 
temporal dimension, it can be pointed out that while references were already frequent in criminal 
cases in judgements made in 1977, they were almost totally missing from civil judgements; but in 
1998 they became frequent also in civil judgements, and this frequency turned out to be 
absolutely equal with the frequency of references made in criminal sentences in 1998/99. D.C. 
One out of every five criminal sentences in 1977 included references to judicial practice and one 
out of every twenty included references to precedents; in 1988 this changed to the extent that 
references to precedents reached the proportion of references made to judicial practice, that is, 
one out of every five referred also to precedents, and this remained as such in 1998/99 as well. 
Whereas, no references to precedents were found in civil judgements in 1977, and only one 
reference to judicial practice was identified at that point of time, in 1988 one out of every ten 
judgements included references to judicial practice and one out of every twenty judgements 
included references to precedents; regarding judgements made in 1998/99 one out of every five 
included references to judicial practice and one out of every ten included references to 
precedents. That is, today, even if references to precedents are still less frequent in civil 
proceedings than in criminal actions, the interpretation based on references to judicial practice is 
as frequent here as there. In summary, the conclusion can be drawn that the changes, not using 
the valuing term „development‟, in the last twenty years have gradually raised the Supreme 
Court`s decisions in cases and the judicial practice that has evolved around it up to a stage where 
they can act beside the text of law as the medium of law. The calculation made in future judicial 
decisions will have to include high court judgments and judicial practice both in criminal and 
civil proceedings. The same refers, as a matter of fact, to the compilation of syllabuses for law 
education: teaching law becomes less and less possible without incorporating judicial practice 
into it because the text of law proves to be less and less sufficient in itself to attain its purpose. 
 
Just to avoid misunderstandings, it has to be noted that with regard to the above numbers and the 
tendency that is getting outlined from them, the Supreme Court‟s decisions of principle and 
guidelines as well as collegiate positions have not been discussed yet. For they do not constitute 
decisions in cases, precedents but can be considered detailed enacting clauses of criminal and 
civil statutory law that have every aspect of an abstract legal norm. (The resolutions on the unity 
of the law which, having replaced guidelines and decisions of principle last year, set forth general 
guidelines for the judicial practice with respect to specific cases have not been examined yet due 
to the short time that has elapsed since they were introduced.) 
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Notwithstanding, separately from the numerical data that refer to the judicial practice and 
decisions in cases, it could be interesting to look at the frequency of that kind of interpretation 
which refers to the normative decisions of the Supreme Court and the changes thereof. In 
criminal cases in 1977 in one out of every eight decisions reference was made to collegiate 
positions, in one out of every five to criminal decisions of principle or guidelines; in 1988 the 
frequency of references made to collegiate positions did not change; the kind of interpretation 
that referred to criminal decisions of principle or guidelines became fifty percent less (in one out 
of every ten criminal sentences reference was made to them); in the judgements made in 1998/99. 
D.C. it is in just a few cases that interpretation based on references to collegiate position can be 
identified, and slightly more references to guidelines or criminal decisions of principle are found. 
Whereas, in civil proceedings this decrease of significance did not take place, and in one out of 
every five judgements examined reference to collegiate position can be found in 1998/99. D.C. 
just as in judgements made in 1977. It is true that in this field references to civil decisions of 
principle have always been very limited. 
 
 
4. Interpretation that refers to constitutional basic rights or constitutional court’s decisions 
 
This kind of law interpretation, as a matter of fact, had not been applied prior to the 
social/political changes in 1989; looking at the end of the 1990‟s, however, this interpretation 
basis seems to appear in judgements. 
 
When considering the core of the thing, the most important statement in this respect to be put 
right from the outset into focus is that interpretation that refers to constitutional basic rights and 
especially constitutional court judgements has an absolutely minimum role in the interpretation 
of law. Contrary to the central role that the Constitutional Court in Hungary, with the widest 
power in the world, plays in determining legislation and repealing law, in the procedures of law 
enforcement it almost does not appear. One of the reasons of it is that at the beginning of the 
operation of the Constitutional Court the Court itself declared the exclusive role of the Supreme 
Court in law enforcement law interpretation and in the establishment of unified legal practice (see 
Constitutional Court Resolution 57/1881: Hungarian Gazette p.2456 issue 1991/123). And that is 
absolutely supported by the Supreme Court‟s conscious practice, by avoiding that Constitutional 
Court decisions are involved in the law interpretation issues that occur. Several cases can be 
identified among the judgements examined where one of the judging councils of the Supreme 
Court made decisions with respect to issues which had been covered by long, detailed 
Constitutional Court resolutions (e.g. regarding established rights or data protection cases) but the 
judgements made no references whatsoever to these. 
 
A more complete view can be gained if internal distinctions are made between the cases of law 
interpretation performed on the grounds of constitutional rights and thus the Supreme Court`s and 
the high courts` attitude to these are defined more precisely. It has occurred several times that the 
opposing parties have referred to constitutional court decisions but the court did not react to that, 
and the judgement made did not contain any, either negative or positive, position that referred to 
them. Another distinction should be made with respect to the fact that sometimes the court refers 
to constitutional basic rights in its law interpretation but does not refer to the relevant 
constitutional court decision(s). A further distinction should be made between criminal and civil 
cases. In criminal proceedings the court also refers to constitutional basic rights, while in civil 
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actions the judges do not, only the parties refer to them in some cases. 
 
When turning to the numerical data now, it can bee seen that in the criminal sentences examined 
in 1998 references to constitutional court judgements were made in three cases, and there were 
further two cases when the court referred to constitutional basic rights without citing any decision 
made by the constitutional court. In 1999 in criminal sentences references were made to no more 
than two constitutional court decisions, and one of them was made by a county court, and the 
case did not reach the level of the Supreme Court. Examining the civil judgements in 1998, in 
four cases the parties referred to constitutional court decisions but there were only two cases 
when the court reacted to that and included the reasons of the constitutional judges in the law 
interpretation. In civil judgements in 1999 there have been no such references at all, and although 
two proceedings have been initiated with regard to established rights, and the judging council of 
the Supreme Court has also interpreted the question of established rights, they have not referred 
to the relevant Constitutional Court decisions at all. (See Constitutional Court Resolutions 
43/1995 and 16/1996 on the interpretation of established rights). 
 
The few cases when exceptionally the Supreme Court judges still refer to the constitutional basic 
rights, allow one to draw conclusions with regard to their approach to basic rights. It can be said 
that, contrary to the constitutional judges and the ombudsmen who is also given a part in this 
field in our country, the Supreme Court judges tie the extent of each constitutional right and the 
limits of violating them to the empirical social concepts and the general public opinion; also they 
interpret them on a more restricted basis. An example for that can be taken from the judgement 
published in the 1998/223. D.C. As set forth in the justification, the plaintiff considered it the 
violation of his human dignity that at a camping site the assistant personnel of the camping site 
had wanted to hold his identity card as deposit as long as he would stay at the camping site and 
would want to give it back to him after he would have paid for the tent site on the last day. The 
case reached the Supreme Court‟s revision council and it took the position that the violation of 
human dignity could not be ascertained unless such action could be considered a violation in 
accordance with a generally accepted opinion in society. In the present case the generally 
accepted social approach does not consider the holding of the identity card a violation of human 
dignity, and it can be considered a normal practice in camping sites. Whereas, the Constitutional 
Court, at least the majority of the judges of the first nine years term, tended to make a decision 
contrary to the most widely accepted social opinion ascertaining the violation of human dignity, 
and presumably it was not at all alien to their nature to observe the violation of human dignity in 
the said case. What is more, many times it was decisions based on constitutional basic rights that 
the Constitutional Court attempted to initiate the restructuring of social opinion with. The same 
way in the decision 1998/412. D.C. a tie to the empirical social public opinion can be identified 
in view of suitability for violation against human dignity and impairing honesty: „It is the general 
approach evolved in society, the general ethical and public opinion that should be taken into 
consideration when it has to be decided whether in the given case stating or spreading the fact is 
suitable for impairing honesty.‟ 
 
The judges of the supreme judicial body interpret the violation of human dignity on a more 
restricted basis than the Constitutional Court judges regarding the fact that they deem that it can 
be violated only in the interrelationship of persons: „human dignity is the expression of the 
demand that a person, an individual shall be treated in compliance with the minimum 
requirements that evolved in society‟ (1998/412. D.C.). Whereas, the Constitutional Court used 
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this formula many times also in cases when they alleged to have discovered other kind of 
limitations o f liberty. For example, they deemed that the violation of human dignity was realised 
when an adopted child, subsequent to having attained his majority, wanted to find his blood 
parents but he was prevented by the relevant clause of the family act (see Constitutional Court 
resolution 57/1991). 
 
5. Interpretation that refers to the legislator’s will or intention 
 
Concerning the 300 civil judgements, in seven cases reference was made to the minister‟s reasons 
for the relevant enforced clause of the law with the aim of interpreting the law; in two cases 
reference was made to the „apparent intention of the legislator‟ but without any other references 
to underlying points. Whereas, in the judgement of the examined 300 criminal actions reference 
to the minister‟s justification was found only in one case. (It has to be added that in addition to 
the above cases, having examined 15 further cases from the Decisions of Courts  of 1981, in five 
cases references to the minister‟s justifications was found in the interpretation of the relevant 
clause of the law, and it can be made understandable by the fact that in enforcing the new 
Criminal Code made in 1978 for some years the minister‟s reasons played a major role in judges‟ 
decisions as a point of reference for the interpretation of law. The examination of the criminal 
sentences in 1988, however, showed the prime rule, that is, no interpretation based on the 
minister‟s justification was found.) 
 
Thus in Hungarian high court judgements interpretation that refers to the legislator‟s will is 
insignificant even on the level of reference to the minister‟s reasons, to say nothing of judges who 
would intend to know the legislator‟s will from legislation documents. (Cf. the Swedish legal 
interpretation practice that is taking this direction: Peczenik/Bergholz 1991). What is more, 
looking at the tendency, it also shows total disappearance. Considering the judgements made in 
the 300 examined civil proceedings, it can be pointed out that in the D.C.-decisions in 1977 four 
such references were found, there were three in judgements in 1988; there were still two such 
judgements in 1998, but in the judgements made in the first half of 1999 no such references have 
been found. In the sentences made in the 300 criminal actions reference to the minister‟s 
justification was present in one case in 1977. (As noted, the cases in 1981 can be rated as an 
exception due to practising the new code.) 
 
6. Summary 
 
As it can be seen from the above, four kinds of law interpretation are absolutely not present in 
high court practice. In none of the 600 D.C-cases were law interpretation performed by using law 
logistics formulas found. The appearance of legal literature based interpretation is an absolutely 
new phenomenon in our country, and only one interpretation that included a reference made to 
the Criminal Code and another that included a reference to the Civil Code were found in the last 
two years (in 1998/270. D.C. reference is made to the commentary of the Criminal Code, in 
1999/117. D.C. to the Civil Code in the interpretation of law). More liberal interpretation based 
on legal literature, for example, reference to a specific monograph or a legal study was not found 
at all in the 600 cases. 
 
No interpretation that refer either to the basic principles of a branch of law which create greater 
departure from the text of the law, or to the general principles of law can be found either. As it 
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has become apparent, high courts handle the possible way of interpreting law in the light of 
constitutional basic rights also with care. If, therefore, the term, the „activism‟ of the court can be 
applied for depicting greater departure from the text of the law, which has been stated so far in 
Hungary as criticism with regard to the judgements made by the Constitutional Court during the 
first term, then high court law interpretation cannot be described as „activist‟ even in the slightest 
degree. 
 
Looking at a different aspect of the subject, the text positivist style of the 70‟s cannot be 
identified when examining the end of the 80‟s either, especially not at the end of the 90‟s. As it 
has been shown in the above analyses, with regard to the various ways of interpreting law, in 
addition to the grammatical/word by word interpretation, in several cases significant 
enhancement has been ascertained. Accordingly, the role of legal dogmatics interpretation has 
significantly grown both in civil and criminal proceedings; similarly, interpretation that refer to 
judicial practice and precedents has been applied to a much greater extent compared to the 
judgements made in the 70‟s. 
 
The fact that interpretation performed on the basis of law interpretation has gained ground is also 
indicated by the growing length of the sentences and judgements published in Court Rulings. 
While the majority of the D.C.-judgements in 1977 were not longer than just a half page or one 
page, the majority of the judgements in 1998/999 took two or three pages. My calculations reveal 
that the majority of the D.C.-judgements consist of 1.200-1.500 words; and for the sake of 
comparison, it has to be noted that the notoriously laconic French high court judgements consist 
of 200 words, in average; in Germany they consist of 2.000 words and in the United States 8.000 
words (see MacCormick/Summers 1991 and Kötz 1973; 1988). It makes it clear that the 
increased length of judgements and the more extensive description of judicial law interpretation 
and justification in Hungary cannot be considered too detailed yet. No doubt, if our judges 
described all of their primary considerations and the reasons for their decisions on the relevant 
subject in their judgements, then these would become even lengthier. Being aware of the law 
theory tendencies that foster this kind of practice, this can be prognosticated in Hungary for the 
future as well (Wróblewski 1991; Alexy/Dreier 1991). 
 
 
 
 
VII Chapter:  The layer of precedent law in Hungary 
 
 
 
Analysing the primary ways of interpreting law, in law enforcement procedures in Hungary it can 
be discerned that from the 1970‟s up to the present day significant changes have taken place with 
regard to basing judicial decisions on previous judgements and judicial practice. In civil 
proceedings in those day hardly any references were made to former high court decisions in cases 
or judicial practice, there was a relatively low number of references made in criminal actions but 
during recent decades the number of such references have further increased to a great extent in 
criminal sentences; also they have appeared to a great extent in judgements made with regard to 
civil cases. (In the analysis judgements based on the Supreme Court‟s decisions of principle, 
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guidelines and collegiate positions have been handled separately, and have been considered to be 
judgements that are not part of the judicial precedents because they have all the features of the 
abstract norms, and they were created through mechanisms outside decisions in cases. Thus 
separated, the changes in the frequency of references made to these have been already described.) 
 
This increase of weight offers grounds for looking more closely at the presence of judicial 
precedents in Hungarian law and the characteristic features of its operation. In order to do that, 
the high court decisions in cases of civil and criminal substantive law  published in the Decisions 
of Courts have been considered, and the following statements are based on their analysis. The 
periodical  Decisions of Courts has been looked through from 1991 to the summer of 1999, and a 
total of 145 criminal substantive law and 94 civil law judgements have been found in which 
reference to earlier judgements or judicial practice or both provided the basis for the decision in 
shaping the legal position for the judgement. 
 
1. The weight of the judicial law 
 
The changes in the field of references to former high court precedents and judicial practice noted 
from the 70‟s have generally showed both the difference in this respect between criminal and 
civil judgements and that this difference still exists, although to a lower extent, even at a higher 
degree of frequency of judgements based on precedents. The proportion of judgements based on 
precedents and judicial practice is of great moment in both fields of law, that is, law is „carried‟ 
to a lower and lower extent only by the text of laws and other statutory instruments but the 
material of  Decisions of Courts contribute more and more to it as well. The differences of this 
moment and its narrowing can be better seen if we look at the development of the frequency of 
references in absolute numbers from 1991 in an annual breakdown: in 1991 in 3 cases in civil 
actions, in 16 cases in criminal actions references to previous relevant judicial precedents or 
judicial practice were found; in 1992 this number was 8 regarding civil actions and 21 regarding 
criminal actions; in 1993 these were 5 and 8; in 1994 10 and 16 such references were made; in 
1995 these numbers were 12 and 15; in 1996 10 and 20; in 1997 16 and 17; in 1998 21 and 17 
references were made but it has to be noted that 21 references to precedents in civil proceedings 
were made during the course of 104 civil actions; while in the background of 17 references to 
criminal precedents only 62 criminal court rulings could be analysed because only that many 
were published in that year. That is, the frequency of referring to precedents in criminal actions is 
still ahead of such frequency in civil actions. Finally, in the first half of 1999 references to 
judicial law can be found in 9 civil actions and 10 criminal cases. 
 
2. The binding nature of judicial precedent and judicial practice 
 
Former high court precedents, as set forth under constitutional law, shall have formal binding 
force only in UK and US legal systems. Here the legal source principle of „stare decisis‟ formally 
stipulates the judicial decisions in cases as one of the sources of law. In Continental legal systems 
the binding force of precedents is not set forth at such level but, as it has been shown in the first 
part of this study, this binding force, although not formally stipulated, to various extent does exist 
(see Marshall 1997). 
 
One of the questions that has to be discussed with regard to Hungarian legal system concerns the 
relation between specific decisions in cases and judicial practice from the aspect of binding force. 
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To what extent a relevant high court decision and to what extent a specific judicial practice being 
referred to has in itself binding force? As it has been revealed by the comparative study of 
European Continental countries, contrary to UK and US legal systems, here a relevant high court 
precedent typically does not have binding force in itself unless a wider judicial practice has 
evolved from the position of several precedents that point at a similar direction. This 
phenomenon can be observed also in our country, and it can be stated about most of the 
references made to judicial law found from 1991 up to now that they primarily bring up one 
judicial practice as reason for the legal position adhered to in the judgement, and one or more 
court judgements are described as examples for this judicial practice. (In two out of the 240 cases 
reference was made to a Supreme Court decision which were not published in Decisions of 
Courts). The prime rule that is observed in Continental legal systems can be ascertained in 
Hungary as well. Also, quite often it occurs that it is simply claimed that the given legal position 
is based on a judicial practice but no reference is made to any decision of court. Sometimes it 
gives rise to suspicion in the analyser, for example regarding the decision  1998/467. D.C. where 
in the case of a fatal traffic accident five references were made by the court to judicial practice to 
base various legal positions on it but no specific decision in case was described for checking it 
out. The actually existing nature of judicial practice can be also questioned for the analyser by the 
fact that the court bases its legal position on the „consistent practice of the Supreme Court‟ but it 
is not able to bring up any decision in case published in the Decisions of Courts as it happened in 
the case of 1998/277. D.C. where the asserted „consistent practice` was proved only by a decision 
in case made four years before and not published. 
 
Although less frequently than sheer reference is made to judicial practice but a good many times 
it also occurs that only a specific D.C. is referred to as the basis of the legal position of the 
judgement and it is not stated that it constitutes judicial practice. For example, in the case  
1997/391. D.C. the subject of debate was whether the venture agreement entered into between a 
`bungler`, a party that had no trade licence is null and void, or whether charging general turnover 
tax as part of the venture fee was lawful. The defendant/`bungler` had performed the work with 
slight insufficiency and once it had been corrected, it was possible to state that the work was 
completed. The plaintiff contested the `bungler‟s right to charge general turnover tax. The 
Supreme Court proceeding in error referred to the fact that the new Act V of 1990 on private 
enterprises entered into force on 15 April 1990, and in the case  1994/186. D.C. in order to 
establish judicial practice the Supreme Court stated that if legal rules did not forbid the 
performance of an activity, then the venture agreement was not be made null and void by the fact 
itself that the entrepreneur did not have a trade licence with respect to the given work. And than 
the general turnover tax could be charged for this activity, the court based its decision on this 
single D.C. 
 
Quite often it also occurs that the court does not assert a practice that is as widespread as judicial 
practice as the basis of one of its legal positions but it bring s up `several Supreme Court 
decisions` in general which uniformly share this position concerning the given question and 
refers to one or two specific D.C. to base it on them. For example, in the case 1998/79. D.C. the 
court gives reasons for its position with this solution: `As the Supreme Court has referred to it in 
several of its decisions in cases … the party who has invited bids shall not be liable to enter into 
an agreement‟. 
 
In one case a legal debate can be found that exactly concerned the relation between the sheer 
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decision in cases and judicial practice in terms of binding force. That was the case 1998/232. 
D.C. when the court of first instance formed its legal position based on the Supreme Court‟s 
relevant decision in case and asserted that there was a judicial practice that adhered to this 
decision. Whereas, the court of second instance asserted that this Supreme Court decision in case 
was just contrary to widespread judicial practice: `…the Supreme Court decision in case referred 
to by the court of first instance actually played no role in court practice, anyway, decisions in 
cases do not have binding force on lower courts`. This justification was made as a result of the 
revision procedure where the Supreme Court‟s judges referred, in agreement, to the position of 
the court of second instance and eventually that was what they approved of. Consequently, as it 
can be deduced from the above, the judges of the prime judicial forum also acknowledge the 
binding force of high court precedents entwined into, adding to judicial practice as it has been 
seen with the judges of the court of second instance. On the level of setting forth in constitutional 
law, as a matter of fact, precedents entwined into, adding to judicial practice are not binding, 
therefore the justification quoted above express only the position actually held by the judiciary. 
And that takes us to the issue of the binding force of Hungarian judicial law. 
 
 
3. The degrees of the binding force of judicial law 
 
Looking at the entire scale, the binding force of judicial precedents in various countries can be 
described under four degrees. The force shall be the strongest when in the event of it being 
violated the judgement shall be definitely set aside due to that; it shall be milder than that when 
through explicit reasoning it is possible to depart from former relevant precedents if that 
reasoning convinces the forum of judges who make the decision in the second instance; the 
binding force shall be even milder when the precedent serves no more than an underlying reason 
which appears beside further legal grounds (e.g. statutory order, constitutional basic right; 
prevailing opinion in law literature; etc.); finally, this binding force shall be the mildest when one 
or more decisions in cases are described as pure illustrations to base the legal position on them 
(Summers/Eng 1997). 
 
In Hungarian legal practice, at least in criminal and civil cases, all four degrees can be 
observed. In plenty of cases judgements can be found which have, in the event of violating 
relevant precedents or judicial practice that has become widespread on the basis thereof, 
established infringement of the law or other statutory instruments; and having set such 
judgements aside instructed, because of that, the lower courts that had made such decisions to 
start new proceedings. This can be observed, for example, in the case 1999/211. D.C. where a 
civil action concerned claiming a present back, and the basis for claiming it back was 
endangering sustenance, and it was debated whether the plaintiff‟s circumstances of life underlay 
endangering sustenance? Clause (1) § 582 of the Civil Code allows this, and the court of second 
instance deeming that the plaintiff‟s circumstances of life underlay this title to claim back made a 
decision in favour of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court`s judges proceeding in error, however, 
argued that previously `the Supreme Court had defined its position based on several decisions in 
cases that the examination of endangering sustenance might not be restricted to clarifying 
financial cover for cost of life, also that in terms of sustenance, in addition to the donor‟s income 
and financial status, it had to be examined to what extent the donor was in need because of his 
age and health condition and whether this condition was of a temporary nature or could be 
considered a condition that had become permanent.` Having examined that it eventually changed 
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the final judgement. What concerns us now in this respect is whether the judges of the supreme 
forum based this decision on `the law infringing nature of the final judgement because of 
incorrect enforcement of substantive legal rules`. That is, the decision by the judge that did not 
comply with several Supreme Court decisions in cases was qualified not only as `violating 
precedent` but `infringing statute`. This example is not a unique phenomenon, in plenty of cases 
in the revision procedure this degree of force can be ascertained with regard to judicial precedent 
both in civil and criminal actions. To give an example for criminal actions, reference can be made 
to the case 1999/100. D.C. where, in addition to other crimes, the court of second instance 
ascertained the offence of abusing official document because during the course of a house search, 
ordered due to another crime, a passport issued under the name another person was found at the 
defendant‟s place. Through that the defendant held official document of another person which he 
had concealed, that was the reason the court gave for its legal position. The Supreme Court`s 
judges proceeding in error, however, referring to permanent judicial practice and citing a specific 
court ruling indicated that holding the official document of another person in itself could not be 
considered concealment unless the defendant had given a negative answer regarding this fact to 
the owner‟s or the authorities question. Due to lack of compliance with this judicial practice the 
Supreme Court decided in the revision procedure that `the rules of criminal substantive law have 
been violated` and in view of that it set this part of the judgement aside. 
 
Even if at the level of the constitution, where only the legally binding force of the law and the 
resolution on the unity of the law on the courts are set forth, judicial precedent and judicial 
practice which is shaped from decisions in cases do not constitute law; in the actual jurisdiction 
they are explicitly defined in the judgements of the Supreme Court. This is true only in some, 
perhaps most, of the cases because quite often references to precedents appear in  Decisions of 
Courts with no more than underlying or illustrative force. That is, because in Hungarian law the 
degree of the legally binding force of `one precedent`, `several Supreme Court decisions`, 
`judicial practice` is not formally defined, in several cases these have only underlying or 
illustrative role while in other cases the infringement of these appear as the infringement of the 
legal rules. 
 
Binding force is frequently made uncertain by the fact that among the judging councils of the 
Supreme Court law interpretation decisions appear that apparently draw to different directions. A 
good example for that is given by two court rulings that point at directly opposite directions:  
1998/211. D.C.  and 1998/570. D.C. made in 1998 concerning the offence of defamation. The 
former one puts it down in its heading set in bold type that `The judging practice evolved 
concerning the offence of defamation that states that complaints, critical comments and reports 
submitted to public and social organisations in order to protect general interest or lawful private 
interest imply no danger to society even if their content is, partly or fully, untruthful, is false`. 
And subsequently, opposing the `incorrect judicial practice`, it made its decision. After that, in 
the case  1998/570. D.C. again the offence of defamation in the form of reporting was asserted 
but the judges of the Supreme Court proceeding in error, without mentioning the precedent made 
just a few months before, referring to court judgements made several years before decided in 
accordance with the `incorrect judicial practice`. And it was possible to identify this phenomenon 
several times while analysing hundreds of  decisions of courts. 
 
In this respect, the option of formal revision of judicial precedent is to be also described here. An 
institutionalised instrument of this is the procedure concerning the unity of the law introduced at 
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the end of 1997, which is initiated when `in order to further develop legal practice or guarantee 
unified judging practice a resolution on the unity of the law is required concerning an issue of 
principle; or when some council of the Supreme Court intends to depart regarding an issue of law 
from the resolution of another judging council of the Supreme Court` (clause (1) § 29 Act LXVI 
of 1997). Firstly, it is apparent that this new institution that has existed for not more than just one 
and a half year takes the decisions made by the judging councils of the Supreme Court out of the 
DC`s, the decisions in cases published in the Decisions of  Courts, and make them formally 
binding on other judging councils of the Supreme Court. This binding force means that one shall 
not depart from it unless under special proceedings, proposing to institute a procedure on the 
unity of the law and on the grounds of an approving decision thereof. 
 
A new legal institution which by force replaces another institution that has been applied for 
several decades, in the present case the normative material of the decisions in cases, guidelines 
and collegiate positions of the Supreme Court, can be realised with difficulties and minute step 
by minute step. In view of that, it can be understood that no more than 24 resolutions on the unity 
of the law have been made in the field of civil, criminal, administrative and labour law during the 
course of this one and a half year. (For example, in 1998 one labour, two civil, three 
administrative and six criminal resolutions on the unity of the law have been made; and up to the 
Autumn of 1999 three civil, three administrative and five criminal resolutions have been made.) 
It means that, for example, in addition to the approx. 150 criminal and criminal proceedings court 
rulings in 1998 there were only six resolutions on the unity of the law of this kind, or approx. 200 
civil court rulings were covered by two such resolutions on the unity of the law. 
 
The analysis of several hundreds of the aforesaid  decisions of courts has revealed that there are 
indeed definitely more decisions in cases and judicial practices that point at different directions 
than issues which are resolved on the level of resolutions on the unity of the law. For example, in 
the case 1998/211. D.C. referred to above, there was an intention to correct the `false judicial 
practice` without proposing to institute a procedure concerning the unity of the law, and as it was 
seen, another judging council of the Supreme Court without even mentioning it disregarded that 
in the case 1998/570. D.C. The institution is nevertheless suitable for the formal revision of the 
judicial precedent and time will probably set it in greater motion. 
 
4. Judicial precedent being closely linked to the text of the law 
 
It has been clearly shown in the above, that the weight of judicial precedent has significantly 
increased in Hungarian law and it means, firstly, that in judgements the frequency of basing 
decisions on high court judgements has been growing; secondly, that the binding force of former 
precedents has been enhanced which is manifested by the fact that the judges of the supreme 
forum in many cases apply sanctions against violating, ignoring, precedents the same way as 
against infringement of the legal rules. This increase of weight raises the question what the 
relationship is between the layer of judicial precedent that recently has become significantly 
noticeable and the layer of the texts of law and, in general, statutory instruments. To what extent 
precedents constitute specifying/interpreting precedents and to what extent they possibly 
constitute ruling out of provisions set forth in texts of the law? It is worth openly addressing this 
point because the two theories of judicial law that have been effective so far, the  German 
„Freirechtslehre‟ at the beginning of the 20th century and the `legal realism` that dominated in the 
1930‟s in the United States, both promoted judicial law and supported the intention to push laws 
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and the legislator in the background (see Fikentscher 1975). By integrating the one sided 
emphases of various legal concepts into a multi-layered legal concept, and apparently being 
aware of the processes of legal development in the last century, it is now possible to define 
judicial law as one of the layers of law as a kind of law that can be fitted in with no problems (see 
Pokol 1989; 1998a) but judicial law is indeed able to develop into both directions and only 
empirical examination can explore which version is realised in each country. 
 
To answer this question the starting point can be found in the entirety of our high courts` law 
interpretation practice. As it has been shown in the first half of this study on the grounds of 600 
examined high court decisions, Hungarian judicial law interpretation can be characterised as 
being accurate in the reproduction of the text of the law, and slight departure from the text of the 
law is performed only by including law dogmatics concepts into the interpretation but the basic 
rights or general law principle interpretation that has a more loosening effect is not typical of 
judges in Hungary. It cannot be doubted, however, that judges have moved from the definitely 
text positivist law interpretation of the 1970‟s towards more liberal law interpretation in recent 
years, as it has been shown by our aforesaid examination. But that has basically not questioned at 
all the close link to the text of the law present in the law interpretation of the courts of the 
country. 
 
This approach also defines the types of judicial precedents in Hungarian law. The examination of 
further 250 high court decisions made prior to preparing this study, which definitely referred to 
precedents and judicial practice in developing their legal position, has revealed that judicial 
precedent in Hungary does not consist of regulating precedents which would push the relevant 
statutory orders aside, instead they are interpreting/specifying precedents of relevant clauses of 
the law. The occurring decision making dilemmas which emerge in the midst of the colourful 
swirling of specific cases while enforcing given clauses of the law, and regarding which this or 
that kind of decision can be made under the framework of statutory order, are resolved by 
precedents by offering a normative decision that point at one of the directions. Judges who day 
in, day out face decision making dilemmas left open by the relevant clause of the law, are able to 
resolve them uniformly throughout the country by using the specifying/interpreting precedents. 
Precedents, therefore, do not take away the legislator‟s decision making competence but narrow 
individual judges` freedom of consideration. Under the text-layer of the law the layer of 
specifying/interpreting judicial precedents with their exactness due to closeness to cases provide 
the judges with obligatory points of references for making decisions. 
 
In summary it can be said that Hungarian judicial law, at least during the course of its 
development so far, has harmoniously fitted in the text of the law and has not constituted the 
spreading of judges `free law finding`. It does not mean, however, that in the future no changes 
can take place towards pushing statutory law aside because the self organisation of the judiciary, 
the disappearance of the licences of the judicial government policy that represent the majority of 
parliament in appointing leading judges took place just a few years ago. Therefore, while support 
is to be given to the development of judicial precedent as a tool that makes statutory law specific, 
it is to be guaranteed that possible departing tendencies can be noticed and necessary counter 
measures can be taken by the legislator. 
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VIII. Chapter: Constitutionalization of the law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complicated relations in modern society cannot be regulated by law unless they are separated 
into several intrinsic layers. If we drop the textual approach to law, then we can have an unbiased 
view of the system of concept categories of each branch of law under the layer of the text 
appearing on the surface which constitutes the dogmatic layer of law; in addition to these, judicial 
case law - high court precedents, judicial practices making the open usage of acts and orders 
more accurate – represents the third layer of law. The relations of these three layers of law, their 
proportions to each other are different in each legal system, but to a certain extent all three have 
been present in modern legal systems of this last century. The appearance of constitutional 
jurisdiction, which subsequent to 19
th
 century beginnings in America has spread in several 
European countries since the end of the 1940‟s and become a routine procedure after the changes 
in 1989 in Central and Eastern European countries, is a new product of development. Compared 
to dogmatically chiselled traditional administration of justice made more accurate by judicial case 
law, this new layer of law, which originally appeared in the form of human rights as the 
collection of ideological/political requirements outside legal systems in operation, is 
characterised by highly different features. One such difference is that the normative content of 
constitutional rights and freedoms and fundamental principles is more abstract than the rules of 
traditional fields of law. The other difference is due to the fact that relations between particular 
rights are mostly irreconcilably strained, and a certain right can be enforced only at the expense 
of another right or principle. These features did not cause any problems while people had to fight 
with them as ideal requirements, setting human rights against actual conditions, for the 
transformation of prevalent conditions. Judicial decisions based on them as constitutional rights 
and freedoms used for being applied in cases, however, often lead to legal uncertainty. 
 
 
1. Three dimensions of constitutionalization 
 
 
This particular problem of the layer of constitutional rights and freedoms has not been serious for 
predictable administration of justice even while its effect has been exerted on the legislator and 
other lawmakers. This has represented the prime rule during the recent half century in the 
countries where the institution of constitutional court has appeared. Constitutional rights and 
freedoms and fundamental principles have guided the alternative choice of the legislator and 
pushed the content of provisions of law in drafting acts and orders in the direction where the 
abstract instructions of fundamental rights and principles appear in them more properly. At this 
point, it is at most the question of democracy that is raised by the too wide power of judicial 
review exercised by the constitutional court. For the expression of the empirical will of the 
people in parliament formulated by the voting of millions is forced to the background on the 
grounds of the decision of a few constitutional court justices. In spite of the problem of 
democracy fundamental rights, which include overall aspects of justness, can reduce the 
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amplitudes of the empirical will of the people based on short term and rather emotional moods of 
the masses. Making a somewhat aristocratic remark, it can be said that „the radically subversive‟ 
element built into mass democracy  can be tamed by the constitutional court justices, who 
deliberate and make decisions in adherence to the standards of upper classes. Problems actually 
arise if this decision-making forum gets permanently and globally in conflict with legislature 
based on the empirical will of the people and the authoritative political elite. 
 
It constitutes a new dimension when constitutional rights and freedoms go beyond determining 
the legislation and begin to exert directly determining pressure towards the micro-processes of 
law and judicial decisions in cases as well. In addition to these two dimensions, 
constitutionalization may touch jurisprudence and dogmatic activity: by connecting internal 
issues of various branches of law and dogmatic constructions of law to constitutional rights and 
fundamental principles; and by describing the dogmatic system of various branches of law more 
or less as being deduced from fundamental rights. Subsequently, a specific branch of law will 
appear as „a constitutional branch of law‟ – „constitutional criminal law‟, „constitutional taxation 
law‟, „constitutional labour law‟, etc. – and once this has been accepted by the lawyers in the 
given branch, then, in addition to law politics criticism alongside lawmaking, „the constitutional 
rights of the branch of law‟ will be considered as the basis of interpretation of the rules of that 
branch by legislators as well. The constitutionalized jurisprudence of various branches of law 
may thus move in two, different directions: towards legislation they may appear as a new law 
politics assessment system, now condemning current legal conditions for lagging behind 
constitutionalized fundamental rights, and towards law enforcement as the supporters of judicial 
law enforcement with a new viewpoint driving law interpretation towards the constitutional rights 
under branches of law. 
 
Out of the three dimensions of constitutionalization, only with respect to the constitutionalization 
of judicial proceedings is my intention in this study to examine the operation of the layer of 
fundamental rights, and to expound the problems that arise in this field. After that, in the final 
part of the study I shall describe the phenomenon of „political fighting through litigation‟, which 
arise from these developments. By breaking elements up into three dimensions it is possible to 
assess the effect exerted by the layer of constitutional rights and freedoms on each layer of the 
legal system more accurately than by describing the constitutionalization of the entire legal 
system without any differentiation made. Thus, for example, at the comparative law conference 
arranged in 1998 in Bristol the papers prepared on this subject focused on „the 
constitutionalization of the legal order‟ in summary, while they commented the current state of 
constitutional court‟s judicial review of the legislation in various countries (see Koch 1998; 
Poplawska 1998). The subtle treatment of the subject allows that the effects of 
constitutionalization can be assessed in each dimension separately, and that the negative or 
positive assessment of one dimension should not influence the assessment made in the other 
dimension. 
 
 
2. Two aspects of the constitutionalization of judicial proceedings 
 
 
If the layer of fundamental rights go beyond the judicial review of legislation and begin to 
influence judicial decisions in cases, then the influence can be examined from two different 
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aspects. Firstly, regarding that the judge can decide the case by taking into consideration, in 
addition to the relevant legal rules, constitutional rights and freedoms. That is, in this event, 
constitutional rights and freedoms exert their effect on the judicial decision not only through 
drafting laws to be enforced by the judge but in addition to/instead of that they directly appear in 
the formation of decisions. Secondly, regarding that it exerts an effect towards the 
constitutionalization of the legal order when participation in the litigation is disconnected from 
the state of being personally concerned and more comprehensive groups, associations can enter 
the judicial proceedings for whom it is not the specific subject of the litigation that counts but the 
possibility to fight for a definite outcome of the litigation using it as means of shaping an overall 
issue. Let us look at these two aspects of constitutionalization, possibly called the substantive law 
and procedural law side of this process respectively, and the questions related them in more 
detail. 
 
2.1 The substantive law aspect of constitutionalization 
 
While in most of the countries where the institution of constitutional jurisdiction has been 
established, it has been confined to the judicial review of legislation, subsequently constitutional 
rights and freedoms and fundamental principles have not been granted a direct role in the micro-
processes of law; in Germany and the United States since the mid 1950‟s attempts have been 
made in this direction. In Germany this problem area has been called „the horizontal‟ effect of 
fundamental rights or, looking at it from another aspect, „the tertiary direction effect‟ 
(Drittwirkung); in the United Sates since the 1960‟s when the theoretical treatment of the issues 
concerning new legal developments commenced, studies on the subject have been prepared under 
the headword: „the constitutionalization‟ of solving problems in the administration of justice and 
society. The problems arising here are grasped in different width by the two thematic 
interpretations, and the wider, American thematic interpretation has corresponded to the actual 
situation that the constitutionalization of law enforcement has been performed on a wider scale 
and touching the operation of law more profoundly in the U.S. than in Germany. 
 
In Germany the Constitution declares fundamental rights to be directly enforceable rights, and 
since the 1950‟s during the course of making judicial decisions the question has arisen what role 
constitutional rights and freedoms that seem relevant in the given case may have alongside 
applicable legal provisions (Alexy 1985). Logically, in this respect, three positions are possible. 
The first can be that the judge shall not take fundamental rights into consideration because the 
legislator has already been controlled and determined either by them or the constitutional court 
decisions interpreting them. In this direction the role of fundamental rights is somewhat stronger 
when the judge needs to take into consideration the guiding of the relevant fundamental rights 
and constitutional court decisions basically in formulating his decisions tied to the relevant 
provisions of law, but also in his interpretation work because of the openness of the provisions of 
law, and needs to implement his deliberation in view of these. Finally, fundamental rights will 
attain the strongest position in the forming of the judge‟s decision when the judge can (and shall) 
both refer to fundamental rights in the interpretation and strike the applicable provisions of law 
down and base his decision entirely on constitutional provisions. 
 
These three positions emerged in German law literature from the beginning of the 1950‟s in the 
analysis of the possible effects exerted by constitutional rights and freedoms towards direct 
judicial decision; and the problem was called „the horizontal effect‟ of fundamental rights in view 
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of the fact that fundamental rights had originally protected the individual „in vertical direction‟ 
against the state and the overall community. And now their effect in the interrelations, i.e. in the 
horizontal relations, between citizens was put into focus. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court thoroughly considered its decision made on the issue, and after the Federal Labour Court 
had ignored the provisions of labour law in a labour lawsuit and decided the case directly on the 
grounds of the Constitution, and a huge debate evolved in the literature on the consequences of 
this revolution in law enforcement, the Constitutional Court took the position that fundamental 
rights might exert only indirect effect on judicial decision, and judicial decision might be based 
on them only to the extent of analysing the openness of the provisions of law, but laws should not 
be ignored. If a judge deems that a particular provision of law is in conflict with one of the 
constitutional rights and freedoms, then he can suspend his proceedings, and may appeal to the 
Constitutional Court requesting the examination of that particular provision of law. He himself, 
however, shall not ignore it. 
 
Germans have been left alone with even this middle-of-the-road position of theirs because 
Austrians and Italians, who have had constitutional jurisdiction since as early as the 1950‟s, 
having examined the matter have decided that they do not approve of the horizontal role of 
fundamental rights even to such an extent. Also, in Germany, in spite of the declarative 
recognition, the inclusion of constitutional rights and freedoms into judicial decisions has 
remained moderate even in such an indirect function. 
 
Constitutionalization has been performed on a much wider scale in the United Sates, and it has 
exerted a much broader effect on both the operations of the legal order and political life. 
Subsequently, since the 1970‟s a new tendency has begun to replace the old one, first by stopping 
further constitutionalization, then by a resolute reversal from the beginning of the 1990‟s (see 
Epp 1998). 
 
In the United States the constitutionalization of judicial proceedings was greatly connected to the 
different dominance of political forces on member state and federal level and the opposition of 
the two levels for that very reason, which eventually resulted in the Civil War in the 1860‟s. The 
federal government, the federal legislature and the separate federal court system established on it 
traditionally constituted the depositories of the central formation of will in the United States just 
becoming uniform against member state laws and member state authorities; and the continuous 
extension of federal competencies during the recent one hundred years has been accomplished by 
the more and more broadening interpretation of the Constitution by the federal courts, and by the 
Federal Supreme Court, in the first place. One aspect of this has been (in addition to the widening 
legislative power of the federal Congress to the account of member state legislatures) the 
inclusion of constitutional provisions pertaining to federal issues into judicial law enforcement, 
and through that the striking down of member state laws (and member state courts ordered to 
enforce them). To make this understandable it might be worth referring to the legal case from the 
beginning of the 1980‟s when a college in the U.S. entered a two-year contract with a PE teacher, 
but gave him notice after a year. The PE teacher intended to argue with the lawfulness of the 
notice not in compliance with labour rules, which would have fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
member state court, but by interpreting the loss of his salary as loss of property and basing his 
claim on the provision of the Constitution that sets forth that “no person shall be deprived of 
property without due process of law”. This basis of litigation transferred the case into the 
competence of the federal court, and if the judges were inclined to interpret property in such 
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terms, then a considerable part of labour cases would be executed as an action of infringement of 
a constitutional right and redress thereof. This case, however, happened to be allocated to Richard 
Posner, Chief Justice of the Chicago Federal Court of Appeal, who being an opponent of 
constitutionalization rejected the claim, and indicated to the PE teacher that in a member state 
court judgment would be made pursuant to labour rules probably in his favour (see Cohen 
1985:1117-1118). What counts here is that litigation is doubled by creating the option of 
constitutionalized litigation, and the plaintiff has the option of either prosecuting a constitutional 
lawsuit or trying to solve his or her problem pursuant to simple laws. 
 
This tendency reached its peak by the mid 1970‟s and in federal courts a parallel 
„constitutionalized‟ administration of justice evolved in addition to traditional techniques of 
litigation. The opposition evolving among lawyers and in courts made public opinion and politics 
aware of the emerging problems, and especially the law politicians of the Republican political 
side began to claim, more and more dramatically, the necessity of turning this process back. 
President Reagan put the issue in his election program at the beginning of the 1980‟s asserting 
that in the event that he was elected President, he would attempt to appoint federal justices who 
are against „the constitutionalization‟ of judicial decisions. After he had been elected, his 
administration of justice managed to break through in the 1980‟s and once the federal judiciary 
had been replaced, constitutionalization ceased to be pursued in judicial proceedings to such a 
great extent. Eventually, through filling vacancies with the nine justices coming in turn in the 
federal supreme judicial forum by the beginning of the 1990‟s, it was possible to turn the 
majority of justices towards stopping constitutionalization. Against the line of 
„constitutionalization‟ that began in 1953 with Chief Justice Earl Warren, and continued with 
Hugo Black, then with William J. Brennan, William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, the camp for 
reversing the process was represented by Felix Frankfurter, John M. Harlan, William H. 
Rehnquist, Sandra Day‟O Cooner, Antonin Scalia, who fought a hopeless struggle with them in 
the beginning, and who have constituted the majority of the supreme judicial forum in America in 
recent years. Among law scholars Ronald Dworkins has to be considered the arch supporter of 
the constitutionalization trend, while it was Alexander M. Bickel who began to fight to cut it back 
in the 1960‟s, then since the 1970‟s Robert Bork and since the 1980‟s Antonin Scalia have 
written important works to carry on with the issue. (Eventually Scalia was appointed the associate 
justice of the Federal Supreme Court in the middle of the 1980‟s, but Robert Bork‟s nomination 
failed because of the political and media strength of the opponents who acted uniformly.) 
 
Compared to the German „horizontal effect‟, the constitutionalization of law enforcement in the 
United States was thus accomplished with a more penetrating force for a while. Constitutional 
rights and freedoms and supreme court decisions interpreting them in the U.S. are made part of 
law interpretation just like in Germany, but through the independent course of constitutional 
litigation it is also possible to strike down laws the way referred to above. A broad interpretation 
of constitutional rights and freedoms, and the deduction of numerous normative points of 
reference from constitutional fundamental principles, are instrumental in completely striking 
down simple laws and the constructions of the legal dogmatic behind them; and judicial decisions 
in cases can be made on the grounds of constitutional rights and the points of reference applied in 
the literature of rights that elaborate on them, instead of provisions of law made more accurate by 
legal dogmatics (with regard to family law in the U.S. see Schneider 1988:79-121). In terms of 
legal techniques it might not be out of the question that a new kind of predictability will evolve 
after a longer period, although because of the multitudes of necessary changes it is unforeseeable 
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in what way this could happen, if it is possible at all; nevertheless, after a twenty years period of 
this trend the mainstream of American law has shifted towards reversing it. 
 
2.2 The procedural law aspect of constitutionalization 
 
In the United States, alongside the substantive law aspect of constitutionalization, from the 
1960‟s developments on the procedural side began to shift traditional administration of justice to 
the domain of constitutional law/public law for a while. The core of this was that individual 
litigation was replaced by mass action, which extremely enhanced the importance of judicial 
proceedings in view of conducting the struggles of wider groups of society. And the execution of 
mass action pursuant to constitutional rights and freedoms actually created the alternative for 
groups of society of either organising themselves into parties and attempting to attain their goals 
in the legislation through modifying laws, or fighting for them through judicial proceedings thus 
changed. 
 
Traditional litigation was shifted into this direction along two, intertwined tracks of development 
from the beginning of the 1960‟s. One of them represented the evolution of „public interest 
litigation‟ or „public law litigation‟, and the other that of „class action‟. 
 
(Public law litigation) Entering a traditional, civil action, or joining an ongoing action is 
possible only by a person whose interest protected by law is directly affected by the case in such 
action. The outcome of a massive court action often affects the status of other people in similar 
situation, especially when judicial precedent law plays a powerful role in the legal system of the 
given country. In this event, in any subsequent litigation this decision will be taken into 
consideration as precedent on behalf of the persons in similar situation; subsequently, for the 
persons who are in a situation similar to the individual litigant the outcome of the action is 
important. It apparently goes back to the fact that in the United Sates attempts have been made by 
outside parties to join judicial proceedings since the end of the last century. The first form of this 
effort was the „amicus curiae brief‟ (see Kristlov 1963). This consisted of the description of a 
lawyer‟s position written by some respectable lawyer or law professor in order „to help‟ to decide 
the given case. These letters expounded arguments, regulations applied in other countries which 
urged the judges who decided the case to proceed into a given direction. This activity is usually 
pursued by respectable lawyers, government officials, experts of large companies prior to 
superior court decisions of general importance, when the outcome of the case is meaningful for 
them. One version of the amicus curiae brief is the so-called Brandeis-brief, which expounds 
legal arguments and changes in social facts for the judges who decide cases, and attempts to 
attain secession from previous relevant precedents. Louis Brandeis, who later became the 
member of the supreme judicial forum, wrote his example setting letter in an important case in 
1908, which, after a two page traditional legal argument, outlined in a 110 page study social 
changes calling for new decisions to be made by judges against old precedents. In the midst of 
the euphoria of transforming law into „sociological jurisprudence‟ that drew upon social sciences 
this kind of letter set a pattern for „social engineer‟ lawyers for long decades. 
 
This antecedent makes the evolution of public law litigation from the 1960‟s understandable. At 
that time a modification was made in the rules of court, which allowed that anyone whose interest 
should be affected by the outcome of an ongoing action might join such action, provided that the 
party in the action in similar situation should not be able to defend the given interest. The judge 
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was obliged to permit the joining of the action; and another clause allowed that the interested 
party might join the action, even if the claimed interest was properly defended, when an overall 
fact or legal issue was concerned in the action. The judge, however, had the right of deliberation 
whether to permit the joining of the action (Vreeland 1990:279-310). Since this modification in 
the rules of court intervention has taken place in multitudes of lawsuits, and now judicial decision 
may be influenced not only from outside with an amicus curiae brief, or in the form of a 
Brandeis-brief by overall interest groups, associations but also by the parties involved in the 
lawsuit. 
 
In such event, however, the action will be essentially transformed, and the emphasis is shifted 
from an individual‟s interest to win the action to the enforcement of an overall social group‟s 
long term interest. Subsequently, the lawsuit is executed for the sake of winning a permanently 
better legal position with the participation of the unions of the relevant social group. This change 
in character will make the courtroom similar rather to the plenary session of a legislative body, 
with huge media publicity, and not the place where neutral lawyer‟s argumentation takes place. 
Litigation appears to be an alternative for political interest groups to attempting to fight for the 
modification of law as a lobby or a political party in parliament (see Chayes 1982). Choosing the 
option of political fighting through public law litigation is especially advantageous for ethnic 
groups or minorities because they can enforce their will with more difficulty in the majority 
legislature. A cutting back attempted in 1984 was justified by a preparatory subcommittee of 
Congress by stating that “The members of a particular race or sex can easily set up a group, given 
the inclination of the federal judges to acknowledge the litigation right of social groups defined in 
terms of sociology. Abstract rights and freedoms constitute a basis for such groups, which makes 
rights litigation similar rather to legislation than traditional lawsuit between class litigants” 
(quoted by Feinberg 1984:272). The golden age of public law litigation was in the 1960‟s but 
even in the period between 1986 and 1989 171 such cases can be found when examining actions 
executed in federal courts, in spite of the fact that by then the staff of federal judiciary had been 
mostly replaced, and justices considered the possibilities for joining lawsuits stricter when 
granting permission; and, consequently, the transformation of lawsuits into public law litigation 
was to a certain extent forced back. 
 
When analysing the American impact in this respect on Western European countries, it can be 
seen that the appearance of public law litigation has taken place only partially. Because here it 
usually falls within the public prosecutor‟s competence to join a lawsuit if the interest of the 
litigant is not properly represented and bears an overall social significance (for a comparative 
analysis of this see: Feldman 1992). In spite of this, certain developments have already begun 
with a view to attaining that the law of the European Union shall be enforced through judicial 
proceedings against reluctant domestic laws by applying to the European Court of Justice 
regarding specific cases if the relevant social group has not been able to enforce it because of the 
resistance of domestic legislature (see Feldman 1992). In the form of a germ it is the same as 
what has resulted in „the constitutionalization‟ of law enforcement in the fight between federal 
and member state political forces in the United Sates during the recent 40 years. In Europe quite 
often it is through the extension of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice based on the 
broadening interpretation of the Union‟s Treaty that member state legislatures are more strongly 
subject to the Union. Currently, however, on the level of the Union there is no fundamental rights 
charter (the European Court of Human Rights applies the European Human Rights Treaty 
regarding both the Union and each member state of the European Commission) and therefore „the 
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pushing forward‟ of the formation of will in Brussels has not been able to proceed by applying 
fundamental rights in a wider sense. Thus, although the status of the relation between the 
European Union and its members states is similar in every respect to the situation in the U.S. at 
the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and there this situation led to the 
(federal) constitutionalization of law enforcement, this cannot generate similar phenomena 
among the member states of the European Union. But if a fundamental rights charter with proper 
legal force were after all established in the European Union, and attempts are being made to 
attain this goal by some political groups, then the creation of the United States of Europe would 
be supposedly accelerated through that channel as well. 
 
With regard to public law litigation reference should be made also to the phenomenon of 
strategic litigation. This phenomenon evolves due to the existence of precedent law in the 
countries where precedent law plays a larger than usual role, and because of that in the United 
States public law litigation assumes the nature of strategic litigation. The point is that strong 
interest groups are interested not only in winning a particular case, they litigate not primarily to 
win a particular action but for the sake of enforcing a decision in a leading case in favour of 
them. One of the consequences of this is that if prospects in the particular lawsuit are 
unfavourable, then interest groups attempt in any way to come to a agreement with the opposing 
party, possibly by accepting worse conditions than the ones that they could after all obtain in the 
action, just to avoid that a sentence is made, so that no legal „trace‟ of the given case should 
remain. On the contrary, if conditions for winning are good, then under no circumstances are they 
willing to come to an agreement because the prime aim is to attain precedent in the given case 
(see Tushnet/Schneider/Kovner 1988:975). 
 
(Class action) This form has evolved primarily in mass claims for damages when due to a large 
company‟s responsibility for particular products or because of an environment polluting event 
crowds of several thousand or ten thousand people become affected. In this event those affected, 
forming a litigation group, enter the action as a quasi interest group so that the judge attain the 
payment of damages by fighting. But the spreading of „class action‟ has transferred this form of 
litigation to numerous other fields, and measures of public administration agencies, school 
authorities, etc. are often attacked in this form. And through this spreading, class action often gets 
fused with public law litigation (see Elhauge 1991:72-77). In this event, a single judicial decision 
decides the case of ten thousands of people; what is more there are tendencies that on condition 
that anyone shall prove that he or she shall „rank among the class‟, that is, shall be in a situation 
identical with the situation the parties involved in the action were in, a judicial certification may 
be issued to such person regarding the judgment of his or her claim without the need of such 
person formally taking part in the action because it is apparent that the judge – as any lawmaker – 
decides the case of huge social masses, and not the case of a particular individual. 
 
 
 
3. Attempts made at constitutionalizing law enforcement in Hungary 
 
 
Right from the outset it should be noted that in Hungarian judicial law enforcement no major 
shifts have taken place in the direction of constitutionalization; nevertheless, recently there have 
been attempts that indicate the appearance of concepts with an impact in this direction. In the 
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description of the state of affairs in Hungary the analysis of these attempts is again worth splitting 
into two parts, and after exploring the substantive law dimension of constitutionalization the 
realm of procedural law needs to be looked at separately. 
 
 
3.1 The substantive law aspect of constitutionalization.  
 
The first point that should be made in the analysis of the state of affairs in Hungary is that the 
Constitutional Court created in 1989 by the change of regime was vested with an enormous 
power to review legislation, and the tribunal itself further augmented this power, but did not push 
forward to review judicial proceedings and decisions. (In adherence to the model evolved in 
Western Europe, in Hungary the Constitutional Court is operated as a separately organised body 
and it is not the Supreme Judicial Court that undertakes this task.) Nor did the provisions of the 
Constitution allow this pushing forward, but – because in another respect it did not cause any 
problem for the judges of the Constitutional Court when extending their competence – it was 
much more important that feeling the tension generated by their expansive action against the 
legislature the judges of the Constitutional Court decided themselves in 1991, in the initial period 
of their operation, that they did not intend to compete with the law interpretation activity of the 
Supreme Court covering the entire judicial system (see the Constitutional Court Resolution of 
57/1991). 
 
A new attempt to create the path for the Constitutional Court‟s judicial review of the resolutions 
made by the Supreme Court on the unity of law seems to have changed this position. (The 
resolutions on the unity of law made by the supreme judicial forum are binding pursuant to the 
Constitution on lower courts when later they deal with cases similar to these.) The problem here 
is that this would make the direct effect of constitutional rights and freedoms and fundamental 
principles on judicial law interpretation formally recognised. So far the judges of the 
Constitutional Court have been able to intervene only in the drafting of laws pertaining to judges, 
and thus constitutional rights and freedoms and fundamental principles have exerted their 
formative effect only in this domain. By this step a fundamental breakthrough would take place, 
and abstract rights and freedoms would be directly asserted in the realm of judicial proceedings 
and decisions as well. 
 
 
There is further cause for concern that should the path for constitutional court‟s direct judicial 
review of the resolutions on the unity of law be opened, then the halt prior to the decision made 
by the other, supreme judicial forum, also constituting judicial precedent law, will become simply 
unjustified. The path once opened for the constitutional law review of judicial law interpretation 
would be constrained to run through the entire high court case-law material. And if that happens, 
then for lawyers it will become a primary task to search for help in the field of constitutional 
rights and freedoms and fundamental principles in addition to the provisions of law unfavourable 
for their clients. These are abstract and flexible enough to make any case that seems to be losing 
defensible. And courts, either at lower or medium level, shall not reject to transfer the action to 
the domain of the Constitution as it is done today with reference made to the Constitutional Court 
Resolution 57/1991. (See the judicial decision  223. in 1998, for example.) 
 
In summary, if the resolution on the unity of law were made subject to constitutional court‟s 
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judicial review, then within a short time we would get through the necessary steps to the 
constitutionalization of law enforcement in the realm of substantive law, even if this would not be 
supported by the majority of constitutional court judges at all. And whether it would stay on 
“medium” level, as it was the case with the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in Germany 
described above, or would be transferred to the level of direct constitutional law litigation as 
happened in the federal jurisdiction in the U.S., cannot be predicted. This latter case has once 
occurred in Hungarian administration of justice when a local judicial court striking down the 
relevant provisions of legal rules decided an abortion case on the grounds of the Constitution. It 
was approvingly welcome by minor jurist circles but overall public opinion formed among 
lawyers and the judiciary reacted negatively to this case. 
 
It should be noted that in Central-Eastern Europe it is Poland where attempts have been made to 
constitutionalize law enforcement, and until 1997 the constitutional court there had the power of 
obligatory law interpretation vis-á-vis judicial courts. Law interpretation pursuant to abstract 
rights and freedoms always draws ideological/political aspects more intensively, and finally this 
led to open clash between the supreme judicial forum and the constitutional court judges. As a 
result of the clash the new Polish Constitution in 1997 voided the obligatory law interpretation 
power of constitutional court judges and their option to intervene in law enforcement. (See 
Poplawska 1998:132-133). 
 
3.2 The procedural law aspect of constitutionalization.  
 
As it has been described in the analysis of the constitutionalization of American judicial 
proceedings, in this domain legal actions are made subject to public law and constitutionalized by 
overall social groups who join the action alongside private persons directly interested in and 
affected by the action. This shifts the emphasis from winning a particular action in the short run 
to indirect, long-term effects. That brings along both permanent legal effects (e.g., obtaining a 
high court precedent which may create legal basis for later claims for a wide range of people 
affected by the given issue) and the involvement of a broader, political public opinion in the 
procedure of the action. 
 
Looking at the activity of jurists, judges and lawmakers in Hungary, it can be immediately 
ascertained in summary that, contrary to the extensive presence of public law litigation and class 
actions intertwined with political implications in the U.S., these are not frequent in our country. 
The aforesaid abortion case, which has been the only example, even in terms of substantive law, 
of any attempt made at constitutionalization, appeared in the media and was considered by 
political public opinion as a place for clashing with advocates of contrary social views; and it 
involved the anti-abortion association and the data protection ombudsman, who referred to the 
protection of a constitutional right, as well as the law politicians of the small group of activist 
lawyers who were fighting for an overall constitutionalization of the judicial proceedings. 
Furthermore, in some of the criminal procedures with ethnic implications it can be observed that 
the representatives of human rights activist organisations with noticeable media support, the 
Roma Parliament, the National Ethnic Minorities Legal Aid Office, e.g., take firm action to 
defend perpetrators of Gypsy origin, and approach the problems of the criminal procedure in the 
light of constitutional law instead of the criminal law and the rules of criminal code. This 
phenomenon, however, has not yet evolved in wider areas in domestic jurisdiction. 
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Dissolving this summary statement and separating relevant legal frameworks, it can be said about 
the institutional and practical background concerned in the issue that on the level of legal 
frameworks nothing would thwart the shifting of judicial proceedings towards public law. 
 
In civil actions in Hungary, pursuant to the European prime rule, public prosecutors also have an 
extensive right to enter an action and intervene in an action, although this right has been 
narrowed by the statutory modifications made after the changes in 1989; also, the Constitutional 
Court Resolution 1/1994 deemed that a part of public prosecutors‟ power to enter an action was 
anti-constitutional. But even today public prosecutors apply to take legal proceedings quite freely 
when the obligee is unable to defend its rights (see clause (1) §.9 of the Civil Procedure (CP)). 
Also, numerous special rules of law empower public prosecutors to bring a lawsuit or take firm 
action in civil lawsuits already initiated (see pp. 36-47 of the explanation of CP), In addition to 
public prosecutors, social organisations are also authorised by law in certain areas to bring an 
action or intervene in a lawsuit. Thus, Clause (2), §.109 of Act LIII of 1995 shall empower 
citizens‟ environment protection organisations to take an action in general provided that they 
shall notice any activity that endanger the environment anywhere. Likewise, consumer protection 
social organisations shall be authorised under §.39 Act CLV of 1997 to do so in the event of any 
infringement of customers‟ rights (see pp. 40-41 of the explanation of the CP). 
 
Also, wide legal frameworks for civil actions to attain the function of public law/political actions 
are created under §.54-57 of the CP, which regulate intervention in a lawsuit. It can be said that 
they allow intervention into an action on a much wider scale than the above outlined American 
solutions because there interested parties may intervene on condition that the interest in the action 
is not properly represented. The Hungarian regulation, on the contrary, does not make the rule 
subject to this restriction, and “anyone who is legally interested in what the outcome of the action 
in progress between other persons will be, may, prior to the trial preceding the passing of a 
judgment by a court of first instance has been adjourned, intervene in order to facilitate the 
winning of such action by the party with identical interest" (CP Clause (1) §. 54.). And, the points 
what the legal interest shall be and how directly one shall be concerned is left by the vague 
phrasing to be determined by the prevailing judicial practice. In the United States in the 1960-
70‟s, e.g., when general political opinion greatly supported the implementation of social changes 
through law, judges were willing to approve any citizen‟s compliance with the condition of being 
legally concerned asserting that as a taxpayer any citizen should be concerned in some way in 
any legal case with broader impact (see Chayes 1982). In the judicial practice in Hungary the 
interest by which one is entitled to intervene is interpreted in a restrictive sense; and this 
regulation has remained problem free primarily because Hungarian civil organisations have not 
entered in their repertoire the attainment of their goals through lawsuits. 
 
Furthermore, for assigning public law function to civil actions the institution of „joinder‟ set forth 
under Hungarian regulation, provided for under §. 51 of the CP, is also at hand. It is in every 
respect basically identical with the American institution of class action, and a possible change in 
the strategy of domestic civil organisations can make it a suitable means of pushing actions into 
the direction of public law as it happened in the United Sates in the 1960-70‟s. Clause (c) of the 
aforesaid Section, e.g., allows the option of applying the institution of joinder, i.e., joint action, in 
a broad sense provided that “the claims in the action arise from similar content and legal base”. 
 
The joining of criminal actions by wider social groups, possibly associations, is allowed by the 
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fact that §.57 of the Criminal Code secures participation in the action for “other interested 
parties”. This innocent power under procedural law will, of course, exert a genuine overall effect 
when other interested parties who appear in criminal proceedings, or, possibly the association (or 
the representatives thereof) of a wider circle of the interested parties, base their claims on 
constitutional rights and freedoms instead of the procedural law and criminal substantive law, and 
thus change the function of the lawsuit. The same applies, as a matter of course, to joining civil 
actions. Such actions assume public law function also by their substantive law basis being shifted 
towards constitutional rights and fundamental principles and constitutional court decisions made 
on them alongside the procedural aspect of mass action. The joint effect exerted by the two 
domains will actually transform the traditional judicial proceedings. 
 
Thus, in Hungary legal frameworks are available in the domain of procedural law for the 
constitutionalization of law enforcement; and, in addition to the confining effect exerted by the 
European law culture, it has been actually the lack of a strategy in this respect of domestic civil 
organisations that has fortunately safeguarded domestic law enforcement from being shifted 
towards constitutionalization. It seems, however, that the intense responsiveness of dominant 
groups in the sphere of intellectuals and the media to the intellectual influence of American 
intelligent circles, makes this kind of shift more probable in our country than it has been possible 
in the Western European countries in the recent decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
IX. Chapter: Political fighting through litigation 
 
 
 
In European legal systems continuous political fighting and the competition between various 
decision alternatives, which have evolved after the attainment of political democratisation (thus, 
in the Western parts of the Continent since the second half of the 19
th
 century, and in the Eastern 
parts, in their recreated form, since the political changes in 1989), are organised in parliament and 
around it. Political decisions becoming state decisions, thus laws, government decrees, etc., 
constitute the main path for attained results, agreed compromises of political fighting to become 
law. The different logic of law and politics will be at this point transformed by an intermediary 
law politics sphere, which nears them to one another through a series of transformations. This 
way the different logic of the two subsystems, the righteous/unrighteous approach in law, the 
assessment duality of either taking over the government or going into opposition as the logic of 
politics, will remain more or less intact, and politics will, after all, be able to transfer the majority 
priorities of the empirical will of the people into the law, the content of acts. 
 
The intermediary law politics sphere between the distinct subsystems of law and politics rests 
partly on the side of the legal subsystem: in the form of lawyer associations and other 
professional organisations, which are no longer forums for elaborating models of legal dogmatic 
but forums for choosing between them – by paying attention primarily to social consequences 
and not simply to technical aspects of how to avoid contradictions in terms of legal dogmatics 
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when choosing between various regulatory models de lege ferenda. On the other hand, law 
politics institutions evolve also on the side of the political system as the divisions of the law 
politicians of each political party: law work teams of parliamentary party factions, law 
departments and events of party colleges, e.g., can be referred to in this respect. This dual 
structure of law politics transforms the regulatory models that arise from within the law in two 
phases, and turns those supported by the majority in parliament into statutory orders. The 
organisation of law politics can be identified everywhere where a multiparty system and a 
parliamentary legislature is in the centre of the political system and the legal order. In Western 
European countries and after the political changes in 1989 in Central-Eastern European countries 
this law politics model represents the main path for the connection between law and politics. 
 
It is possible to observe another model for connecting law and politics, which attempts to transfer 
political aims to the realm of the law through court proceedings; this model began to develop in 
the United Sates in the 1960‟s and became a dominant phenomenon for one and a half decade, 
but since the 1970‟s it has been forced back. Owing to American intellectual/political impacts, 
however, this model has appeared, since then, to a certain extent, in some Western European 
countries, in spite of the fact of having been forced back in its mother country; and, especially in 
the new Central European democracies certain jurists show responsiveness to it. 
 
 
1. The evolution of political fighting through litigation 
 
Wherever political democracy and alternative political efforts and interests may be openly 
asserted, on the sites of law determination opposing political forces will most probably appear as 
well. Thus, wherever within the legal system high court precedents play a major part in the 
determination of law, each political group will, understandably, push forward to influence them, 
because such precedents will determine the possibilities of taking action for thousands of 
concerned parties later on as law. How such pushing forward towards judicial decision takes 
place is determined by plenty of structural circumstances. To understand them it is worth 
comparing the two countries applying common law, the UK and the U.S. where judicial 
precedent law traditionally plays an important part, because in these two countries, in spite of 
having a common starting point, political fighting through judicial litigation has developed in 
strikingly different ways. 
 
In the United Kingdom lawyers and especially barristers, authoritative in determining law, and 
the judiciary evolving from them have remained internally homogeneous in terms of politics, 
from first to last, essentially by being rested on the interests of the upper classes interested in the 
maintenance of the status quo. In most of the cases only political parties have been able to attain 
political changes in the existing institutions and prevailing solutions. It has contributed to this 
situation that -after the university training of lawyers the mechanisms of the professional career 
of barristers/judges select those promoted on the grounds of their commitment to the existing 
institutions. Barristers shall enter the circle of the Queen‟s Counsellors subject to the proposal of 
the Lord Chancellor, and the appointed shall enter high courts from there, but always from the 
row of judges one grade lower, thus the judges who accede to the position of Law Lords go 
through several screenings during a period of long years. This course of the professional career 
prevents lawyers with activist lawyer‟s attitude from playing a part of any importance in the 
determination of the English Law. On the contrary, from 1900 in the United Sates the focal point 
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of tertiary level lawyer‟s training was more and more shifted to universities, and by the 1960-70‟s 
owing to the opening of the universities to the widest layers of society lawyers were recruited 
from the entire scale of society. Since then American jurists have consisted of black activists who 
studied Marxism and Leninism, just as well as bellicose feminists, activist lawyers of 
homosexual/lesbian groups, etc., and combative conservative activist lawyers organised as a 
reaction against them. And this internal distribution of political camps have taken roots in 
university departments with staffs of department professors working pursuant to different 
concepts of law; and, in like manner, renowned feminist activists, black civil rights activists and 
combative conservative judges opposing them have been appointed to the judiciary, subject to 
whether the conservative Republicans or the liberal Democrats have given the President of the 
United States and the legal administration. 
 
These two opposing forms of professional organisation of lawyers have given different chances 
for political fighting through litigation to evolve; and, while in the UK this has blocked its way, 
and therefore political forces attempt to attain the changes important for them through 
parliamentary laws instead; in the United Sates the internal groups of lawyers having become 
politically heterogeneous and their spreading to most of jurist professor‟s and judicial positions 
have provided proper precondition for its evolution. 
 
The lawyers split into political camps would, however, not have been able to establish the 
institution of political fighting through litigation themselves. And indeed another development, 
“the rights revolution”, commenced after Earl Warren‟s accession to the Chief Justiceship of the 
Supreme Court in the U.S. in 1953 contributed to its establishment as well. There are records 
from earlier of chief justices deciding cases pursuant to constitutional rights and freedoms instead 
of the provisions of laws, but after the appointment of Justice Warren, step by step, a majority 
evolved who deemed it possible to reshape the society of the United Sates through litigation for 
social changes based on fundamental rights. Numerous political efforts had been unsuccessful in 
getting through the legislation of either Congress or member states because they were supported 
only by minor groups of society, and the majority of society opposed them. It was in this situation 
when Warren became Chief Justice, and once Felix Frankfurter who opposed activist jurisdiction 
had left the forum of justices in 1962, “the rights revolution”, the trend of social changes through 
litigation based on constitutional rights and freedoms, could begin to develop unimpeded. 
 
It was of course also of prime importance that in the 1960‟s the Democrats gave the Presidents of 
the United States, first J.F. Kennedy, later assassinated, then Lyndon Johnson, who in their 
practice of appointing federal court judges promoted with the greatest enthusiasm law professors, 
activist jurists considered to be the advocates of the rights revolution. Federal court judges so 
appointed were more and more ready to approve litigation based on fundamental rights pursuant 
to the supporting precedents of the Supreme Court, and thus struck down laws passed by 
Congress and member state courts. Lawyers, citizens, following suit, became more and more 
“rights conscious”, and under the stimulus of support by federal courts based their lawsuits more 
and more on fundamental rights, avoiding legal actions based on simple provisions of laws. 
 
This development was overwhelmingly supported by the majority of competent dailies and the 
media, and all this gradually built up a favourable atmosphere for rights service throughout the 
universities and in intelligent circles. (A typically recurring favourite scene of the films made in 
the 1960‟s and 70‟s showed a simple black workingwoman (a cleaning lady or a secretary, etc.) 
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engaged in a lawsuit, who looking up at the figure over the entrance of the court and reading the 
words of the Constitution suddenly realised that she had rights and expressing it with simple 
words in the courtroom put verbose lawyers to shame.) Based on favourable media support and 
climate of opinion, in the beginning black civil rights movements, then, in the 1970‟s, feminist 
movements, and finally, in the 1980‟s, homosexual/lesbian movements built up their institutions. 
These three rights movements, which, mostly in association, have been able to dominate 
numerous American universities and cultural institutions since the 1980‟s, have set an example 
for various efforts how to engage in political fighting through litigation. The movements of 
immigrants, environmentalists, the homeless, protectors of animals, etc. have all attempted to 
attain their political aims by applying the litigation strategy thus worked out. 
 
Alongside the formulating of political will based on legislature, parties and parliamentary 
lobbies, all this generated a “secondary political system” in the United Sates from the 1960‟s, 
which based on constitutional rights and freedoms led through judicial litigation. This tendency 
of development, however, began to break more and more since the middle of the 1970‟s, and 
during the term of the Republican presidents (Reagan, Bush) in the 1980‟s was very much forced 
back, but political fighting through litigation continues to maintain considerable positions. 
 
 
2. The legal frameworks of political fighting through litigation 
 
Lawyers split up into camps within the profession can use judicial action for political fighting 
only in the event that some rules of substantive law and the code of procedure are redrafted, or 
reinterpreted, so that instead of/alongside an individual party engaged in a legal action overall 
social groups may appear in the action and litigate in line with abstract and thus politically easily 
flexible fundamental rights, instead of simple provisions of laws. Now that the aspect of 
fundamental rights has been discussed, let us examine the rules of procedural law, which help this 
process. 
 
One of them is the broadening of the legal term “standing”, the right to initiate an action or 
intervene in an action, which gives power both to the party who is directly and personally 
involved in the case and parties who are just loosely concerned. This broadening was made in the 
beginning of the 1960‟s in the United States, and, as it has been referred to above, there were 
judges who were willing to approve any litigant party‟s compliance with the condition of being 
legally concerned by asserting that as a taxpayer any citizen should be concerned in some way in 
any legal case with broader impact. A further process to widen proceedings was the broadening 
of the term „class action‟, as a result of which several thousands of people and the lawyers of 
their associations could participate in the action: in a damage suit initiated because of the 
damaging effect of a product of a manufacturing company; for example, or, in a class action 
against an authority‟s order. Another form of this was „public interest litigation‟, or in other 
words “public law litigation”, which evolved also in the 1960‟s, the main point of which was that 
when an overall legal issue or fact was in focus in an action, then anyone who were somehow 
concerned in the issue could join the action. Social movement lawyers specialised in political 
fighting through litigation made sure that the lawsuit focused not on simple provisions of law and 
the restricted legal deliberation thereof, but overall rights issues. 
 
Finally, it was an important legal support in the development of political fighting through 
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litigation that from the 1960‟s, under pressure of presidential administrations supporting it federal 
laws were passed which allowed the assumption of legal costs by the state if in a rights action the 
plaintiff had won the action; and in such proceedings the postponement of the payment of legal 
costs until the end of the proceedings was permitted. 
 
All these formed the basis, even on the level of procedural law, of the unhindered growth of 
political fighting through litigation in the United Sates. 
 
3. The organisation of political fighting through litigation 
 
The organisation basis of political fighting through litigation is constituted by non-profit, “public 
interest” lawyer‟s offices, jurist departments of human rights institutions and various movements, 
associations. The existence of such organisations en masse in a country is a precondition required 
for this kind of litigation to develop to a noticeable level simultaneously with traditional 
litigation. For lack of these, it is vain that the high court judiciary becomes responsive to political 
fighting through litigation, it is vain that through their decisions they attempt to urge certain 
segments of society to attain remarkable changes; mass actions will fail, and without sustained 
effect the entire political fighting through litigation will come to a sudden stop. The supreme 
judicial forum in India, e.g., following the American pattern, commenced a practice of activist 
judgement to shape society at the end of the 1970‟s, but due to aforesaid causes it died out 
without any effect after a while (see Epp 1998:110). 
 
It was not like that in the United States. There the organisation of political fighting through 
litigation began as early as the beginning of 1900, although at that time the judiciary firmly 
resisted the appeal of fundamental rights and their adherence to the law was characterised by a 
rigid, conservative attachment to the words and phrases of legal rules. When quite rarely they 
acted firmly against certain laws in line with fundamental rights, even then they did that in the 
interest of the forces that protected the existing conditions and relations between forces; as in the 
Lochner case, e.g., which became the symbol of conservative activism for decades. In spite of all 
these, ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) the first great fundamental rights organisation 
was founded in the United Sates as early as the beginning of the 1920‟s followed by NAACP 
(National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) that fought for equality of rights 
for black people and numerous other fundamental rights organisations. Right from the outset the 
most important one of these had always been ACLU, which had been funded since its setting up 
by American financial circles interested in changes, and in the beginning this organisation was 
the leaven in setting up several similar organisations, both by contributing to their organisation 
and funding them (see Epp 1998:27-49). 
 
Without these organisations it would have been impossible to launch the rights revolution since 
legal costs that cover long, multiphase litigation were far more than the financial means of 
individual litigants. Only the financial support given by ACLU and the other fundamental rights 
organisation established with its help could guarantee that simple litigation was to be extended to 
litigation based on constitutional rights and freedoms. Indispensable was the presence of 
fundamental rights organisations in actions also because with traditional jurist‟s expertise and 
methods there would have been no chance for fundamental rights argumentation marshalling 
facts of moral philosophy, sociology and other branches of science. Only lawyers of 
organisations specialised in these fields were able to elaborate that. 
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After these beginnings, by the end of the 1930‟s, when by breaking the position of the 
conservative justices who opposed the New Deal the majority of the supreme judicial forum was 
turned gradually towards supporting the „progressive‟ change, the spirit of „Let‟s turn society 
from fundamental rights to progressive direction!‟ slowly began to spread at the peak of federal 
judiciary vis-á-vis the conservative majority in the legislature. This had been almost completed 
by 1947 but finally it was Earl Warren‟s appointment in 1953 that accomplished the revolution. 
The readiness of the majority of the justices of the Supreme Court, who turned against the 
legislature, to apply fundamental rights on an activist basis gave a further push to the 
development of cause lawyering organisations, and by the 1980‟s masses of them had been set up 
(Menkel-Meadow 1998:31-68). Alongside rights legal aid associations either incorporated into 
movements or built up as ancillary organisations of these, from that time began to take shape the 
system of non-profit public interest lawyer‟s offices, which were formally independent lawyer‟s 
offices just as any normal lawyer‟s office but the staff committed to specific causes were – and 
continue to be – actually regarded as activist lawyers, rather than neutral lawyers who worked 
purely for retaining fee. (The latter were called derogatorily „hired gun‟ by activist lawyers 
contrasted with their unselfish, committed legal work.) But because on the grounds of legal 
regulations made from the 1960‟s the funding of constitutional rights litigation from public 
sources commenced and huge masses of such actions were initiated, alongside the initial 
committed lawyers entered neutral lawyers working primarily for money; thus, „lawyer 
technicians‟, who worked essentially for retaining fee but continued to maintain a neutral 
relationship with the case and the client, were now distinguished from genuine activist lawyers 
(see MacCann/Silverstein 1998:261-292). Since the 1970‟s in the several hundreds of lawyer‟s 
offices of this kind five-six thousand social movement lawyers have worked, including neutral 
lawyer technicians, and this number has not decreased ever since; although since the 1980‟s 
because of the federal judiciary having been shifted towards textual approach to rules of law the 
chances of this activity winning lawsuits have considerably diminished (Scheingold 1998:118-
150). 
 
Litigation based on social movement lawyers (or, as they call themselves „cause lawyers‟) show 
some fundamental differences beside traditional, normal leading of actions by lawyers, and these 
features well indicate that political viewpoints directly enter the realm of procedure through the 
various legal aspects kept separately in traditional lawsuits. Five major differentiating features 
can be discerned in the legal actions of social movement lawyers compared to traditional lawsuits 
(see a summary on this in Trubek/Kransberger 1998:202-205). 
 
1. „Humanising the action‟, which means the attempt to confront argumentation confined to 
traditional legal aspects and the constraint to mould the case into legal categories; and the 
statement of the facts of the case with as exhaustive sociological data as possible. This kind of 
action has a great advantage in the American type litigation which is based on an extensive 
involvement of lay jurors with jurors present, in addition to criminal cases, both in civil 
actions and lawsuits that fall under other branches of law; and where the advocates of rights 
activism permanently require that the function of the jurors be augmented. Instead of 
reduction to legal aspects a wide-ranging statement of facts with emotional, moral, political 
overtones, addressed as much to the jury as the professional judge – this is what makes an 
action „humane‟. 
2. „Politicising actions‟, which means that instead of legal arguments and concepts that are 
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traditional and politically mostly neutral (or, as phrased by social movement lawyers: that 
apply more concealed political considerations) overtly feminist, antiracist movement, etc. 
legal arguments are used subject to which particular sector of social movements the political 
fighting through litigation concerned falls under. It should be noted here that the university 
sections of American social movement lawyers, who have been able to establish themselves 
since the 1970‟s and 80‟s at law schools of universities, have consciously attempted to work 
out modifications of concepts and out of them systems of concepts under various branches of 
law which represent overtly feminist, racial (protective towards black or coloured people) or 
homosexual/lesbian legal constructions. And social movement lawyers use these in actions, 
preferably avoiding traditional law dogmatics concepts. Because these are, they believe, 
antifeminist, racist and heterosexually biased. 
3. „Making actions collective‟, which means that alongside the individual litigant as many 
number of other parties in similar situation are to be involved as possible. As it has been 
indicated, since the 1960‟s this has been made possible by joining public interest actions, 
class actions and by filling the federal judiciary in these years with judges who are responsive 
in this respect. 
4. „Making actions media events‟, which means that in the procedure of the action alongside the 
aim of winning the suit appears the aim of presenting the case (and the „cause of movement‟) 
in the mass media. What is more, the broadest possible presence in the media through 
litigation constitutes an impact which outdoes the benefit of winning of the action, because 
the „cause‟ becomes known to the general public, multitudes of sympathizers might be won, 
and the initiation of similar lawsuits in other parts of the country pursuant to the pattern 
presented in the media might be urged. Therefore, social movement lawyers often acquiesce 
in losing the action when the circumstances of the lawsuit make huge presence in the media 
probable. This may, however, be in conflict with the aim of attaining an important precedent, 
which is one of the essential goals of social movement lawyers in rights actions (strategic 
litigation), and this urges them to refrain from litigation doomed to be lost. And, indeed, 
materials on „cause lawyering‟ notice that quite often raging battles are fought between non-
lawyer activists who prefer presence in the media at any cost and activist lawyers of 
movements who keep strategic legal aims much more in view (MacCann/Silverstein 
1998:263-274). 
5. „Emotionalising the action‟, which means that the litigant, often multitudes of parties, and the 
lawyer share emotional grounds. Social movement lawyers, cause lawyers are not simply 
„hired guns‟ in the hand of the litigant who are ready to put into action their brilliant legal 
technique on behalf of any client for a proper fee, but „associates sharing ideas and principles‟ 
who live for the „cause‟ very much like their clients represented by them. This, however, 
often gives rise to the conflict that the client, with a view to concentrating on his or her own 
particular interests, might be inclined to come to an agreement and in general attempts to 
focus on his or her own specific case, while committed „cause lawyers‟ fight for the overall 
cause. This tension can be eased by involving in the action as many clients as possible, 
because that way the all-embracing nature becomes manifest and the social movement lawyer 
concentrating on such all-embracing cause can act rather free from the requirements of the 
individual litigant. 
 
All these features can develop in a powerful form if the costs of constitutional rights lawsuit are 
undertaken by the state, and in this event social movement lawyers will search for the client 
indispensable for the action purely as a justification; they may even pay, under some pretext, the 
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person formally involved as plaintiff so that they could initiate the lawsuit based on the client. In 
this event, because the client is not to bear any costs, social movement lawyers can freely shape 
the action in line with the above-described features. That is why it means the greatest danger for 
political fighting trough litigation when public funding of constitutional rights litigation is 
curtailed either by federal or member state legislature; and this has occurred several times in the 
United Sates in recent decades; to say nothing of the endless number of bills lying submitted to 
federal and member state legislatures. 
 
After the descriptive presentation let us now briefly look at the track along which law and politics 
are connected in terms of assessment. While the law politics sphere organised around the 
parliament is based on keeping the logic of the two subsystems sound, and brings over regulatory 
propositions from the legal dogmatic sphere through double transformation without damaging the 
closed construction of law, political fighting through litigation takes political fighting and its 
viewpoints directly into the courtroom. Furthermore, as a precondition of that it politicises law 
departments of universities, and creates there overtly political law theories, legal constructions 
that overtly assume political viewpoints. Political fighting through litigation thus evades 
legislature and using abstract constitutional rights and freedoms as weapons turns straight 
towards the courtroom, and with social movement lawyers, university activist law professors or 
courtroom cause lawyers, realises its goal directly inside law, preferably with huge presence in 
the media, broadcast live to public opinion. 
 
 
4. The appearance of political fighting through litigation in Hungary 
 
The legal culture and the organisation of lawyers in Europe do not favour the evolution of 
political fighting through litigation in Hungary as it has not been the case in other European 
countries either. In Hungary the organisation of politics takes place rather steadily around the 
parliamentary field, and the departments of university law faculties are mostly attached to the 
politically neutral set of traditional law dogmatics constructions. Here the deep-seated attitude of 
lawyer‟s ethic represents adherence to dry/elegant argumentation in courtrooms, and the 
obligation to exclude direct political overtones. Therefore, political fighting through litigation has 
not been able to get a foothold even in the countries where constitutional jurisdiction has evolved. 
(In the beginning, from the end of the 1940‟s, this referred to Germany, Italy and Austria; then 
from the end of the 1970‟s Greece, Portugal and Spain followed suit; and after the political 
changes in 1989 most of the Central-Eastern European countries have also introduced this 
institution.) Germany has gone the farthest towards it by acknowledging the effect of 
fundamental rights in the interpretation of laws, but this legal possibility has not developed into 
political fighting through litigation, to the contrary, the inclusion of fundamental rights into the 
interpretation of the provisions of law made them „embedded in legalese‟. That is, it has been 
more typical that fundamental rights have been supplied with dogmatics and thus „tamed‟ than 
fundamental rights have politicised judicial courtrooms. 
 
After these antecedents it seems surprising that in spite of the fact that the existence of 
constitutional rights and constitutional jurisdiction in Hungary, as an institution created after the 
political changes in 1989, goes back only for ten years, but minor lawyer‟s circles have already 
set out to exploit the possibilities of political fighting through litigation. Looking at the sources of 
financing and intellectual motivations, these developments arise directly from the social groups 
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interested in American political fighting through litigation, and they are actually the 
transplantation of institutions and solutions tested for decades into Hungary. Their basis is 
represented by the Central European University, the Fudamentum Human Rights and 
Documentation Centre and some social movement lawyers of various legal aid organisations and 
movements of various ethnical groups basically built up on the financial basis of the American 
Soros Foundation. Let us look at what chances they have for introducing the practice of 
American political fighting through litigation in our country. 
 
What increase their chances are factors primarily outside law. Very strong support from the 
media creates the advantage which this little group enjoys, and the extremely centralised 
operation of the media in the capital city shaping public opinion of the entire country as well as 
personal ties between executives of the press, the radio and television makes this advantage very 
serious. Political fighting through litigation rests on the media, as it has been the case in the 
United Sates described above where „the rights revolution‟ has been slowly attained also through 
the media since the 1920‟s. 
 
Factors inside the law, however, do not favour this law politics strategy. The internal courses of 
judicial career separated from politics in 1997, and the appointment of judges and their promotion 
in the hierarchy of the profession is not possible unless in adherence to the patterns accepted by 
the entirety of the judiciary. This course of the career gives not much chance for activist lawyers 
breaking away from the European legal culture with a tradition of several hundred years – we can 
state our hypothesis; and, at this point, reference can be made to the effects arising from the 
patterns of the English judicial career which also hinder the spreading of activist lawyers for the 
same reasons. 
 
A further obstacle in the way of the spreading of social movement lawyers is the fact that current 
Hungarian activist lawyers are almost exclusively university jurists, or legal experts at some 
organisation, but they may not act as lawyers. The few lawyers who quite frequently use human 
rights motives in their argumentation, either for defence against the abuses in the phase of police 
investigation in criminal cases, or when threatening to apply to Strasbourg after having lost a case 
at home, are broadening the range of traditional tricks of lawyering rather than actually acting as 
social movement lawyers. 
 
Among university jurists, however, a climate of sympathizing with social movement lawyering is 
more intensely present but it is probably based on the fact that they are not fully aware of the 
effect exerted by social movement lawyering and political fighting through litigation on the 
material of specific branches of law – and specific law departments! The positive attitude means 
much rather that “After all, constitutional rights represent a highly noble aim!” And, this, looking 
at it in itself, is true. 
 
As a conclusion, it should be noted that in the United States the euphoria of the 1960‟s and 70‟s, 
once the effect of political fighting through litigation endangering the legal system had been 
experienced, was followed by a vehement reversal, and by now political fighting through 
litigation has become just a shadow of what it used to be. Information regarding this was totally 
lacking when after 1989 in Hungary we began to introduce constitutional jurisdiction as a 
counterpole of dictatorship, and public opinion often regarded the taking of constitutional rights 
further to the courtroom of normal forums of justice as the augmentation of democracy. This 
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article can be nothing else but a brief introduction to throwing off one-sidedness. 
 
 
 
 
 
X. Chapter: Legal Education as Part of the Legal System 
 
 
 
When grasping law in its totality, in addition to legal norms, the system of the concepts used by 
norms must be made part of the concept of law. Norms express obligatory or prohibited 
behaviour patterns only in the event that the concepts in them have a sense in a defined direction. 
And in highly developed countries these legal concepts are interwoven into an increasingly 
complicated system of connections, and stand as legal dogmatics for each branch of the law 
behind the rules of law and codices of statutes as a thick web. The legal theories that exclude the 
legal dogmatics intellectual aspect from law, and include only legal norms in the concept of law 
narrow down the actually operating law. We can also say that this way they raise the viewpoint of 
outsider laymen to the level of legal theory, because on the surface of law only the creation, 
application and enforcement of legal norms appear. But when one can look at law from inside, 
and is aware of the occurring decision dilemmas in the light of thousands of cases, will know that 
without the thick web of law dogmatics concepts, and for lack of their obligatory sense, each 
judicial decision would be arbitrary, in spite of thousands, ten thousands of detailed legal norms. 
 
By thus extending the concept of law, beside law as a system of norms law as an intellectual 
system comes in sight with greater emphasis, and the spheres of legal activities are supplemented 
with, in addition to the spheres of creating, applying and enforcing norms, spheres to ensure the 
creation and maintenance of the intellectual system of law.  Regarding this role we have referred 
several times to the sphere of the jurisprudence-law dogmatics activity; now the sphere of legal 
education should be looked at closely. 
 
 
 
 
1. Basic functions of legal education 
 
 
As a starting point it must be established that the results of the activities of exploring and further 
developing the legal dogmatics connections must be permanently transferred into the activity of 
all the lawyers because they are performed by only a segment of lawyers (university jurists and a 
few members of high courts), but in creating and applying new norms attention must always be 
focused on legal dogmatics connections. This transfer is ensured by periodicals on jurisprudence, 
by involving law professors in the elaboration of concepts in the course of legislation, especially 
codex like major changes; and there are numerous other ways of such transfer. Alongside 
continuous conveyance of information, the handing over of the complete legal dogmatics to the 
entire legal profession can be implemented only in the course of legal education, the training of 
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jurists. Highlighting the intellectual system of law and considering it the basis of law thus makes 
the process of legal education the central element of law. In another approach it can be added that 
legal education preparing for legal work can be placed outside the legal system when looking at it 
statically, but considering the operation of the legal system in its dynamism the necessity of 
inclusion becomes apparent. Today‟s shaping of legal students determines the sphere of 
tomorrow‟s judges, prosecutors, lawyers. 
 
Beside this function, there is another basic function legal education must fulfil to support the 
intellectual system of law. As legal education must create the way of thinking in the prospective 
lawyer which develops evaluation in the dimension of lawful/unlawful a routine in approaching 
the events of the world, and simultaneously eliminates evaluation pursuant to political fights as 
well as evaluation pursuant to ideological differences and possible other evaluation of events 
from any other aspect. The stable operation of the legal system always contains this dual output 
of legal education: handing over the law dogmatics system of the main branches of law in an 
outlined form and the attained skill to view the events of the world in the dimension of 
lawful/unlawful, and pushing political, ideological, etc. values alien to this in the background. 
 
The functions of legal education beyond that are contingent, from country to country different 
functions may come beside these. For example, while the higher education system in European 
countries has developed into a single grade scheme, and covers both preparation for profession 
and general intellectual training, in the United States by separating undergraduate (general) and 
graduate training (preparation for profession) legal education, medical education, etc. contain 
only professional training. Now let us disregard this contingency and concentrate solely on 
professional training in the analysis pertaining to the basic functions of legal education. 
 
Furthermore, regarding the legal subsystem of society, the question arises how is it possible to 
include university legal education in this subsystem with such strength because basically the 
university sphere constitutes an institutional part of the subsystem of science beside research 
institutes? To answer this question we can start from the dual nature of jurisprudence. In the 
activity of jurisprudence, contrary to most branches of science, in addition to the examination in 
the dimension of true/false, the evaluation of another subsystem, the evaluation in the dimension 
of lawful/unlawful is dealt with too. Thus beside establishing, grouping, classifying facts, which 
dominate primarily in the sociological, historical researches of law, a logically unified system 
must be aimed at that can ensure a contradiction free domain behind thousands and ten thousands 
of legal rules. This activity mixes the abstract and logical dimensions of scientific thought with 
the normative view of facts and conflicts arising from the practical sphere of law, and thus creates 
the intellectual system of overall legal dogmatics for each branch of law. If science is considered 
an approach in the dimension of true/false, then the approach to jurisprudence in this dimension 
of true/false might raise qualifying problems. For example, at the end of the 1940‟s the German 
Franz Jerusalem, or at the beginning of the 1980‟s the Hungarian András Sajó raised the point of 
the “dubious” status of jurisprudence (Jerusalem 1948, Sajó 1983). 
 
So these are the peculiar features that explain that legal dogmatics and legal education are more 
forcefully interwoven into the system of law. Whilst in the event of numerous other social 
subsystems university professional training remains in the university-scientific subsystem to a 
greater extent, and it is usual for the representatives of the profession to join the given subsystem 
only after the postgraduate training, once they have spread in the subsystems. 
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2. The dilemmas of legal education 
 
 
(Either legal dogmatics theoretical training or practical legal training) Legal education in 
European countries in the past centuries developed pursuant to the model of legal dogmatics 
training, more specifically, especially in the areas under the influence of German law – and in the 
United States from the beginning of the 20
th
 century – it developed in the direction of this model, 
even if beside legal dogmatics tarining the role of practical legal training remained strong (see 
Edwards 1992, Ostertag 1993). This model, however, was and is constantly criticised, and the 
attempt to achieve a minor or major reform of legal education is constantly on the agenda of 
jurists both in Western European countries and the United States. 
 
One of the critical remarks that always emerges regarding legal education is that its subjects, 
educational methods are overtly aimed at handing over abstract legal connections, and it does not 
do its best to produce a freshly graduated, available, complete practical lawyer as its output. This 
critical remark can be called permanent not only in the countries with more abstract legal 
education but also in the more practical American training. In a witty remark theoretical legal 
education is compared to the school of driving which attempts to teach how to drive by teaching a 
detailed manual of the car and then letting trainees to drive in traffic (Ostertag 1993). In spite of 
the witticism in this comment, it rests on a deeply rooted misunderstanding, and that is why the 
role of legal dogmatics in the legal system and the role of legal education in this field must be 
clarified. 
 
The university training of legal students is the only place in the system of the operation of law 
where the categories of developed dogmatics for each branch of law and the connections among 
them can be handed over in their complete form to the prospective lawyers; and compared to that 
it is a secondary question to what depth the drilling of practical legal skills must be integrated 
into university training; or, whether these, in a contrary manner, should be left for the practical 
training after the university, which is to be implemented by the organisations of lawyers, 
prosecutors and judges. 
 
One of the basic dilemmas of legal education concerns the point whether legal dogmatics in each 
branch of law should be handed over in the first place, with the legal rules currently in force and 
judicial case law being taught merely with a view to attain deeper understanding of legal 
dogmatics categories by means of application; or, contrary to that, the aim of education should be 
to produce as extensively as possible a “complete” lawyer immediately available for allocating 
practical work to him or her? Only in an aside reference should be made to the kind of legal 
education representing a dead end road in which neither any legal dogmatics system, nor practical 
legal skills are handed over, and which makes legal students mug up statutory provisions just in 
force, and even during the final examinations prior to graduation they need to be questioned 
about new rules due to the changes in the rules of law having occurred in a short time. Apart from 
this dead end road kind of training, the inappropriateness of which is admitted by everybody, 
regarding the resolving of the basic dilemma confronting views are held in the communities of 
lawyers in each country. This confrontation mostly focuses on the point that in the circles of 
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university jurists the importance of education centred around law dogmatics is much more 
emphasised, while in the circles of practical lawyers criticism attacking the “sterile” and abstract 
nature of university education is supported. 
 
If we look at the Hungarian legal training closely, confronted with other legal education models, 
then the criticism can be partly deemed right. During the five year training period organised 
participation in practical legal work is scarcely arranged. In spite of the continuous criticism 
regarding this not much has been accomplished in recent years in this field. Let us look at two 
solutions that attempt to include practical legal skills and knowledge in university legal training 
with greater emphasis. One of them represents the German two grade legal education where in 
the first grade legal theory and legal dogmatics bases, legal history knowledge are handed over, 
and once this has been completed by passing the first state examination, comes the two and a half 
year long second grade under which the “referendarius” having passed the first state examination 
obtains fluency primarily in the judicial, and partly in the prosecutor‟s and lawyer‟s profession. 
This second, practical training is completed by passing the second state examination, and in 
possession of this the trained student becomes a fully qualified lawyer (Volljurist). After that one 
may ask for being registered among lawyers without any further examination or training, but 
having started a judicial or prosecutorial career, within these organisation frameworks, one needs 
to go through further, more special professional training (Ostertag 1993). In this model the 
teaching of practical knowledge and skills are incorporated into the legal training not at the 
expense of legal dogmatics training but by extending the term of education and organising 
practical training outside the university centrally, as well as by attaching half of that, through the 
second state examination, to the university. 
 
Another solution to increase the proportion of practical training in legal education is offered by 
the way of the American legal clinic training (see Amsterdam 1984, Floyd 1997, Rekosch 1998, 
Wilson 1998). University legal training takes three years, following the four year university 
undergraduate (general) training, and its syllabus contains only legal subjects; furthermore, 
although it is also aimed at handing over the system of law dogmatics categories similarly to the 
European model, the role of case law, practical training is more dominant in this function than in 
the countries on the Continent. Still, the criticism regarding “too abstract” legal education is 
permanently asserted, and since the 1980‟s a reform experiment has been launched to directly 
involve legal students in practical legal work. The idea goes back to 1933 when the legal realist, 
Jerome Frank suggested that similarly to the practical training at clinics applied in medical 
training legal training should be moved in this direction too. The strength of legal realists was yet 
not enough to put this into practice, but “the rights revolution” launched from the 1960‟s 
breaking up the internal opposition of law faculties of universities and the force of intellectual-
media power circles to shape public opinion created a good background to the reform of the legal 
education. Traditional lawsuits controlled by legal dogmatics in several fields was drastically 
replaced by politicised constitutional litigation, and the road through judicial litigation became 
one of the main roads for radically changing society; and the fermentation that began after that 
made law faculties open to receive legal clinical training. The point of this is that students (first 
only senior third-year students, later second-year, what is more, first-year students could also 
join) are made available at clinics to give legal advice for those who belong to poorer layers of 
society and have lower income, and under the control of a supervising lawyer they may fulfil 
tasks of preparing proceedings (Amsterdam 1984, Floyd 1998). In another solution when only 
simulation takes place and students play that they participate in proceedings by allocating various 
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legal roles among themselves, or giving legal advice. 
 
The aim of legal clinics, however, to put it clearly, goes beyond the students‟ legal education, 
furthermore, it is also one of its key goals to help poorer layers of society (black and other 
coloured people, immigrants) receive legal aid (Rekosch 1998, Floyd 1997). In spite of all the 
elevated attitude present in this humanitarian goal, it must be noted that through clinical training 
students inevitably get into the intellectual-political fights going on among social groups, and this 
character of legal clinics often goes together with developing the position of cause lawyering 
within the university (see Scheingold 1998:118-151). Nevertheless legal clinics have spread in 
recent years at American law faculties, and although they have not attained the status of 
obligatory subjects, a minor or major part of students include one or more of their subjects in 
their studies. (Approx. ten percent of the necessary credits can be accomplished in such courses.) 
 
For Hungarian legal education it is important to think over the aforesaid two alternatives of 
practical training because legal clinics supported by American foundations have already appeared 
in a few Central-Eastern European countries, and one of their bases has been established at the 
Law Faculty of ELTE. (See the Internet for the description of legal clinics in Central-Europe: 
http://www.pili.org/publications/colloquim2000/index.html).  
 
We can implement full-scope evaluation of this when having in sight that practical training in the 
Hungarian legal education has not developed as a course attached to the university, as in the 
aforesaid German model in the second state examination, but as part of each legal profession‟s 
own organised training (training of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, notary publics) after the 
university education. Therefore it is somewhat misleading to take what university legal training 
provides as the full picture. By pointing this out, it can be seen that the complete legal training in 
our country consists of university training and the training complying with specialised juristic 
work. If we are dissatisfied with practical training thus developed, completely cut off from 
university training, then there is the option of opening toward the German model, and by 
extending the term of training it is possible to integrate practical training much more into 
university training, and its role could be evaluated by setting state examinations after that. So this 
would be the path for the shift to the two grade legal education. It should be noted, of course, that 
even today there are views with strong positions on the agenda of jurists in Germany that the two 
grade structure should be given up, and, similarly to our system, profound preparation for 
specialised juristic professions should take place after the university within the domain of each 
profession (Coing 1973, Weber 1989). Nevertheless, the advantage of the German solution is that 
it allows a time frame for the basic law dogmatics training, and it is not at the expense of this that 
it extends practical training. 
 
It is exactly in this respect that there are problems with the American legal clinic training, 
especially when, in addition to senior students, first- and second-year students are also involved 
in solving the narrow cases of practical legal affairs. Through that the aforesaid basic functions of 
university legal training become questionable: the opportunity to hand over law dogmatics for 
each branch of law as a complete whole decreases, and qualified lawyers cannot make up for it 
later. And this threatens with the intellectual systematic nature of law falling apart. The aforesaid 
other function might be also injured, provided that training at legal clinics is much more 
interwoven with social-political fights through cause lawyers. Instead of the neutral and 
unemotional processing of the events of reality in the dimension of lawful/unlawful and the skill 
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attached to it becoming fixed, the attitude to perform revolutionary changes in social conditions 
might evolve by the end of the legal training. This other distortion can be, of course, decreased if 
practical training takes place merely with the aforesaid simulation method, and the “social 
worker” function and cause lawyering are cleaned off this form. 
 
(Training judges or training lawyers) Another dilemma regarding legal education is shown by the 
disputes that blew up over the German juristic training (see Coing 1973, Weber 1989, Ostertag 
1993). This training takes basically the judge‟s position as its basis, and this is manifested both in 
the fact that in practical training constituting the second grade of the two grade juristic training 
most of the time is addressed to gaining knowledge of judicial work, and that proposals made by 
groups of lawyers to extend the syllabus of legal education so important for them are regularly 
rejected by university law faculties. For more expansive lawyer‟s activity goes at several points 
beyond juristical work in the strict sense, and this demands partial involvement in tax advisory, 
financial, business, etc. activities, which requires knowledge that is almost entirely left out of the 
syllabus of legal education. 
 
Contrary to the German education centred around the training of judges, the American training 
can be called one centred around the training of lawyers; and the law dogmatics training 
prevailing here too shows that overall law dogmatics training can be attained even in this version. 
Nevertheless lawyer‟s organisations in the US and the authors accepting their viewpoints often 
raise objections against most of the subjects keeping the lawyer appearing in high courts in view, 
and preparing prospective lawyers for high court precedent material and argumentation there. 
Contrary to that, critics deem that the path to the necessary reform of legal education is handing 
over the knowledge of a more comprehensive lawyer‟s activity, and this would shift subjects 
from the more comprehensive law dogmatics connections toward knowledge outside law (Floyd 
1997).  
 
When examining the solutions in terms of the basic functions focused on above, then the German 
legal education centred around the judge‟s viewpoint can be deemed optimal. By placing the 
judge‟s position remaining more clearly in the internal logic of law in the centre the system of 
categories of law dogmatics can be more comprehensively handed over. An intermediary solution 
can be the training centred around the lawyer‟s viewpoint in the American legal education as it is 
actually carried out, which educates lawyers in the light of procedure and precedent material at 
stages prior to high courts and focusing more clearly on legal issues. Finally the most problematic 
solution might be the one that attempts to build legal training by placing the lawyer going half 
beyond law and being involved in the activities of other professions in the centre. And this would 
indeed fundamentally oppose law dogmatics training representing the summary of the intellectual 
totality of law, and would shift the legal system toward conditions threatening with law 
intellectually falling apart. 
 
(Legal dogmatics training or social science training) In numerous legal concepts, beside forcing 
back legal dogmatics training, great emphasis is given to the necessity of creating more powerful 
social science training in legal education. This emphasis appeared, in the last century, subsequent 
to the Marxist legal theories, in the American realist school of law, and today it is fostered 
especially by the adherents of the economic theory of law. The actual situation is that since the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century the subjects of economics, sociology, philosophy, political science 
have been getting one after the other, in a brief introductory form, into legal education. What is 
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more, on top of all that an introductory kind of subject of numerous branches of science have 
been included in American undergraduate training. The debate is much more about whether this 
should be extended with further number of training periods, or how deeply the jurist him or 
herself should base the knowledge, material of rules and dogmatic solutions for each branch of 
law on social science knowledge? That is, this approach represents both a more extensive social 
science training for the students and, in addition to that, a call for the legal dogmatics activity 
becoming sociological jurisprudence. 
 
When looking at the starting points stimulating each legal concept in this direction, then it can be 
seen that, for example, Marxist legal concepts at the end of the 1800‟s considered fully conscious 
social control attainable, and in their view “scientific” state could handle rules of law as means 
for implementing planned social changes. The entire legal interpretation of the Hungarian Gyula 
Pikler, or under his influence that of Bódog Somló, was imbued with that notion (see Pikler 1892, 
Somló 1901). But the American realist school of law believing in social engineering performed 
by lawyers, for similar reasons, deemed that society was controllable and changeable the same 
way, albeit not through legislation but judicial lawmaking, and they attempted to make use of the 
results of the newly evolved branches of social sciences. Following the realists, today the 
adherents of the economic theory of law, while being sceptical about the attainability of law 
dogmatics review of and control over judicial decisions, intend to have judges guided by the 
findings of social science, and therefore attempt to shift legal education from legal dogmatics 
toward social science training (see Posner 1990).  
 
Having thought over the complexity of society deeper and admitted the importance of the 
independent social subsystem character of law, the establishment of principles in system theory 
bids one to be cautious in the field. Niklas Luhman, who in spite of his legal qualification (and 
practice) became a profound expert of sociology, philosophy, economics and numerous other 
branches of social science during the half century of his scholarly activities, always warned 
against the euphoria of ”turning law into social science” (see Luhmann 1974, 1981). The 
independence of law requires that the findings of social science should not be incorporated into 
the law unless the law dogmatics unity is kept uninjured. Rested on this theoretical base it can be 
said that relevant social science knowledge should be made part of lawmaking not by trying to 
train lawyers to master numerous types of knowledge but by attempting to ensure a more 
complex way of looking at things through involving the representatives of various branches of 
social science in the process of lawmaking as experts. The same way in judicial procedures it is 
not so much the judge that should be retrained to become an economist, sociologist, etc. but this 
should be solved by involving experts more extensively. The introductory type of economics, 
sociology, etc. subjects, which now are already taught, are needed to prepare prospective lawyers 
to be able to evaluate the materials prepared by the involved experts to some extent. 
 
In summary it can be stated that the central task of university legal education is to hand over law 
dogmatics for each branch of law and develop the attitude of processing reality in the dimension 
of lawful/unlawful. The social science training becomes important as a supplement to that since 
handing over practical juristic skills can be only one of the goals of university legal training. By 
extending the period of training it is conceivable to proceed in these two fields, as it is the usual 
practice in Germany through the system of the two grade state examinations, but at the expense 
of law dogmatics training their proportion must not be increased. 
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3. Legal education and the theory of critical legal studies 
 
 
The analysis of the state of affairs of the legal education outlined above rests on a few system 
theory considerations, and these must be indicated explicitly to make our reservations about 
different legal education views understandable. 
 
One of our starting points in this respect comes from the multi-layered structure of modern legal 
systems, in which we deem primacy prevails, out of the intellectual layers of law (the layer of the 
text, the layer of law dogmatics, the layer of judicial cases, the layer of constitutional basic 
rights), in the layer of law dogmatics. In spite of the importance of the other layers of law, the 
intellectual unity of the legal system, and the avoidance of the chaos permanently and 
threateningly arising at the level of complex systems is ensured only by the layer of legal 
dogmatics. This starting point makes it understandable that from the approaches to law which 
narrow law down to only one layer and do not believe in a multi-layered structure follows a 
different model of legal education, that is, legal education itself is not considered as part of the 
legal system. For example, the concepts of judicial law deem that activities related to law outside 
the court room are not important. Similarly, on the other hand, the text positivist attitude to law 
disregards legal dogmatics and, subsequently, the central role of legal education in law, because 
lawyers will anyway need to become aware of the new texts of statutes from time to time, which 
according to this view exclusively constitute law, and university legal education itself does not 
fulfil any special function. Taking this to extremes, and owing to the optimism of the 
enlightenment, which had its effect, the point is that simple law open to the intelligence of every 
human being must not be put in the hand of a narrow profession, the lawyers, and it is one‟s civic 
right to fulfil juristic tasks. After the French revolution in 1789 this view also contributed to 
terminating university legal training, and only after leaving out a generation‟s time, in the 1820‟s 
was this restarted (see Dawson 1968). And this view also exerted an impact in the United States, 
and until the end of the 1800's reservations about university legal training strengthened this 
impact (Friedman 1973). The university training itself can be permanently established only on 
condition that we acknowledge a more lasting system of intellectual connections behind the ever-
changing text of statutes. Without that a general kind of intellectual training would be sufficient 
but specialised legal training would be aimless. This is what highlighting law dogmatics in our 
multi-layered concept of law raises awareness of. 
 
Another starting point refers to the fact that political fights with a view to resolve tensions and 
injustices prevailing under current social conditions and in institutions have shaped their own 
ways outside law in political and ideological subsystems, and the impact and compromises of 
such political fights appear in law only in a formalised way as enshrined in the statutes of 
parliamentary legislation. In modern societies there is an institution system realised through 
pluralistic mass media, the freedom to found parties and associations to fulfil this task. Or, if 
there are insufficiencies in this respect, and the institution system of political democracy is not 
proper to ensure the social formation of will, then it is the political system that must be reformed, 
but in order to solve these problems the legal system or the sphere of social science universities 
must not be politicised “as a substitute”. Politicising these spheres represents too great a price for 
remedying the problems of political institutions, and may as well cause a modernisation dead end 
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road should we try to find solution this way like a smith who removes the scales from someone‟s 
eyes with tongs. 
 
These starting points served as points of reference in our determining the position of legal 
education and basic functions, and again these serve as points of reference for criticising different 
approaches to legal education. 
 
The farthest from our starting points stands the approach of the American critical legal studies 
(“Critical Legal Studies”), but on the grounds of its own starting point even in this approach to 
law legal education plays a central role. The representatives of this approach to law, the “Crits” 
as they call themselves, set out from the fact that law operates absolute entirely as part of the 
political system, and actually it represents a, masked, field of social fight. The Crits strive to 
explore power interests present in each legal construction, and through that expose the functions 
of each legal institutions and legal solutions as means of class struggle. They consider law 
dogmatics constructions also as the summary of the ruling classes‟ interests, and key law 
dogmatics changes as shifts of power among various groups of the ruling classes. 
 
It follows from this approach to law that they analyse the legal education aimed at handing over 
law dogmatics categories as the sphere meant to maintain the hegemony of the ruling class. It 
must be also noted that the Crits quite often twist traditional Marxist terminology regarding the 
hegemony of the ruling classes with a view to adjust them to the camps of the current American 
political fights, and by stressing the terminology of political camps of black and other coloured 
people, homosexuals, feminists, etc. grasp this sphere as the law of upper class heterosexual 
white men (see Kennedy 1996:427-437). According to the Crits legal education is an eminent part 
of the political legal sphere of power where the concealed means of class power is hammered into 
the prospective judges, lawyers, prosecutors, so that later when getting into office they would be 
able to ensure that oppressed groups of society (women, black, homosexual, etc.) are subjected to 
the ruling groups. 
 
Two tasks follow from this analysis of the situation of legal education for the Crits. One of them 
is to make legal analyses in their studies that explore both the upper classes (white men) gaining 
advantage in each law dogmatics construction and the disadvantageous features affecting the 
oppressed as well as the impacts of political fights for power present in legal changes when 
analysing the history of law (see Hunt 1986, Tushnet 1991). This jurisprudence activity (or rather 
legal ideological fight activity) in this approach to law is, however, not simply for making 
scientific justice public, as in the event of most approaches to law, but the main aim is, once “the 
legal education invaded by the enemy” has been cleared, to spread it in legal education. For the 
Crits admittedly represent not simply a group of jurisprudence but a law policy combat unit. And 
as they have not been able to directly capture the practical domains of the legal sphere, or 
because of the traditionally conservative character of lawyers it was not lifelike to set this aim, 
they identify the occupation of legal education as the prime goal (see Tushnet 1991). Looking at 
it in its dynamism, whoever dominates legal education today will be able to exert huge impact 
through properly socialised activist lawyers, activist justices, etc. in the overall fields of law as 
well. Accordingly, the key activity of the Crits, since the time they organised their group at the 
end of the 1970‟s, has been built up in this direction, and although they have either split up into 
internal camps in many respects (feminist legal theory, racial legal theory, etc.), or been shifted 
toward post-modern theoretical directions, basically they pursue their activity primarily at 
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American campuses even today. 
 
The activity of the Crits have greatly contributed to politicising the American legal profession 
and the university law faculties in the past quarter of the century. Owing to their successful 
political organising activity, which helped them to conclude a political alliance with the 
representatives of the groups dissatisfied for various reasons with the current social conditions, 
they attained a dominant position at numerous American law faculties by the beginning of the 
1990‟s. As Harry T. Edwards, federal justice, professor of law from Michigan put it in his article 
published in the beginning of the 90‟s bringing storms and heated debates, at most law faculties a 
political trench warfare had evolved between the Crits and their allies and the university lecturers 
writing and lecturing on traditional law dogmatics works who opposed them; and in the 
procedure of engaging new lecturers, renewing the contracts of existing lecturers and especially 
regarding the commencement of their tenure, that is, entering the finalised professorial contract 
the key issue was which camp out the two the candidate supported, and it was purely the standing 
of the balance of forces and not the actual scientific and educational achievement that was 
determinant in these decisions (Edwards 1992). The Crits are fostering the idea of pushing the 
subjects on legal dogmatics categories in the background, and, instead of these, they teach the 
works of philosophers, sociologists, professors of literature (Edwards 1992).  
 
As a closing remark it should be indicated that in the university struggles having become 
permanent the adherents of the economic theory of law, in spite of all their differences in respect 
of theory and ideology, are willing to conclude alliance with the neo-Marxist Crits, and this 
makes it understandable that in the current situation they are still able to proceed in the same 
direction in getting the law dogmatics teaching method, dominant for decades, “out of balance” 
with the support of the leftist Crits, whom they otherwise fundamentally oppose both in terms of 
world view and political attitude (see Posner‟s criticism on Edward‟s article: Posner 1993). After 
the victory attained in fights at universities, however, the recipe of the economic theory of law 
does not aim at politicising legal education in a neo-Marxist manner, but teaching specialised 
branches of social sciences in detail, and this is what they intend to replace the law dogmatics 
based legal education with. 
 
 
 
 
XI. Chapter:  Private and public command of law 
 
 
 
Law and legal standards are taken out of the sphere of social standards and ethical standards by 
the fact that eventually they are sanctioned by state authority. In terms of legal theory, however, it 
is an open question what the extent of public command of law is in view of the entire process of 
law, or, contrary to that, to what extent private parties‟, private authorities‟ force can prevail? 
Disregarding the few approaches to law that fully identify law and state (Hans Kelsen‟s, or the 
Hungarian Bódog Somló‟s legal theory, e.g.), in most works on legal theory we find that the 
partial independence of law of the state is declared but more detailed analyses into how it is so 
cannot be really found. 
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From legal history materials conclusions can be drawn that under initial circumstances law and 
the enforcement of law was performed to a greater extent by the participation of the parties, 
especially the offended party, and through development more and more phases of the legal 
process were determined by the state. In the development of Roman law, for example, only after 
a long period was the “private criminal law” in the initial phase transferred to public law, and 
alongside the authorisation of the private offended party to persecute crime crimes to be 
persecuted by the state began to appear (see: Coing 1996, Marton 1993: 40-52; Zlinszky 1991:10-
13). Also, several tendencies show that the more and more extensive state machinery took over 
the determining force at several points of the legal process. It can be shown both in law making, 
law enforcement and the execution of judicial decisions. Following the same thread of thought, it 
can be stated that the punitive power, the power of life and death liege lords were entitled to, and 
the system of manorial courts sitting in judgement on serfs represented the influence of private 
law in the Middle Ages alongside public administration of justice on the determination of law, 
and this was gradually stopped by law development in the modern age, followed by the 
establishment of the monopoly of state jurisdiction. 
 
From all this the conclusion can be drawn that historic tendencies show that in modern societies 
command of law is more and more transferred from the one time private command to public 
determination. In addition to the general truth of the thesis, however, at several points contrary 
processes can be also seen, and thus only specific analyses can give a reassuring reply in this 
field. In the following analyses we examine public determination in creating legal standards and 
in the enforcement of such standards in particular cases, and the cases of the survival of private 
command. Then we shall touch upon the analysis of the execution of case-law decisions. 
 
First, let us examine the tendencies of the increasing strength of the state authority, then the 
forms of private command and their extension. 
 
 
 
 
1. The increasing determination of law by the state authority 
 
1.1 Public command of law making 
 
In this part of the legal process a clear tendency can be shown, and it can bee seen that if society 
has reached a certain level of development, then the state organising the overall community will 
play an increasingly strong part in creating legal standards, and the factors beyond the state will 
be pushed into the background. This trend can be seen in the development of the Roman law as 
well as in the European legal development of the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, also the 
development of law in 19
th
 century North America shows the fast growth of the role of the state 
apparatus after the establishment of more complex social relations. 
 
In the development of Roman law after the common law and jurist law development, the free law 
making of the emperor‟s power was acknowledged, and the Digestas already contained the 
“Princeps legibus solutus” thesis which represented the emperor‟s legislative power (Caenegem, 
1980:616). Through that the law of the early Republican Rome created mostly independently 
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became more and more determined by the emperor‟s state apparatus. 
 
In the development of law in the early Middle Ages the track already covered in the Roman legal 
development was repeated, and first alongside, then more and more to replace the spontaneous 
law making of the initial common law, the law made by the central state authority was 
established by the end of the 1700‟s. In the 12th century, once the Digestas had been found, the 
ruler‟s legislative power was debated. Contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the Digestas 
Accursius found provisions in Gratianus‟s Institutio which suggested that the ruler was subject to 
law, and contrary to the “Princeps legibus solutus” thesis it took the position that “re vera maius 
imperio est submittere legibus principatum” (Caenegem 1980:619). However, once the central 
state machinery had become powerful in the late medieval development, out of the ancient 
Roman legal theses again the “princeps legibus solutus” thesis became emphasised, and later Jean 
Bodin, for example, built the thesis of the absolute ruler‟s sovereignty on this. 
 
Due to all that instead of the concept of “the good and untouchable old law” the idea of the law 
made by the central state authority became dominant, and owing to the Enlightenment and the 
political revolutions in the 1800‟s only the subject of the making of statute law changed, and the 
ruler was replaced by the parliamentary legislation. (See Csaba Varga‟s excellent study for the 
changes from the codification of common law to conscious, written law code making, Varga 
1976). 
 
In the Anglo-Saxon law development this was coloured only by the fact that statute law was 
fulfilled only in the 20
th
 century over the dominant precedent law. But the relations in complex 
society and the necessity of adequate legal regulations required by these called for the primacy of 
the statute law made by the state apparatus (see MacCormick/Summers 1991). 
 
1.2 The state’s command of law enforcement 
 
There are several aspects of the development of the state‟s command of law enforcement. One of 
the points here is the statement of legal decisions with regard to individual cases on the grounds 
of legal standards, and the decisive role of the state in that. In England the settlement of legal 
issues in cases was placed in the hands of the king‟s travelling judges right after the Norman 
Conquest, from 1066, and common law was made out of their accumulating decisions. Apart 
from later changes, however, the members of the high courts were appointed by the central state 
authority, even if this became subject to increasingly strict rules, and after a while the Lord 
Chancellor was allowed to appoint only barristers to be judges. 
 
Contrary to that, in German legal development for a long time judges purely executed 
judgements, and judgements themselves with regard to individual cases were made by the law 
professors of university faculties under the so-called file submission procedure 
(“Aktenversendung”). This procedure was, however, forced back when the absolutist control of 
the state was established in the 1700‟s, but it was fully put to an end only in the middle of the 
1800‟s, and the judges‟ decision making power in individual cases became complete (Dawson 
1968). 
 
Another point is the extent of the decisive force of the state authority and private parties in 
conducting court proceedings. 
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The role of the judge that represents public authority and the extent of his activity in shaping 
legal proceedings were fundamentally different, and are mostly different even today, in Anglo-
Saxon legal systems and in the Continental legal systems. In the latter the judge‟s role is central 
in the shaping of legal actions, and both in the exploration of facts, the production of evidence 
and making decisions on legal issues the judge dominates the action vis-á-vis the parties and their 
lawyers. On the other hand, in lawsuits in the UK and the US the judge‟s role is highly passive 
and the presentation of facts and the production of evidence and the shaping of the facts of the 
case are in the hands of the opposing parties (Thalmann 1989; Maxeiner 1990), and the judge can 
only state the judgement on the outcome of the facts of the case described to him. And this may 
as well be directly opposite to what he believes to be the actual facts of the case and the 
judgement related to it. If, however, the facts necessary for it are not brought into the action by 
the interested party, or if he has brought them in but cannot prove them, then in spite of his 
discretion the judge may consider only the facts of the case described to him. The action is thus 
shaped rather by the private parties, and the role of the judge who represents public power is less. 
 
Recently, however, shifts have taken place both in the UK and the US, at least in private law 
actions, and regulation has moved to a certain extent towards the judges dominated conduct of 
action prevalent on the Continent (see Sobich 1999). The judge‟s more active action shaping 
power has forced back the procedural power of private parties and their lawyers to a certain 
extent. This shows that the requirements of a complex society for predictable law forced the 
strengthening of the public momentum, as it happened in Continental legal systems from the 
1800‟s. 
 
The role of the jurors still restricts the role of judges representing the state authority in 
determining law in the legal system of the United States. Contrary to the UK where from the end 
of the 1800‟s the role of the jurors was almost entirely eliminated from passing private law 
judgements, and was forced back also in passing judgements in criminal cases. In actions, 
dominated anyway by the lawyers of the two opposing parties, the convincing of the lay jurors 
will determine the judgement which the judge announces as the judgement after playing the part 
of simply maintaining the order. In Continental legal systems on the other hand, alongside the 
judges appointed by the state who determine the action, lay jurors, assessors have a definitely 
minor role, and their part has further decreased in recent decades. 
 
 
2. The forms of private command of law 
 
The state authority pushing forward along the entire length of the legal process both in law 
making and law enforcement can be considered a phenomenon realised as a tendency on higher 
levels of social development. Furthermore, contradictory tendencies can be identified regarding 
certain aspects of law, and a quantum leap in private power influence can be observed in them. 
Out of these we are examining four tendencies below. One of them represents the option of 
pushing aside law realised through arbitration, another one is shown by the “private” labour law 
of collective agreements beside state labour law; the fact that law dogmatics “centred around the 
victim” gains ground represents the partial privatisation of criminal procedure and criminal law 
where the bargain concluded between the perpetrator‟s lawyer and the offended party steps in a 
certain sense in front of the state‟s punitive power; and finally the privatisation phenomena of the 
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execution of sentences can be connected here. 
 
2.1 The possibility to push aside public law: arbitration 
 
Within private law relations it is primarily economic relations that offer the possibility in modern 
legal systems to push aside public law and normal jurisdiction and obtain arbitration mutually 
controlled by the parties instead. The extent of this option is different subject to the fact that 
traditionally overall social organisation is mostly realised through the state, or on the contrary, 
the state‟s role to organise society can be deemed less (Kotzorek 1987). In Soviet type societies 
fully based on the state‟s social organisation, for example, there was no arbitration at all, or only 
to a very low extent, while after the change of regime in 1989 its significance definitely grew in 
these countries, thus in our country too. 
 
It was a general feature of arbitration that it could be obtained in the relations between parties 
engaged in business professionally, but as a result of the spreading tendency in the recent decades 
the prime rule is going to be soon that it is sufficient if one of the parties fall under this category. 
In Germany, for example, regulation has moved towards this direction (Wolfgang 1994:120-125) 
and the sample law worked out by UNICITRAL also proposes that. In Hungary in the euphoria of 
liberalisation after the change of regime it was enacted in the same form and today this is the 
current law. 
 
The basic feature of arbitration is that it has one grade and no appeal can be lodged against the 
judgement. Only on the grounds of strictly defined invalidity is it possible to seek remedy against 
the judgement of the arbitration tribunal at normal courts, but it is possible only in a negligible 
percent of the cases due to strict circumscription of the invalidity reasons. The final award can be 
executed the same way as a normal court‟s binding decision, here there is no difference between 
“private jurisdiction” and public jurisdiction. 
 
This kind of jurisdiction is attractive because of its briefness, and its spreading is greatly fostered 
by the fact that the normal public jurisdiction becomes to have several grades and the spreading 
of retrial techniques owing to the integration of various procedural guaranties in normal 
jurisdiction. Another reason can be the spreading of the options either to reject an agreement, or 
to wriggle out on the basis of “softer” legal grounds generated by the establishment of 
constitutional jurisdiction and other ways of review. Time is money, and it is particularly true in 
the event of people who professionally deal with business. Thus, winning a case after several 
years is hardly better than losing a case, and both the former and the latter may bring along 
bankruptcy. Subsequently, to a certain extent, the increase of the role of arbitration may be 
considered “revenge” for making jurisdiction to have more guaranties. And it explains that this 
kind of “private jurisdiction” is available today even if one of the parties is a simple private party 
beside the business of the professional party. 
 
The actual extent of applying arbitration in Western countries is well shown by the data from the 
beginning of the 90‟s, that at that time in the sector of German engineering industry in 80% of all 
the export agreements parties to the agreement stipulated the need for it (Böckstgiegel 1992). 
And in Germany the option to obtain arbitration was liberalised only after that! In Hungary the 
Act on Arbitration of 1994 created one of the most liberal solutions in the world, but this legal 
option was actually applied to a very low extent in the 90‟s. (See the volumes of the periodical 
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Gazdaság és Jog where arbitration awards are commented under a separate column.) 
 
To what extent does the “private” momentum prevail in arbitration, and to what extent the state‟s 
decisive force is present here? This question may be answered if we distinguish between the 
parties‟ role to select the arbitrators and to determine the procedure. 
 
The appointment of the arbitrator is primarily based on an agreement reached between the parties. 
In domestic practice it is usually the parties themselves who select their arbitrator from the list of 
arbitrators of the chamber of commerce and industry, and this list includes names of lawyers, 
university jurists and representatives of other professions. The parties may as well agree in an 
arbitrator from outside this sphere. The arbitrator himself undertakes to perform his task vis-á-vis 
the parties under a civil agreement, and by setting a term in it he may commit himself to make the 
judgement before a defined date (Wallacher 1994:115). 
 
The rules of arbitration procedure are primarily based on the agreement reached between the 
parties, and they may as well regulate as part of their agreement how the procedure shall be 
applied should there be any dispute between them. However, if they do not regulate this 
procedure, then the relevant provisions set forth under the separate law on arbitration or the laws 
on normal litigation shall apply. (Domestic regulation has set forth rules under Act LXXV of 
1994 on arbitration tribunal.) 
 
This “privatisation” of our administration of justice is undoubtedly radically accelerates the 
settlement of legal debates between the parties, but the parties‟ possible further economic and 
other kind of inequalities may prevail to a greater extent in the settlement of the debates. 
Therefore, the former German regulation, for example, set forth that the agreement which has 
been reached by making use of the economic and social position of one of the parties shall 
become null and void. This has, however, “softened” this procedure and made the arbitration 
award contestable in a wider sense, in addition to strict invalidity provisions, and has thus 
questioned its function, subsequently the new regulation has ruled it out (Wolfgang 1997:125). 
Pushing aside public law and state courts is thus realised more completely through more liberal 
regulation. 
 
2.2 Public labour law and “private” labour law 
 
 
In the field of regulating labour relations it is especially apparent that the question of the 
proportion between the public regulation and private determination beyond the state is open. In 
societies where the state organises society‟s life extensively, and usually the features of etatism 
dominate, the regulation of work relations is basically implemented by detailed public regulation, 
tendentiously taking labour contracts out of the sphere of private law. Whereas, if trust in the 
public organisation of society is less typical in a country, there labour contracts, similarly to other 
types of agreements, will be determined basically by private law, and the state will intrude only 
some points upon them. Accordingly, in the Soviet type organisation of society, thus for a long 
time in Hungary too, labour law was exclusively public labour law, and labour relations were 
entirely severed from private law. Under the labour contract the parties had to consider numerous 
obligatory legal stipulations, which regulated the employee/employer relation at all key points on 
a central level (see Czuglerné 1990). 
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After the change of regime in 1989 Hungary also turned to labour law regulation pursuant to the 
market economy of democratic political systems, in the course of which public regulation was 
eliminated at the definitive points of the employee/employer relation, and it was up to either the 
parties to the labour contract to come to an understanding or the collective agreements of 
employers‟ and employees‟ interest representation bodies to cover this point. The actual situation 
in the 90‟s has been that instead of the withdrawn public labour law the “private” labour law of 
collective agreements has been able to gain ground to a limited extent. The reason for that can be 
that the division in the trade unions on the employee‟s side usually does not allow and the 
employer‟s side is not interested in making collective agreements (see D.J. 1998; Kádár 1998). If 
no collective agreement is made at the place of work, or in an entire sector, then the labour 
contract will show the features of a private law agreement, and the economic and other kind of 
inequalities between the parties will shift the possibility to determine the agreement towards the 
employer. What is more, a regulation technique can be observed in current labour law regulation 
that this as a minimum determines numerous things for the employees, and under the collective 
agreement amendments regarding several issues can be made only to the benefit of the 
employees. And this makes employers interested in rather not reaching any collective agreement. 
As a result of that, now, at the turn of the millennium collective agreements have been entered 
into at hardly 30% of the companies, and only one third of them could be extended to entire 
sectors, that is, in not more than 10-12% of all the sectors are there accepted collective 
agreements (see D.J. 1998). Furthermore, these collective agreements refer to almost nothing else 
than wages, and the other issues of labour relations are left to be regulated by the individual 
labour contract. 
 
In fact, out of the three layers of the regulation of labour relations the private law labour contract 
is decisive in today‟s domestic regulation, and alongside the withdrawn public labour law the 
“private” labour law of collective agreements has reached only a rudimentary level of 
development. 
 
On the contrary, in Western European countries the decisive emphasis is placed on private labour 
law, and employers and employees‟ interest representation bodies conclude a bargain on the 
detailed regulation of labour relations for each branch (see Rupp 1998; Sodan 1998). 
 
It should be noted that an influential legal concept has also evolved in the past decades, which 
has attempted to work out “negotiation” labour law beside public law as a model for the other 
fields of law. This is the concept of “reflexive law” elaborated by the German jurists, Günther 
Teubner and Helmut Wilke in the first half of the eighties. This legal concept has taken its social 
theory starting-points from the theory of complex systems, and based on this it asserts that the 
development of society and its individual sectors has reached a stage of complexity by now that 
makes it hopeless to see through and properly regulate relations on the level of central legislation. 
In this situation the statutes of the state centre, while attempting to remedy problems having some 
points in sight, due to the effect in another direction of the situation not seen through will 
generate a lot of problems themselves, and new laws drafted in order to remedy these will 
produce masses of new problems. The direction of solution is seen by Taubner in that the state 
must give up the hopeless fight on the level of statutory regulation, and must entrust each social 
sphere‟s interest representation bodies opposing each other and top association agencies to make 
a deal on the internal regulation of the relevant social sphere. This extended collective agreement 
 95 
law would be amended by the state only through its executive apparatus, on the other hand, the 
procedure of making a deal on collective agreements would be regulated at key points by state 
legislation in order to prevent the stronger party taking advantage of its position, and to establish 
the regulation indeed through the compromise of the relevant parties in the given sphere. In 
addition to the employee/employer relation, through this solution the interest representation 
bodies, the top association agencies of the opposing groups in higher education, health care, mass 
communication would determine regulation, and this would be the “reflexive law” instead of the 
current public statute law (see Teubner 1982; 1986; Teubner/Wilke 1984). 
 
 
2.3 The private party’s decisive force in criminal law 
 
The tendencies clearly identifiable in the criminal law show that simple societies‟ “private” 
criminal law is forced back in the course of development by the law of crimes persecuted by 
public authority, and the criminal law that originally represented the community‟s support of the 
offended party‟s private revenge will change into the law of the state‟s punitive authority (see 
Marton 1993; Zlinszki 1996). By this change the injury and loss of the victim of the crime is 
pushed in the background and replaced by the protection of the entire community to prevent 
future perpetration of crime.  Thus the public prosecutor becomes the central figure of criminal 
law and criminal procedure, and will encounter the person accused of the perpetration and his or 
her lawyer in front of the judge also standing on the side of the state administrating justice. In this 
structure the victim of the crime and his or her particular injury is thrust into the background. 
This process, of course, took place in the legal development of Western European countries at 
different pace, and while in Continental countries through an extensive building up of the public 
prosecutor‟s office and making the clearing up of crimes a state function it was achieved in the 
second half of the 1800‟s, in the English development even at the beginning of the 1900‟s it was 
still the task of the offended party to take steps to clear up the crime, collect proofs and present 
such proofs in court (Günther 1973). Thus the private persecution of minor crimes survived to a 
greater extent in the UK than in the public prosecutor dominated Continental criminal law, but 
during the 20
th
 century the state‟s role to persecute crime became decisive here as well. 
 
 
This long term tendency seems to be changed by the new criminal policy attempt appeared in 
recent years, which intends to restore the reparation of the victim of the crime instead of the 
protection of the state‟s punitive authority and the entire community (from future perpetration) 
(see Seelman 1990). Thus the reparation of the injury of the victim becomes the main aim of 
criminal law, and as a result of that, the punishment of the perpetrator becomes subject to what 
extent he or she undertakes the reparation of the victim‟s injury. (While in the punitive policy 
aimed at the prevention of future perpetration it is not taken account of, and the weight of the act 
committed and the lower or higher degree of the guiltiness of the perpetrator is what really 
counts.) 
 
This “victim orientated” punitive policy entail basic changes in criminal procedural law, and in 
addition to thrusting the public prosecutor‟s central role in the background, the victim and his or 
her lawyer come to the front. For the perpetrator the settlement with the victim regarding 
reparation will influence the entire further criminal procedure, and may as well allow the 
cancellation of any further procedure, or, at least, the perpetrator may get away with much less 
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punishment, on the other hand, failure in this respect will entail more severe punishment 
(Seelman 1990:165). In practice this change makes the bargaining between the lawyers of the 
accused and the offended party (victim) the central part of the criminal procedure, while the 
power of the public prosecutor who represents the state's punitive authority will be subject in the 
criminal procedure to the bargain made between the two lawyers. In Germany the idea was also 
addressed that a central state fund should be raised from fines paid for offences, of which the 
perpetrator who undertakes to provide reparation to the offended party may take out a loan with 
favourable interest because the perpetrator‟s financial status often makes it impossible to reach an 
agreement (see Rixen 1994). 
 
Through this change the criminal action gets very close to the structure of the private action, and 
this change can be described, so to say, as “the privatisation” of criminal law. And if the judge‟s 
passive role in ascertaining the facts of the case contributes to this, as it is more typical even 
today in Anglo-Saxon legal systems compared to Continental legal systems, then the role of the 
lawyer of the victim and the accused will be realised in a more dominating way. 
 
This change set out from the United States but, to a lower extent, shifts in this direction took 
place in European countries too. As of now, it is yet unforeseeable how much this “privatised” 
criminal law remains temporary, or how much it becomes permanent. 
 
 
2.4 The privatisation of the execution of sentences 
 
During the Enlightenment it was gradually acknowledged that application of force by private 
parties, private authorities is prohibited, and it is the exclusive right of the state in society, and the 
state that has the monopoly of legitimate force shall be put under society‟s control. This idea 
became a cornerstone of modern democratic constitutional state, therefore it is interesting to 
examine the changes which have taken place in the execution of sentences, the most exclusive 
territory of the state in recent years. As here in a free constitutional state the strongest sanctions 
may be imposed by legally depriving a person of his or her freedom with the punishment of 
imprisonment, and carrying it out has represented the most exclusive task of the liberal 
constitutional state since the Enlightenment (Flügge 2000: 259-262). In spite of that, since the 
middle of the 1980‟s in the United Sates the privatisation of prisons has begun, and it has been 
followed by the UK and France, also in Germany there are influential law politics groups which 
intend to realise it there too (see Smartt 1995; Maelicke 1999; Lilly 1999; Paulus 2000). 
 
 
Pursuant to the original American idea, based on which the establishment of private prisons 
falling into the category of lower grades of imprisonment requiring less security began as part of 
the general “denationalisation” launched President Reagan, the entrepreneurs running the prisons 
receive financing from the state on a convict and daily basis, and they have to solve the execution 
of imprisonment out of that. The key points of behaviour in prison are determined by law, but 
otherwise it is up to the prison entrepreneurs how they solve the organisation of spending the 
time of imprisonment. By random checks, of course, the state prison supervision attempts to 
control the order in prisons, and in the 90‟s in a prison in South Carolina, for example, the usual 
annual state contract was not extended at the end of the year because it was proved that a part of 
the convicts were kept all the time with their hands and feet shackled (Lilly 1999:78-80). In any 
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case, in 1998 in the US there were already 102 private prisons, and 75 thousand convicts were 
guarded in them, true that the total number of convicts was 1.6 million at the time (Maelicke 
1999). 
 
Following the American example, in the UK they have taken this track since 1988 because 
experience revealed that private entrepreneurs could manage the execution of imprisonment 15-
20% cheaper, and they could still make profit, therefore venture capital could be involved in 
building private prisons (Braum/Varwig/Bader 1999). Being in a difficult situation because of the 
circumstances prevalent in crowded English prisons, but refraining from increasing the state‟s 
role taking the Thatcher cabinet decided then that the problem should be solved through 
operating the newly built prisons by private entrepreneurs. This trend of development has not 
changed in spite of changes in the government ever since, and the current labour party 
government attempts to solve the problems of lack of room through private prisons under the 
prison development program running until 2005 (Lilly 1999; Maelicke 1999). 
 
Also in France steps have been taken in this direction since the 90‟s but here state supervision of 
the operation of prisons has been maintained regarding several points, and only partial 
privatisation can be observed here. In Germany, on the other hand, not even partial privatisation 
has been realised so far, but the law politicians of the CDU and the Greens have entered the 
institutionalisation of private prisons in their programs. True that it indicates the possibilities of 
realisation and restrictions in this country that in the provinces where these parties have taken 
over the government and would have the legal possibility to do it, have not begun 
implementation. Anyway, in Germany the public opinion is concerned because of the wide 
authority of the constitutional court about the possibility of approving the legal option of 
applying private prisons and thus legitimate private force (Flügge 2000:259). Pursuant to this 
kind of opinion, the imprisonment of citizens and the execution of coercive measures may not be 
in the hands of private entrepreneurs, and only the state controlled by the community is entitled to 
do that. 
 
To sum it up, it can be said that as regards the privatisation of the execution of sentences the 
situation is quite open these days, and while in most of the countries the state still has monopoly 
in this field, numerous major countries are moving with long steps towards privatisation. 
 
* 
 
 
The situation of the state‟s power to determine law is more colourful than what is expressed by 
the traditional views of legal theory on the level of legal concepts. Fundamental tendencies, 
however, point at the state‟s increasing determining role at key points of the legal process when 
approaching the level of development of complex societies, but as it has been shown in this 
analysis, at several points the starting of essential processes in the opposite direction can be 
observed too. Well founded legal theory statements cannot be made unless having detailed 
information on the changes that take place inside each branches of law. The intention of this short 
study, in addition to give a brief examination of the subject brought up, is to make public opinion 
in jurisprudence aware of this direction of approach to legal theory examination. 
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